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This dissertation is guided by three central questions: Why did the Abu Ghraib 
photographs fail to generate widespread opposition to the Iraq War among U.S. citizens? 
How did U.S. political leaders, news media, and entertainment media rhetorically manage 
the impact of the violence at Abu Ghraib? Finally, what can the tortures at Abu Ghraib 
tell us about commitment to national identity and justifications for violence? I argue that 
the primary rhetorical, ideological work of national violence against a foreign other is to 
create and protect national identification that deflects potential critique of national policy 
and discourages alternative allegiances (e.g., those of race and class). In support of this 
argument, I analyze four sets of texts surrounding the scandal. First, I analyze the Abu 
Ghraib photographs. These photographs, revealing torture of Iraqi detainees by U.S. 
troops, posed a serious challenge to American national identity and the prevailing 
rationale for war: namely, that the U.S. would liberate Iraqis from a torturous dictator and 
the threat of terrorism. The remaining types of discourse, then, can be seen as rhetorical 
attempts at damage control, containing and softening the edges of the visual records of 
 viii
violence against an enemy Other. For example, the second set of discourses I examine 
contains the legal memoranda outlining U.S. “coercive interrogation practices” dating 
back to September 2001. I compare these documents to the political speeches made by 
public officials during the 2004 presidential campaign. These texts, I argue, provide 
insight into the Abu Ghraib scandal’s political context and illustrate how the scandal was 
ultimately managed by the Bush administration as a matter of private authority and 
prerogative rather than public accountability. Third, I explore mainstream media reports 
concerning Abu Ghraib in order to come to a better understanding of how violence is 
framed for public consumption. And finally, I analyze depictions of the torture within the 
popular television series 24. Because 24’s plotline deals with issues of torture and 
terrorist threat, I argue that it can help us better understand both the social climate in 
which the Abu Ghraib scandal emerged and our current climate in which torture is still 
very much an issue.  
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Introduction: Tortured Identity: Nationalism, Violence, and the 
Rhetorical Discourses of Abu Ghraib 
A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can 
shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the 
foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel 
of American resolve. (Bush, “Statement by the President” par. 3) 
The ultimate reason I joined [the U.S. Army] was to be a part of the effort to 
make the country a safer place. I wanted to help protect our country so that this 
people that wanted to come in and attack us wouldn’t have that opportunity again. 
(Specialist Megan Ambuhl)1 
In 2004, Americans learned that our soldiers don’t always come with starched 
uniforms, shining medals, indubitable intentions, and stories of bravery, but that 
sometimes they come with zip-ties, dark hoods, leashes, cruel disregard for humanity, 
and toothy smiles for the camera. Accounts and photographs documenting the torture of 
Iraqi detainees by U.S. military personnel went public on April 28, 2004. These 
revelations carried with them the possibility for renewed public controversy over the war 
in Iraq, but this potential remained latent. The war continued apace, and the Bush 
administration continued to include various kinds of prisoner abuse in its policy outlining 
acceptable interrogation tactics. The American people went back to their daily lives. 
In this dissertation, I explore why and how so little public questioning occurred 
after the initial shock of the Abu Ghraib torture photographs. Why was there no large-
scale public outcry against torture? How did the Bush administration explain Abu Ghraib 
in such a way that the incidents never became a major issue during his run for reelection? 
Where were the media? With hundreds of incriminating photographs being continually 
leaked to the press, did mainstream media outlets fail to question U.S. motives and 
                                                 
1 Specialist Megan Ambuhl was a member of the 372nd Military Police Company and was involved in the 
maltreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. 
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methods in Iraq? The answers to these questions, I believe, lie in the rhetorical 
discourses—in visual images, political rhetoric, news media, and popular culture—that 
framed public perception of these events in ways that made torture seem reasonable, if 
not forgivable. This rhetoric naturalizing torture and justifying violence against a terrorist 
enemy other rests on common-sense assumptions about race, national identity, and 
violence. As Benedict Anderson, Kenneth Burke, Robert Ivie, and others have all pointed 
out, collective self-definition occurs against Others, which often results in the 
objectification and dehumanization of these Others and warrants violence against them. 
In this way, I argue, violence becomes constitutive of national identity. Of course, U.S. 
citizens define themselves in terms of democratic values, not torture. However, the 
process of dehumanizing and objectifying one’s enemies makes violence toward them 
constitutive of a “democratic” subjectivity in contrast to the barbarism of Others. In this 
way, torture may be reconciled with the identity of democratic citizen. 
My research in this dissertation is guided by three central questions: Why did the 
Abu Ghraib photographs fail to generate widespread opposition to the Iraq War among 
U.S. citizens? How did U.S. political leaders, members of the mainstream press, and the 
American public at large manage the violence at Abu Ghraib rhetorically?  And, what can 
popular and political responses to news of the tortures at Abu Ghraib tell us about 
commitment to national identity and justifications for violence? I argue that the primary 
rhetorical, ideological work of national violence against a foreign other is to create and 
protect national identification that deflects critique and discourages alternative allegiance 
(e.g., those of race and class). In order to get a more complete understanding of how Abu 
Ghraib came to be known to the American public and how our understandings of Abu 
Ghraib were ultimately shaped by our understandings of national identity and violence, in 
the following chapters I analyze four sets of texts surrounding the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
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First, I analyze the photographs of the incidents at Abu Ghraib because these photographs 
introduced the problem of torture to the American public in 2004. This set of texts differs 
from all others analyzed in this project because the Abu Ghraib photographs posed the 
initial challenge to American national identity and the prevailing rationale for war: that 
the U.S. would liberate Iraqis from a torturous dictator and the threat of terrorism. The 
remaining types of discourse, then, can be seen as rhetorical attempts at damage control, 
containing and softening the edges of the visual records of violence against an enemy 
Other. For example, the second set of discourses I examine contains the legal memoranda 
outlining U.S. “coercive interrogation practices” dating back to September 2001. I 
compare these documents to the public political speeches made by public officials during 
the 2004 presidential campaign. These texts, I argue, provide insight into the Abu Ghraib 
scandal’s political context and show how the scandal was ultimately managed by the 
Bush administration as a matter of private authority and prerogative rather than public 
accountability. Third, I explore reports concerning Abu Ghraib in the mainstream press in 
order to come to a better understanding of how violence is framed for public 
consumption. And finally, I analyze depictions of the torture in popular culture, focusing 
specifically on the television series 24. Because 24’s plotline deals with issues of torture 
and terrorist threat, I argue that it can help us better understand both the social climate in 
which the Abu Ghraib incidents emerged and our current climate in which torture is still 
very much an issue. Taken together, the rhetorical texts that worked to contain the Abu 
Ghraib photographs managed to initially distance the American people from the horrors 
of Abu Ghraib and ultimately justify torturous acts in such a way as to make their 
practice seem forgivable, if not acceptable. Although the process was not seamless or 
uncontested, the rhetorical work on multiple levels of society neutralized the threat of the 
torture revelations to American national identity and public support of the Iraq war. 
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Ironically, democratic national belonging, in times of war, depends on covert practices 
that are anything but democratic. Violence structures a version of national identity in 
which democracy and torture can co-exist. 
STRUCTURING NATIONAL BELONGING 
The consensus among scholars of the nation is that the nation-state, and its 
attendant ideology (nationalism), is a modern invention used to delineate territory and 
separate people (Anderson; Barker 64; Edensor; Gellner). Nations are complicated by the 
ways in which understood national conceptions are used to maintain and control political 
and social power and by the ways in which national citizens identify with these national 
conceptions. I understand nationalism, as Chris Barker does, both in terms of its cultural 
power to unite through common practice and in terms of its political function of state 
legitimacy maintenance and control. Nations are cultural in that citizens of the nation live 
national belonging through practices of everyday national life (Edensor; Billig). Because 
I recognize a nation’s cultural component, my analysis considers the ways in which 
national identity often serves as an organic source of pride and belonging for citizens who 
adhere to it. Nations are political in that ruling classes often maintain legitimacy and 
loyalty from national citizens in national terms. In recognizing a nation as a political 
entity, I recognize that political, or official, nationalism often contains conservative, 
reactionary policies that conceal the political motivations of a nation’s governing 
institutions (Anderson 110; Hobsbawm; Geertz; Gellner; Giddens; Nairn). Most 
importantly, however, I argue that the work that national citizens and political leaders 
must do in order to create and maintain national identity is largely rhetorical (see also 
Stuckey). Through rhetorical appeals to national identity, nations maintain themselves 
with language, making studies of national identity critically important for rhetorical 
scholars. 
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RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND NATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Rhetorical theory can help scholars understand how national identity works. 
When one discusses the concept of national identity and the processes through which 
common understandings of that identity are maintained and reinforced, one must 
ultimately consider the power and influence of ideology. My understanding of ideology is 
greatly influenced by the work of ideology critic John Thompson. For Thompson, 
ideology is “meaning in the service of power” and, thus, requires the critic to investigate 
the ways in which meanings are constructed by symbolic forms and evaluate the social 
contexts within which these forms are used (7). Ideology is a symbolic tool by which 
relations of power and domination are legitimized, rationalized, and reinforced 
(Thompson 7; Eagleton). A focus on power and domination is particularly important for 
this project because of my concern with the relationship between the legitimization of 
power and the legitimization of violence.  
Inevitably, members of any society make sense of their world ideologically, yet 
their reactions to circumstance are not all prescribed in advance. Antonio Gramsci’s 
contribution to theories of rhetoric and ideology is the idea that people and cultural 
groups struggle over the interpretive frames of everyday life in the process he identifies 
as hegemony. Often, this process encourages some members of society to consent to the 
existing social relations and frames of interpretation. Certain ideological constructs that 
determine the potential ways in which members of society come to understand societal 
relationships are created and perpetuated by the dominant class within that society. 
However, these constructs are neither fixed nor stable. Those whose interests are not 
being served by ideological constructs continually challenge power systems. Despite the 
prominence of ideological challenges, however, the social system remains essentially 
stable in the extent to which dominant ideology embraces contesting ideas and co-opts 
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them, making them a part of the very constructs they contest. Hegemony, then, is the 
dynamic process whereby dominant ideologies and the challenges to them are continually 
negotiated. 
Like theorists of the nation, rhetorical scholars have often been concerned with 
the ways in which ideological messages circulate in institutions, including the mass 
media (see Hall; Kumar; Shah and Thorton). However, very few have taken up the 
inquiry into the rhetorico-ideological workings of nationalism (for exceptions, see 
McGee “The People”; Charland). In the present work, I explore how dominant 
ideological constructions of the nation and national identity allow members of a national 
community to embody certain national ideals, while simultaneously distancing 
themselves from others. National identification is the product of cultural work that 
legitimates the activities of the state.  In this light, photographic evidence of the events at 
Abu Ghraib had the potential to challenge dominant ideological assumptions about 
American character and America’s role in the War on Terror. Subsequent political and 
mass mediated discourses, however, naturalized torture, partially through definitions of 
the enemy as a sinister and irrational threat. This characterization inevitably has racial 
dimensions. 
RACE, IDENTITY, AND NATIONAL BELONGING 
Racial diversity and the racial divide that occurs both among and within national 
constructions is a complicated and problematic topic for traditional scholars of the nation. 
One common assumption among nationalism scholars in regard to race is that, in order 
for members of a national community to have a sense of national belonging, members 
define themselves, to some degree, by what they are not, members of different “other” 
national communities (Hobsbawm; Anderson; Edensor). However, scholars of the nation 
and nationalism also recognize that dominant assumptions that determine what makes 
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“us” different from “them” are not equally accessible to or representative of all members 
of a racially diverse nation. Anthony Marx argues that while national sentiments often 
promote feelings of inclusion, nations, in reality, have “codified or encouraged 
nationalism selectively, demarcating by specified categories who is included and who is 
excluded” (103). This idea that nations exclude members of their own national 
communities is a common site of inquiry for scholars primarily concerned with how 
racial categories intersect with national ones. As Paul Spickard explains, one of the most 
prolific myths about the modern nation-state promotes the ideal that  “each political state 
naturally and ideally controls one people, race, or ethnic group, that ethnicity and national 
identity naturally reinforce one another” (8-9). National governments, then, often have 
the difficult task of attempting to forge political unity out of several disparate peoples. 
Contemporary critical race scholars have argued that race, like nation, is a cultural 
construct (Marx; Spickard 11-13; Barker 61-62; Gilroy; hooks; Sollors).2 For scholars 
concerned with the relationship between race and nation, racial divisions mark social 
divisions within nations as well as among them (Spickard; Barker). Times of social crisis, 
like the September 11 attacks in the United States, can spur significant rhetorical shifts in 
nation-shaping and racial formation. As Sheila Croucher explains, in the wake of 
September 11 public invocations of the strength and superiority of the American nation 
provided a rallying cry for the Bush administration’s war against a terrorist enemy other, 
while nationalist rhetoric simultaneously attempted to minimize awareness of racial 
problems within U.S. national borders. Thus, attempts of national governing institutions 
to portray national citizens as a cohesive group often employ ideological assumptions that 
                                                 
2 A central debate in literature concerned with racial construction revolves around whether the term race is 
appropriate. If one accepts national identity as being created, in part, through participation in national 
practices, the term ethnicity would seem one fitting to discuss the ways in which people of a nation come to 
identify themselves with national communities. However, the term ethnicity is problematic in that within 
discussions of ethnicity, questions of power and racism often go unaddressed (Barker). Therefore, for the 
purposes of this project I employ the term race (for similar usage see hooks; Gilroy; and Barker 63). 
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minimize the social and economic problems faced by different racial groups within 
nation-states. Importantly, and ironically, ideological assumptions that minimize the 
differences among “us” as we are pitted against “them” are often the same assumptions 
that solidify and justify “our” violence over “theirs.” 
I assume that race and racism are central to American justifications for violence. 
In particular, I examine whether (and to what extent) the categorization of violent actors, 
terrorist and state, is influenced by the complicated ways in which American national 
citizens work rhetorically to negotiate dominant understandings of national identity that 
simultaneously distance American citizens from other national citizens and promote the 
American nation as a cohesive, unified space. 
SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS BEHIND NATIONAL SENTIMENT 
I am concerned with the ways in which appeals to national identity work 
rhetorically. I assume that dominant rhetorical assumptions are inextricably tied to power. 
And, in recognizing that dominant rhetorical assumptions are tied to power, I recognize 
the nation and the state (a nation’s governing body made up of those who can 
legitimately command the use of force) as politically and economically motivated. The 
nationalism literature is saturated with inquiry into the political nature of nation states 
(Anderson; Edensor; Gellner; Hobsbawm). Within this literature, two dominant themes 
emerge in regard to the political (and economic) motivations of national constructs. 
When the nation is considered a political entity, nationalism has two important functions: 
to convince national citizens that they have economic power through individual 
consumption (see Edensor; Foster) and to convince national citizens to support the nation 
in times of national (and international) crisis (see Anderson; Hobsbawm; Cherwitz and 
Zagacki; Dow). For my purposes, the latter concern is of particular importance.  In the 
aftermath of September 11, America’s role as a global economic and political superpower 
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was called into question. Since then, the Bush administration has worked tirelessly to 
convince American citizens that their nation is under threat. It is this perceived threat that 
warrants the use of violence on the part of a “democratic” nation and its military forces.   
NATIONAL IDENTITY, VIOLENCE, AND ABU GHRAIB 
News of the torture at Abu Ghraib occurred in political, economic, and mass 
mediated contexts. In April 2004, the United States had been in Iraq just over one year. 
President George W. Bush, whose Presidency had been defined by his strong response to 
the attacks on September 11 and his promises to protect the American people from the 
dangers of terrorist threat, was up for reelection. Although the President was actively on 
the campaign trail in April of 2004, he did not publicly address the scandal until two days 
after the photographs were released to the public. He insisted that the actions featured in 
the photographs did not represent American troops or American people; he assured the 
American public that the incidents would be investigated, and that the U.S. military 
personnel involved would be brought to justice (see Bush, “Welcome” par. 20). That 
same day, the U.S. military charged six low-ranking soldiers with violence against Iraqi 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib. A seventh soldier, Private Lynndie England, was charged days 
later.  
Just a few short weeks after the Abu Ghraib photographs first hit the press, 
investigative reporters uncovered legal memoranda authored by President Bush, top 
members of the Bush legal team, and members of the Bush cabinet that authorized and 
recommended the use of “coercive interrogation” on enemy combatants and terrorists 
suspects, methods that had striking similarity to the tactics of pain and humiliation 
featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs.  Despite this direct connection between the Bush 
administration and Iraqi prisoner abuse, Abu Ghraib never became a major issue 
challenging Bush’s campaign or the legitimacy of the war in Iraq. In November 2004, 
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President Bush was reelected and, to date, the original seven soldiers charged in the Abu 
Ghraib incidents remain the only persons held to any account for the violent actions that 
took place in the prison. It is against this social and political backdrop that I examine the 
rhetorical discourses that ultimately framed public perception of the torture at Abu 
Ghraib.  
Images of Torture 
The Abu Ghraib photographs are at the heart of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. 
Therefore, in my first case-study chapter, I examine the importance of the photographic 
images of Abu Ghraib. In particular, I examine the ways in which the Abu Ghraib 
photographs can be considered rhetorical interventions into public discourses about 
American national identity, terrorist threat and the state-sanctioned violence of war. 
Drawing on the visual rhetoric literature and on Michael Calvin McGee’s work on 
ideographs, I provide an analysis of the Abu Ghraib photographs alongside an analysis of 
the ways in which these photographs have been re-appropriated in forms of resistance.  
Politics, Torture and the Interpretation of Law 
The second case-study chapter examines the political discourse surrounding Abu 
Ghraib. In particular, I compare the so-called torture memos (which began circulating 
among top Bush officials as early as 2001) to public political statements about Abu 
Ghraib made during the 2004 Presidential campaign and consider the ways in which 
these two types of political discourse define torture in terms of American national 
identity.  
Torture News: The Framing of Violence at Abu Ghraib 
Because I am interested in how the American public learned about and was 
encouraged to understand the violent actions at Abu Ghraib, the mainstream mass media 
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are important sites for textual analysis. In the third case-study chapter of this project, I 
examine mainstream media coverage of the incidents at Abu Ghraib beginning April 28, 
2004 (the day that CBS first broke the story of Abu Ghraib) through December 2, 2004 
(one month after President Bush was reelected). Texts for analysis include national 
newspapers, national newsmagazines, and nationally broadcast television networks. 
Using Todd Gitlin’s conception of media framing, I examine what I have identified as the 
three most prominent themes in the media coverage of Abu Ghraib: the nature of 
violence, the victims of violence, and the perpetrators of violence.  
Popular Torture: 24 
In my final case study, I examine how the popular culture circulates images, 
explanations, and justifications for U.S. torture techniques. In particular, I analyze three 
of the six complete seasons of 24. The seasons I have chosen for analysis are Season 2 
(the first full season produced after the September 11 attacks), Season 4 (the first full 
season produced after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal), and Season 6 (the most recently 
produced full season). Guided by literature concerned with the role of dominant ideology 
in popular culture, I explore how dominant messages about violence within the reality of 
24 explain and justify torture as a reasonable means of protecting the American public 
without asking viewers to question their roles as democratic citizens.  
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Chapter 1: Snapshots of Torture: The Abu Ghraib Photographs as 
Icons of Imperial Dominance and Symbols of Invisible Violence Against 
Women  
If there wasn’t [sic] no photographs, there would be no Abu Ghraib. There’d of 
[sic] been no investigation. It’d have been, ‘Oh, okay. Whatever. Everybody go 
home.’ (Sergeant Javal Davis)3 
That we are not totally transformed, that we can turn away, turn the page, switch 
the channel, does not impugn the ethical value of an assault by images. It is not a 
defect that we are not seared, that we do not suffer enough, when we see these 
images. Neither is the photograph supposed to repair our ignorance about the 
history and causes of the suffering it picks out and frames. Such images cannot be 
more than an invitation to pay attention, to reflect, to learn, to examine the 
rationalizations for mass suffering offered by established powers. (Susan Sontag 
116-117) 
On April 28, 2004, photographs depicting the torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. 
military personnel at Abu Ghraib aired in a story documenting the scandal on CBS’s 60 
Minutes II. In a postscript, host Dan Rather explained that the network had chosen to sit 
on the story for several weeks, honoring an appeal from the U.S. Defense Department to 
delay broadcast due to tension in Iraq (“Court Martial” 8). CBS, credited with scooping 
the story, came forward with the broadcast only when other journalists began to gain 
access to the photographs (“Court Martial” 8). Soon after CBS aired its story, the Abu 
Ghraib photographs flooded Internet sites, littered the front pages of newspapers, and 
dominated television broadcasts around the globe. Visual documentation of the Abu 
Ghraib tortures had become readily available for people around the world to see. 
The public visibility of the Abu Ghraib scandal and the visual nature of violence 
captured on film explain the impact, noted in the epigraph by Sergeant Javal Davis, of the 
Abu Ghraib photographs. Although CBS broke the story of Abu Ghraib when the 
                                                 
3 Sergeant Javal Davis was a member of the 372nd Military Police Company. He was involved in, and 
eventually charged with, the maltreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. 
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network decided to air the photographs in April of 2004, the violent actions caught on 
camera had begun much earlier. In May 2003, Amnesty International held a press 
conference in London, claiming that U.S. and British troops were mistreating Iraqi 
detainees (Lacey). Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, an 
organization whose access to military prisons depends on discretion, sent several reports 
to the Bush administration in the summer of 2003 urging an investigation into the 
treatment of Iraqi prisoners (Barrett). However, it was not until January 2004, when 
Specialist Joseph Darby presented military investigators with a disc containing the torture 
photographs, that the U.S. military began its internal investigation of the situation. An 
assigned military investigator, Major General Antonio Taguba, completed his report on 
events at the Abu Ghraib prison in February 2004, but the U.S. military began making 
criminal charges only after the pictures were exposed to the general public two months 
later. Two days after CBS’s April broadcast, the military charged six U.S. soldiers for 
their involvement in torture. When one considers this timeline surrounding the public 
release of the Abu Ghraib photographs, one cannot help but contemplate Sergeant 
Davis’s statement quoted above as it relates to the American public: Without the 
photographs, would there have been any public attention paid to Abu Ghraib?  
Indeed, since the photographs first broke into American national consciousness, 
they have become a form of visual shorthand representing a complicated array of moral 
and legal battles since waged in the name of national security. Soon after the initial Abu 
Ghraib photographs began to circulate, U.S. government officials viewed photographs 
and video clips that were never officially released to mainstream media (Gilmore par. 8). 
The Department of Defense justified its decision to prevent the release of these additional 
photographs by claiming that publication would endanger U.S. troops overseas (Gilmore 
par. 2). Mainstream media outlets in the United States have also faced legal pressure to 
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suppress availability of the Abu Ghraib photographs.4 Despite attempts by U.S. officials 
to constrain the circulation of the Abu Ghraib photographs, however, it would be fair to 
estimate that many of these images were widely circulated across multiple publics and 
demographics; the range of that circulation is impossible to estimate. In addition, re-
appropriation of the Abu Ghraib photographs has also become a common strategy for 
antiwar protestors in the U.S. and abroad (Hesford 31). For example, the International 
Center for Photography in New York ran a large exhibit, entitled Inconvenient Evidence: 
Iraqi Prison Photographs from Abu Ghraib, which featured prints of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs and images of citizens in the Middle East reacting to them (Hesford 31). 
Political cartoonists such as Mike Luckovich have also published cartoons that criticize 
American policy in Iraq, many of which feature recreated images of Abu Ghraib. 
However, although the Abu Ghraib torture photographs seem to have saturated American 
national culture in many ways, to some observers, it seems strange that so much visual 
evidence generated so little fire by way of public response. 
In this chapter I examine the ways in which the Abu Ghraib photographs can be 
considered rhetorical interventions into public discourses about terrorist threat and the 
state-sanctioned violence of war. In particular, I explore the complex constitutive 
rhetorical functions of these images by considering the extent to which they can help win 
or undermine public alignment with national identity and adherence to the politics of war. 
Thus, in this chapter, I am asking, “Do these photographs shape public perceptions of 
U.S. interrogation practices and/or enable opposition to the war in Iraq? If so, how? And, 
what roles do visual images play in shaping public perceptions of the relationship 
between national identity and violence?” There are a number of elements of the rhetorical 
                                                 
4 I personally contacted CBS in an attempt to purchase a tape of its April 28, 2004 broadcast of 60 Minutes 
II. A representative for CBS informed me that due to pending legal matters, CBS could no longer distribute 
copies of the broadcast. However, CBS did willingly send me transcripts of the broadcast. The legal 
matters, it seems, extend only to the images. 
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situation that we must know before we can answer these questions. How and why were 
the photographs taken? Who comprised the intended audiences for various sources? Were 
some photographs featured more than others in the mainstream press, in resistance 
movements? How do these photographs work rhetorically for their original audiences, in 
mainstream media coverage, and in protest?  Answers to these questions are complicated 
by the fact that many of these photographs were circulated and re-circulated among 
several audiences for multiple purposes, and it is unlikely that we can determine any 
single meaning for them.  
Starting with an examination of the photographs aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes II, I 
argue that the Abu Ghraib photographs can be divided into two categories, iconic and 
veiled, and that these two categories can each be divided into two subcategories, agent 
absent and agent present. The first category, iconic, contains those photographs that were 
widely circulated and that became widely recognizable around the globe. The second 
category, veiled, contains photographs that did not appear in the mainstream press 
(although, as subsequent chapters will show, they were often mentioned). Because I am 
concerned with the ways in which these photographs not only depict violent actions, but 
also represent perpetrators and victims of violence, I have divided both categories 
according to whether or not a perpetrator of violence, or agent, is present in the 
photograph. I provide an analysis of these photographs, both iconic and veiled, alongside 
an analysis of the ways in which these photographs have been re-appropriated in forms of 
resistance. The fact that some of the Abu Ghraib photographs were widely circulated in 
the mainstream press and used as a form of resistance while others were kept from public 
view by the U.S. government and, therefore, remain essentially unseen is of vital 
importance.  The practices of torture depend for their legitimacy on secrecy, and the fact 
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that some photographs came into public attention while others were veiled means that 
some forms of violence, particularly violence against women, remain unproblematized. 
PHOTOGRAPHS AS IDEOGRAPHS 
Because I am interested in the rhetorical and ideological functions of the Abu 
Ghraib photographs, I treat them as visual ideographs. Michael Calvin McGee defines an 
“ideograph” as a culture-bound, high-order abstraction that represents a “collective 
commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (“The 
Ideograph” 463). For McGee, an ideograph is comprised of ordinary language, warrants 
the use of power, and guides behaviors and beliefs (“The Ideograph” 462-463). Although 
McGee limited his understanding of ideographs to language, his theory has since been 
expanded to include images. Janis Edwards and Carol Winkler argue that, just like 
ideographic language, “the image has become a discourse fragment that multiple publics 
appropriate for diverse purposes” (495). In their examination of Iwo Jima images in 
political cartoons, Edwards and Winkler make the case for visual ideographs, arguing that 
parodies of the Iwo Jima image work because the image “represents an essence of 
cultural beliefs and ideals at a high level of abstraction” (488).5 Dana Cloud argues that 
“photographs and other images can enact ideographs visually and index, or point to, the 
verbal slogans capturing society’s great abstractions” (“To Veil” 288). According to 
Cloud, photographs not only visually enact the ideographic abstractions that permeate a 
society, but they also “render the abstraction of the ideograph concrete” (“To Veil” 289). 
Cloud’s analysis shows how dominant portrayals of the enemy during war “participate in 
justifications for the war that belie the actual motives for the war” (“To Veil” 287). 
Dominant depictions of the Afghan people, such as those appearing in Time, Cloud 
                                                 
5 Rosenthal’s photograph, taken in Iwo Jima in 1945, depicts five Marines and a Navy corpsman raising a 
large American flag. The picture inspired the design for the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial. 
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argues, operate ideographically by “summing up and exhorting conformity to a sense of 
American-ness established through the negation of the self-governing humanity of the 
Other,” ultimately warranting “the use of force in Afghanistan on allegedly humanitarian 
grounds” (“To Veil” 287). The visual ideograph, then, is an image that captures and 
visually represents a public’s collective understanding of the world. In addition, 
evaluating visual images in terms of visual ideographs can help critics understand the role 
of images in creating, perpetuating, and even resisting dominant ideographic abstractions 
within American national culture. 
Iconic photography  
In order to function as a visual ideograph, an image does not need to be widely 
circulated or highly recognizable (though many visual ideographs often are). The 
photographs at Abu Ghraib, particularly those that became widely circulated, came to 
exemplify the scandal and came to be the way through which multiple viewing publics 
understood it. Therefore, this chapter will draw from the visual rhetoric literature and 
utilize specifically the work of Robert Hariman and John L. Lucaites concerned with the 
function of what they have termed iconic photographs. Lucaites and Hariman argue that 
iconic photographs are 
photographic images produced in print, electronic, or digital media that are (1) 
recognized by everyone within a public culture, (2) understood to be 
representations of historically significant events, (3) objects of strong emotional 
identification or response, and (4) regularly reproduced or copied across a range 
of media, genres, and topics. (Lucaites and Hariman, “Visual Rhetoric” 37) 
Hariman and Lucaites are interested in the role that iconic photographs play in American 
public and political life, arguing that these types of photographs not only reflect the 
dominant ideologies and understandings surrounding specific events, but that they also 
influence political behavior and identity (Lucaites and Hariman “Visual Rhetoric” 37-
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38). For Hariman and Lucaites, whose work has focused on images from the Vietnam 
War and World War II, photographic images become iconic when they provide 
resolutions to the tensions of citizenship and belonging in modern democratic culture 
(Hariman and Lucaites “Performing Civic Identity” 368). Because iconic images are 
widely disseminated, they have the potential to provide the public with shared 
experience. This feeling of shared experience, in turn, allows members of the public to 
see themselves as part of a unified collective (Hariman and Lucaites, “Performing Civic 
Identity” 365). Additionally, some visual texts help members of the public connect to and 
manage the meaning of complicated events; these are likely to become iconic:  
One reason images become iconic is that they coordinate a number of different 
patterns of identification within the social life of the audience, each of which 
would suffice to direct audience response, but which together provide a public 
audience with sufficient means to comprehend potentially unmanageable events. 
(Hariman and Lucaites, “Performing Civic Identity” 367) 
Like the visual ideograph, the iconic image captures and solidifies a public’s dominant 
understanding of world events. Like the visual ideograph, the iconic image has the 
potential to shape political identity and motivate political action and gains this potential 
through the creation of a shared identity in its audiences. Unlike the visual ideograph, the 
iconic image is a necessarily widespread and highly recognizable image, creating this 
shared sense of identity and potentially sparking response within larger publics. Because 
many of the Abu Ghraib photographs graced the front pages of newspapers around the 
globe, they can rightly be considered iconic. However, unlike the photographs produced 
for mass distribution by members of the press, the photographs at Abu Ghraib were not 
originally intended for public audiences, and indeed many never significantly surfaced in 
the mainstream press. Understanding photographs both in terms of iconic images as well 
as visual ideographs is important because some images did not obtain iconic status. 
Silences around some of the images may point to deep-seated challenges these 
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photographs could potentially pose to dominant understandings of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal.  
Theorizing the Photographs at Abu Ghraib 
Scholars have already begun to examine the rhetorical function of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs and, in doing so, have recognized the ability of these photos to create 
collective identity and induce collective acts of conformity and resistance (Tester). For 
example, Haim Bresheeth argues that the Abu Ghraib photographs function much like 
those produced by photojournalists for media outlets in that they have a way of shaping 
public understanding of difficult, complicated events (62). In fact, Bresheeth argues that 
the Abu Ghraib torture was disturbing for public audiences, in part, because photographs 
documenting that torture exist. He explains, “The new ingredient was not the torture itself 
but that pictures existed of the procedures – hundreds and maybe thousands of them” 
(65). The horror of the violence at Abu Ghraib for public audiences, then, begins with 
performance of violent actions and ends with the circulation, or sharing, of that violence:  
This wide incidence of recording Iraqi prisoners being humiliated and tortured by 
the use of dogs, electricity, nudity and pornography has been an ingredient 
missing from all other cases discussed before. New digital technology enabled the 
US personnel involved in torture to send images to friends and family, seemingly 
unaware that there might be something wrong with this. (Bresheeth 65) 
This initial circulation of the Abu Ghraib photographs among members of their intended 
audience is a set of actions that Dora Apel compares to the circulation of lynching 
postcards by white racists in the American South in the 1950s and 1960s. Apel argues 
that the documentation of the Abu Ghraib tortures by U.S. military personnel, much like 
the documentation of lynching by lynch mobs, occurred because the perpetrators of 
violence understood the recorded acts of violence to be sanctioned by the larger 
American national community. She argues that this belief, in both cases, shows “that the 
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exercise of such sadism and humiliation is a fundamentally political act. The viewer is 
meant to identify with the proud torturers in the context of the defense of a political and 
cultural hierarchy” (Apel 89). So while the sense of collective identity invoked by 
lynching postcards in the American South helped sanction violence against Black 
Americans by reinforcing a culture that protected violent white perpetrators from 
prosecution, similar assumptions about national identity and violence during America’s 
current War on Terror help the American people justify the actions at Abu Ghraib. Apel 
explains,  
After 9/11, ‘democracy’ became code for America, and defending democracy 
meant arresting and imprisoning thousands of Middle Easterners in the United 
States, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, where the sense of 
community sanction was fundamental to the torture and atrocities. The 
community in question was most immediately the military and more broadly the 
white, conservative, Christian culture represented by the regime of George W. 
Bush, the commander-in-chief, and reinforced by his cabinet and their chains of 
command. (90)  
Similarly, Nicholas Mirzoeff argues that the initial dissemination of the photographs 
among their intended audience (members of the U.S. military and their families) 
exemplifies a power dynamic that determines who has the authorization to see the 
violence of war and determines how that violence is portrayed (24). Basing his argument 
largely on the work of Foucault, who argues that torture is no longer public spectacle in 
an age of penal justice (see Foucault), Mirzoeff argues,  
For all the mass proliferation of images, the visuality of war remains profoundly 
undemocratic. The embedded journalists showed what was permitted to be shown, 
so that, for example, of the twenty thousand air raids on Iraq, journalists 
witnessed about one hundred. Here we can begin to see why Abu Ghraib has 
remained invisible. For even though the photographs that were made public were 
shocking enough, it is known that there are others, including video, that involved 
rape and even death and that were shown only to members of Congress. (23) 
As Mirzoeff rightly points out, the Abu Ghraib photographs and their eventual exposure 
to a public audience are complicated by politics and power that determine the ways in 
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which violence is exposed and eventually understood by a mass audience. Like Apel, 
Mirzoeff recognizes state silence surrounding Abu Ghraib as community acceptance of 
the violence represented in the photographs. He argues,  
The public interpellation of the racialized subject by the trophies of lynching has 
been replaced by the invisible visibility of a police culture that claims that there is 
nothing to see while circulating its pixilated documents of imperial hierarchy 
around the Internet. (30)  
Issues of power, identity, and violence complicate the Abu Ghraib photographs. Although 
I agree with scholars like Mirzoeff that issues of power are important when considering 
who has the authorization to see violence, the following analysis is also driven by an 
understanding that power is equally involved in who has the privilege of turning away 
from such violence. These processes, the seeing and the turning away, point to the 
rhetorical functions of images of torture.  
RHETORICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ABU GHRAIB PHOTOGRAPHS 
In the following analysis, I describe the rhetorical work of the photographs for 
those who took them, for the media, for the public at large, for those who chose to use the 
images in protest, and for those who tried their hardest to make the photographs go away. 
An article entitled “The Gray Zone” by Seymour Hersh6 reports that knowledge and 
sanctions for the actions at Abu Ghraib led up the chain of command to the Pentagon. 
While this knowledge of and motivation behind the Abu Ghraib tortures will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 2, understanding reported motivations for the actions and the 
photographs at Abu Ghraib provides a starting point for analyzing the photographs 
themselves. According to Hersh’s military informants, a secret operation, “Copper 
Green,” was utilized by U.S. military personnel in charge of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
                                                 
6 Seymour Hersh is credited with providing one of the first in-depth reports of the incidents at Abu Ghraib 
in print media. It was Hersh’s first article about Abu Ghraib “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” published May 10, 
2004 that prompted CBS to air its story on Abu Ghraib on April 28.  
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as means of obtaining information. Copper Green “encouraged physical coercion and 
sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more intelligence about the 
growing insurgency in Iraq” (par. 2).  
As part of these attempts at obtaining information, Hersh reports that military 
officials relied heavily on a book entitled The Arab Mind, a study first published in 1973 
by Raphael Patai. According to Hersh, “The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on 
“Arabs” and sex, depicting sex as taboo vested with shame and repression” (par. 33). 
Basing their interrogation technique on what they thought to be Muslim sexual taboos, 
the perpetrators of violence at Abu Ghraib used the photographs as a form of blackmail, 
threatening to shame the victims if they did not provide U.S. military intelligence agents 
with information about the growing insurgency in Iraq. As Hersh explains, “It was 
thought that some prisoners would do anything – including spying on their associates – to 
avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and friends” (par. 34). While this 
motivation may have been an original intention, there seems to be much more to the 
photographs themselves. For example, the sexual taboos used to “soften up” Abu Ghraib 
prisoners are those that would be specifically humiliating for Muslim males. In The Arab 
Mind Raphael Patai writes,  
[T]he performance of the active homosexual act is considered as an assertion of 
one’s aggressive masculine superiority, while the acceptance of the role of the 
passive homosexual is considered extremely degrading and shameful because it 
casts the man or youth into a submissive, feminine role. . . . The same evaluation 
of the sexual act as the assertion of male dominance comes through in the Arab 
view that masturbation is far more shameful than visiting prostitutes. With a 
prostitute a man performs a masculine act. Whoever masturbates, however, 
evinces his inability to perform the active sex act, and thus exposes himself to 
contempt. (134-135) 
Although prisoners in the Abu Ghraib photographs were made to perform simulated 
homosexual acts and made to masturbate in front of female prison guards and other male 
prisoners, Patai’s claims do not account for why prisoners were often hooded (making it 
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harder to identify them if blackmail was a motivation) or why the photographs were 
circulated among military personnel and their families. Patai’s assertions regarding Arab 
sexual taboos also do not account for why the iconic Abu Ghraib photographs (the 
photographs that were circulated in the mainstream press) feature male victims. For, as 
Patai explains, “the greatest dishonor that can befall a man results from the sexual 
misconduct of his daughter or sister” (119). So, while the following analysis will take 
these reported motivations for the photographs into account, it will also consider their 
additional and alternative rhetorical functions in the public imagination.  
I explore the photographic images that depict the violent actions, perpetrators, and 
victims at Abu Ghraib prison. I have divided the photographs into two categories, iconic 
and veiled. The first category, iconic, contains those photographs that were widely 
circulated and the second category, veiled, contains photographs that did not appear in 
the mainstream press. Because I am concerned with how these photographs not only 
depict violent actions, but also perpetrators and victims of violence, I have divided both 
categories according to whether or not a perpetrator of violence, or agent, is present in the 
photograph (see Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Categorical Division of the Abu Ghraib Photographs 
 Widely-Circulated Not Circulated 
Agent in Photograph Iconic: Agent Present Veiled: Agent Present 
No Agent in Photograph Iconic: Agent Absent Veiled: Agent Absent 
My analysis is divided into three parts. First, I examine the photographs that I am 
labeling iconic. Second, I explore how activists have re-appropriated these iconic 
photographs in different forms of protest. In this section I analyze four re-appropriated 
Abu Ghraib texts (two originating in the United States and two originating in the Middle 
East) and explore the ways in which these photographs have been used to criticize the 
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dominant narratives present in the original iconic images. Finally, I examine the Abu 
Ghraib photographs I am labeling veiled.  
Iconic Photographs: Agent Absent 
In this section of analysis, I examine the photographs that I have labeled iconic. 
These photographs were aired and published continually in mainstream media outlets. I 
am interested in how violence is portrayed in the photographs, and I am particularly 
interested in how violent actions are linked back to identification with either the 
perpetrators or the victims of violence. I argue that the presence (or absence) of an 
American violent perpetrator changes the dynamics between the photographs and their 
American viewing audiences. Therefore, I have divided this first section into two 
subsections: agent absent and agent present.  
The following photograph originally aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes II. It was the first 
Abu Ghraib photograph released in the press (see figure 1). When it aired Dan Rather 












Fig. 1. Man in hood on box, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 April 
2004. Photgraph available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
In this photograph a man is standing on a box. His head is covered and there are wires 
attached to his fingers. According to news accounts, the man was told that if he fell off of 
the box he would be electrocuted. The prisoner is at the center of the frame. Arms spread 
and face hooded, the man has become the icon of the Abu Ghraib scandal. There are three 
central features that seem to exemplify the violence captured in this image: the man is 
hooded, the man’s body is put in a stressful and potentially painful position (it is not 
known how long the victim was made to stand, keeping his balance on the box), and the 
man has been rigged with wires and told that he faces electrocution.  
The prisoner’s hood makes him anonymous. In their work on violent images that 
focuses specifically on the rhetorical power of the photographic images of Emmett Till, 
Christine Harold and Kevin M. DeLuca argue that bodies in pain have great rhetorical 
 26
power.7 Commenting on the public spectacle of lynching in the American South, Harold 
and DeLuca argue that as a form of racial terrorism, the public spectacle of lynching 
served as a warning to black communities, “anchoring white supremacy in a mutilated 
black body” (269). They also remark that with their indiscriminate practices, lynch mobs 
would go attack anyone remotely associated with the supposed grievance at hand. In 
other words, for the purpose of racial terrorism, “any black body would do” (269). This 
notion that any body would do is interesting when considering the Abu Ghraib 
photographs. The above photograph of the hooded man could be a photograph of anyone; 
the power dynamic between the perpetrators and the victim of violence in this instance 
depends only on the knowledge that some Iraqi is beneath the hood. By hooding their 
victims, the perpetrators of violence seem to suggest that any Iraqi will do. Thus, the 
torture of one Iraqi male implies willingness or desire to torture all. 
Harold and DeLuca argue that the photograph of Till’s mutilated corpse was 
powerful not just because it was a picture of a body in pain, but because it was a picture 
of a human face, or what once was a human face (274). For Harold and DeLuca, 
audiences were able to identify with the body of Emmett Till, in part, because focus on 
his face made Till more human (not just a dead body, but a dead body that was once a 
live boy). Unlike the body of Till, the faces in the Abu Ghraib photographs are often 
hidden. The victims are anonymous bodies. 
Indeed, anonymous and dehumanized, bodies in pain enduring sexual humiliation 
become the focus in many of the Abu Ghraib photographs. In a similar photograph to that 
of the hooded man, the face of the victim is cropped out completely. Instead the viewer’s 
gaze focuses on the victim’s body and on the object of the victim’s mental suffering and 
                                                 
7 Emmett Till was a young African American boy who was brutally murdered because he spoke to a white 
woman, Carolyn Bryant. An all-white, all-male jury found Till’s murders, Bryant’s husband and brother-in-
law, not guilty. Till’s mother, Mamie Till Bradley, made a photograph of her son’s mutilated corpse public. 
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potential pain, the wires that threaten the victim with electric shock if the victim falls off 
of the box (see figure 2).  Although this photograph did not air on CBS, it was referenced 
in CBS’s initial story and subsequently appeared in several print media and Internet 








Fig. 2. Close-up of electrodes, available online at 
http://civilliberty.about.com/od/waronterror/ig/War-on-Terror-
101/American-Torture.htm.  
Although in both of these pictures (figures 1 and 2) the threat of electrocution does not 
seem imminent for those of us who have the privilege of viewing the photograph, one can 
hypothesize another reason for hooding the victims: hooded, the victim cannot tell 
whether or not the wires on his fingers are attached to a device that will electrocute him. 
The hooding of the victims, then, not only makes the victim anonymous, less than human, 
but also reinforces a dynamic of control between the powerless victim on the one hand 
and the powerful perpetrators and spectators of violence (viewers at home) on the other. 
As Mary Ann Tetreault explains, the photographs are taken in such a way so as to make 
the perpetrators and the spectators powerful: “[P]risoners are stripped and posed so that 
every part of their bodies is available to handling by their tormenters and inspection by 
the camera’s eye. But the prisoners are hooded, physically prevented from returning their 
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captors gaze” (39). This power dynamic and the fact that the prisoners are made 
anonymous through hooding speaks to the use of a “body rhetoric” that Davin A. 
Grindstaff and Kevin M. DeLuca argue occurs when a body becomes a site for multiple 
discourses and meanings. In their work that focuses on the body of journalist and slain Al 
Qaeda prisoner Daniel Pearl,8 Grindstaff and DeLuca argue that war and acts of terrorism 
(they refer to the videotaped and televised execution of Pearl) “share a common 
persuasive means: the injuring of bodies and the use of those bodies to anchor ideological 
beliefs” (307). According to Grindstaff and DeLuca, a tortured body performs a unique 
rhetorical function in that “emptied of its own world, stripped of its own agency,” the 
tortured body can be made into a rhetorical space for competing identities and multiple 
discourses (308). Pearl’s body comes to represent an enemy, en masse, for his captors. As 
Grindstaff and DeLuca explain, “The Pearl body functions as a rhetorical condensation of 
America, of Jewishness, of Zionism; the Pearl body is, metaphorically speaking, 
America” (310). Similarly, for their captors, the hooding of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
solidifies their rhetorical condensation as a “terrorist enemy.” The bodies of anonymous, 
hooded prisoners thus become a condensation of Iraq, of Islam, and more generally the 
militant, Arab male that threatens an American way of life. The power dynamic that is 
reinforced through the hooding and posing of these bodies, in turn, solidifies America’s 
place as a global superpower, one that triumphs over and controls this threatening enemy. 
The torture photographs are a kind of national allegory consonant with—not in violation 
of—common sense demonization of an enemy in war. In photographs without an agent of 
violence in the scene, the viewer becomes the primary subject; his or her gaze is that of 
the colonizer. 
                                                 
8 Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and murdered by a militant group called the National Movement for the 
Restoration of Pakistan Sovereignty in Karachi, Pakistan. The NMRPS broadcast a videotape of Pearl’s 
execution in which Pearl was forced to confess to being American and Jewish. 
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Attention to the pain of the victim continues in many variations of the torture 
photographs. In one photograph (see figure 3), a prisoner is photographed bending out of 








Fig. 3. Fatigued hooded man on box, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html.  
This photograph did not air on CBS, but was subsequently published in mainstream news 
sources. In this photograph, the man seems to be giving up. He is doubled over, clasping 
his legs in pain. The focus on this action in the photograph reinforces the power of the 
person taking the photograph even when s/he is invisible: The camera records the fear 
and the power that keep the man on the box. 
The following photograph was not mentioned in the CBS story, nor was it aired. It 
was published in subsequent mainstream media outlets, including the Washington Post. 
In this photograph a man is handcuffed to what appears to be the metal frame of a bunk 
bed (see figure 4). The man’s arms are pinned behind him and his back is arched and 
contorted with strain. Like many other photographs that document the torture of Abu 
Ghraib prisoners, this man’s face is covered, making him anonymous and disguising any 
humanity in the expression of pain that might appear on his face. However, there is a 
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difference between this photograph and other photographs in which hoods are used to 






Fig. 4. Man hooded with underwear, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
In this photograph the man’s face is covered with underwear, linking hooding to sexual 
violation, a characteristic of a number of the Abu Ghraib photographs. In many of the 
photographs documenting torture, male prisoners appear naked and are forced to touch 
each other’s nude bodies. In one photograph, which originally aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes 
II, four male soldiers are naked except for the hoods that hide their faces (see figure 5). In 
this photograph two men are forced to sit naked on top of two other naked men that are 
sitting on the ground. The hands of the two men on top are behind their heads, preventing 
them from covering their naked bodies and preventing them from protecting themselves 
against a physical attack from their captors. 
The sexual nature of the photographs can be associated with both pornography 
and Orientalism, a term first formulated by Edward Said (for examples please see 
Mirzoeff and Tetreault). Said claims that the “Orient” is a European invention. From the 
beginning of the nineteenth century through World War II the construction and 
maintenance of the Orient was dominated by France and Britain. With that distinction 
currently reserved for the United States, the Orient, according to Said, has become one of 
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the most complex and recurring images of the “Other,” by which Western Imperial 
powers have defined and reified their distinct national identities. For Said, it is this 
understanding of Orientalism that best illustrates the ways in which European and 







Fig. 5. Four hooded men, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 April 2004. 
Photograph available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
Mary Ann Tetreault argues that the sexual nature of the torture at Abu Ghraib can 
be understood in a tradition of Orientalist practice 
that fetishizes and feminizes the sexuality of subject peoples as part of a strategy 
of domination. The photographs record rituals of violence affirming power 
relations between occupier and occupied . . . . Sexuality, coded according to 
complex cultural norms of feminine subjection to masculine power, infuses the 
language and acts of members of dominant groups against those they seek to 
subjugate. The pornography of Abu Ghraib constitutes a field report on the 
production and reproduction of U.S. global dominance. (34-35) 
The use of sexual humiliation in the Abu Ghraib photographs links the acts of torture to a 
larger context in which conquered people have been traditionally humiliated by imperial 
power. For example, as Nira Yuval-Davis explains, “Sexualized demonologies which 
combine fear and envy towards racialized objects have existed not only in relation to 
blacks [both in Europe and the U.S.] but also in most other racialized images of the 
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‘other’” (51). According to Yuval-Davis, sexuality is often at the center of racialized 
imagery which projects “dreams of forbidden pleasures and fears of impotency onto the 
‘other’” (51).  Although assumptions about the sexual threat of a racialized enemy other 
is not always heterosexual, Yuval-Davis argues that they are often structured around “the 
common stereotype of the male stranger harassing, threatening or actually raping ‘our 
women,’ whose honor has to be defended” (51). In this sense, I argue that the forcing of 
male prisoners to pose nude and to simulate homosexual acts (see below) can be read as 
an expression of sexual dominance of the perpetrators of violence over their male 
victims. It is in this sense that theses photographs can be considered pornographic. More 
than the presence of sex acts themselves, it is the fantasy of sexualized control 
(MacKinnon) that characterizes these images as pornographic. In claiming that these 
photographs are pornographic, I do not deny or condone the sexualized violence these 
images portray. Rather, I suggest that like much porn, the sexualized violence enacted 
within the Abu Ghraib prison, was enacted, in part, to be recorded and shared, allowing 
outside viewers to participate in the fantasy of sexual domination over a dehumanized 
victim.   
In another photograph originally aired on 60 Minutes II, four naked male 
















Fig. 6. Four hooded men oral sex and masturbation, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 
Minutes II. CBS. 28 April 2004. Photograph available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
In this photo two male prisoners in the foreground are made to perform oral sex. In the 
background, the figure on the left is made to masturbate, while the figure on the right 
simply holds his head in his hands. Beyond the circulation of such graphic sexual images 
in the mainstream media, what is interesting about this image is its implicit positioning of 
the viewer in a relationship of power over these men. Just like many of the other 
photographs documenting torture and sexual humiliation, the men in this photograph are 
hooded. They are anonymous and the only thing we, as viewers of the photographs, see is 
the sexual nature of the acts these male bodies are forced to perform. These actions 
illustrate a feminizing of male prisoners who are made to perform for the gaze of the 
camera, making this shot both pornographic and an expression of imperial power.  
The power over the tortured bodies and the sexual humiliation they are made to 
perform is only part of the story of the torture at Abu Ghraib. The extent of the Abu 
Ghraib violence comes to fruition in a photograph showing the end of violence: death. 
The photograph below is one of the few iconic Abu Ghraib photographs that clearly show 
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the victim’s face (see figure 7). In this photograph, the male victim, who has not been 
officially identified by the CIA or the U.S. military, is dead, having been violently beaten 
and then packed in ice.  Just like the face of Emmett Till, this photograph shows what 
used to be a face of one of the prisoners. However, refusal by U.S. officials to release the 
man’s name renders him as anonymous as the hooded victim subjects that dominate the 
agent-absent iconic photographs. These photographs feature only bodies, bodies in pain, 
bodies forced to perform humiliating and sexually explicit acts. However, in all of the 
above photographs there is no agent of pain, no perpetrator of violence. In this way to the 
violence, just like the victims themselves, is anonymous. The perpetrators of violence 




Fig. 7. Dead prisoner packed in ice, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 
April 2004. Photograph available online at 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20040501_1.htm. 
Iconic Photographs: Agent Present 
However, this violence was not performed by just anyone. American soldiers, the 
men and women charged, ironically, with liberating Iraq performed them in the public 
hallways of a military prison, and they recorded their actions with gestures of victory and 
smiles on their faces. In this next section of analysis, I explore the iconic photographs 
that have an agent of violence present in the image. Neither of the following two 
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photographs aired or was referenced on CBS’s 60 Minutes II (instead, a similar 
photograph with the agent absent was featured [see figure 7]). These photographs provide 
an emblematic example of how the composition and the effect of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs change with the presence of a violent agent (see figure 8). In these 








Fig. 8. Spc. Charles Graner, Jr. and Spc. Sabrina Harman with dead prisoner packed in 
ice, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
The dead man packed in ice is at the bottom of the frame. In the picture on the left, the 
male perpetrator of violence, Specialist Charles Graner, Jr. (currently serving ten years in 
prison for his participation in the Abu Ghraib tortures) crouches above the dead man, 
smiles for the camera, and gives a jubilant “thumbs up.” In the picture on the right, 
Sabrina Harman, who was sentenced to six months in prison for her part in the Abu 
Ghraib tortures, also crouches above the dead man, smiles for the camera and gives a 
thumbs up. Unlike the agent-absent photograph that focuses on the dead man’s face, 
these pictures not only focus on a performance of pride and victory by the perpetrators of 
violence, but also show the sanitized ways in which that violence is performed. In both 
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photographs, the perpetrators are wearing gloves. The gloves quite literally keep the 
blood off of the perpetrators’ hands.  
When the agent is present in the photograph, the power dynamic between the 
perpetrator and the victim of violence becomes much clearer. In some instances, like in 
the photographs above, the agent is quite purposefully at the center. In other instances, 
like the picture of the hooded man (figure 1), it seems as though the agent’s presence is 
accidental. In most published versions the agent is cropped out (see figure 9).  
Fig. 9. Hooded man on box, cropped and full frame, available online at 
http://ddunleavy.typepad.com/the_big_picture/2006/week20/index.html 
Unlike the pictures in which the agent is the center of attention, this perpetrator of 
violence seems ambivalent as he checks what appears to be a camera (perhaps he is 
taking pictures of the man on the box, too) at the side of the frame. The tragic structure of 
this ambivalence is similar to that which Hariman and Lucaites are concerned in their 
work on the image of the “accidental napalm,” an iconic photograph from the Vietnam 
War.  Hariman and Lucaites argue that atrocity of the image, which shows a small girl 
running naked towards the camera in an attempt to get away from the napalm that burns 
her skin, is solidified by the ambivalence of the soldiers in the photograph. As the girl at 




background seem nonchalant, taking no notice of the girl’s pain or her horror. As 
Hariman and Lucaites explain, 
Their [the soldiers’] attitude of business as usual contrasts vividly with the girl’s 
sudden, unexpected, excessive experience of pain and terror. The message is 
clear: what seems, from looking at the girl, to be a rare experience sure to evoke a 
compassionate response, is in fact, as evidenced by the soldiers, something that 
happens again and again, so much so that the adults involved (whether soldiers 
there or civilians in the U.S.) can become indifferent, morally diminished, capable 
of routinely doing awful things to other people. (“Accidental Napalm” 43)  
Similarly, I argue that ambivalence toward violence in the Abu Ghraib photographs 
solidifies the atrocity of the images. The fact that the soldier on the right of the frame is 
not compelled to look at the violence occurring just beside him suggests that the violence 
is routine. And, if the soldier is, in fact, looking at an image in a digital camera, this 
would also suggest that it is the image of violence, a violent souvenir, which is important 
to him. Seeing an agent of violence in this photograph of the hooded man cements the 
power dynamic that is implicit in the cropped version: the perpetrators of violence have 





Fig. 10. Spc. Charles Graner, Jr. and Spc. Sabrina Harman with pyramid of hooded 
prisoners, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 April 2004. 




In another photograph that originally aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes II, Graner and 
Harman are again at the center of the frame (see figure 10). They pose for the camera 
behind a pyramid comprised of naked, hooded human bodies. The bodies are smashed 
together, a sea of limbs piled on top of one another. In the background, Harman leans 
close to the prisoners with a smile on her face as Graner, behind her, crosses his arms in 
triumph. In the distant background, clothing, possibly belonging to the prisoners, is piled 
along the wall. 
This piling of tortured bodies, similar in composition to the piling of their clothes, 
is another way in which the perpetrators of violence seem to reinforce their dominance. 
Two distinct, clothed Americans, one man and one woman, stand above a pile of naked 
limbs, creating a hierarchy of gender and ethnicity (Tetreault 38). This piling of bodies is 
also something, as Haim Bresheeth points out, that has been used to signify dominance 





Fig. 11. Spc. Charles Graner, Jr. beating clothed prisoners, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
As Bresheeth explains, the piling of bodies into indistinct mounds is reminiscent of the 




An additional motif to examine is the recurring organization of human bodies in 
complex heaps, which blur the distinctness of one body from another. Which 
limbs belong to which body? The source of this disturbing imagery may be the 
mounds of dead bodies discovered by the liberators of the Nazi death camps. So 
much flesh, these pictures seem to tell us, amounts to ‘nothing at all.’ (Bresheeth) 
The above photograph (see figure 11) is one of the few in which the bodies of the 
prisoners are clothed. Charles Graner is in the act of beating the prisoners. However, even 
though the bodies are wearing clothing, their heads are still covered. The prisoners 
remain indistinct.  
While there are many photographs that feature piles of indistinct bodies, there are 
many photographs that highlight American dominance over one body as opposed to 
many. In CBS’s breaking story, Dan Rather gave an exclusive telephone interview with 
Staff Sgt. Ivan “Chip” Frederick II who was the highest-ranking officer implicated in the 
Abu Ghraib tortures. The following photograph was referenced, but not shown during the 
broadcast (see figure 12). In this photograph Frederick, calmly looking into the camera, 
sits on top of his victim. The victim’s face, unlike Frederick’s calm one, is contorted with 










Unlike many of the other torture photographs, the victim’s face is clearly visible and the 
victim looks directly into the camera.  







Fig. 13. Staff Sgt. Ivan “Chip” Frederick II with prisoner covered in brown substance, 
available with man covered in brown substance, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
There is speculation in the press as to what type of filth covers the prisoner, but the power 
dynamic is something that cannot be debated. Frederick stands holding a rifle, not at the 
victim, but as a show of arms. The victim stands naked, legs crossed, arms in a supplicant 
position outstretched. The victim’s back is turned and we cannot see his face, but we do 
know that he is at the mercy of his captor. In this photograph the perpetrator can be 
clearly identified and the amusement on his face seems clear. 
There are other photographs in which the perpetrators are not as clearly 
identifiable, but their violent actions more extreme. CBS’s broadcast mentioned, though 
did not air, photographs in which prisoners are being attacked by dogs. In one 
photograph, a man is naked, his hands above his head. The man slouches as much as he 
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can to cover his body and protect it from the dogs circling him (see figure 14). Close 







Fig. 14. Naked prisoner attacked by dogs, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
Below is another picture of a man being attacked (see figure 15). In this 
photograph we can see the fear in the victim’s eyes as he comes face-to-face with a large 
dog. The victim’s hands are bound behind his back, making it impossible for him to 
protect his body or his face from an attack. The soldier holding the dog is not identified 
and indeed the victim is not looking at the other man, rather at the dog that controls his 
fate. In the photographs in which the victims are being attacked by dogs, the dogs, not the 
humans with them, seem to be the primary perpetrators of violence. Like the photographs 
where the perpetrators of violence seem accidental and are, therefore, cropped out of the 
shot, the human perpetrators in these dog pictures do not seem to be as important as the 
fear on the victim’s faces or the viciousness of the dogs rearing to bite them. However, 
just like the photographs where the agent is absent from the frame, it is clear in these 














Fig. 15. Prisoner in orange jumpsuit attacked by dog, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
One person became known around the world for her involvement in the Abu 
Ghraib photographs. In the photograph below, which did not air on CBS’s original 
broadcast, Lynndie England is the person behind the leash (see figure 16). In this 
photograph originally released by The Washington Post, a female England, who was 
sentenced to 36 months in a military prison, is depicted restraining a naked male prisoner 











In this photograph, England, a clothed female captor, stands over a naked male prisoner 
in an image that reinforces both the gendered and ethnic dominance of the United States 
over Iraq. As Tetreault explains,  
In this now-iconic image, the power of Americans over Arabs is symbolized not 
only by the leash but also by the fact that the prisoner is naked while his captor is 
clothed. The message is enhanced by its inversion of conventional gender 
expectations. (38) 
In her essay concerning the images of Afghan men and women depicted in the 2001-2002 
war in Afghanistan, Dana Cloud argues “photographs and other images can enact 
ideographs visually and index, or point to, the verbal slogans capturing society’s guiding 
abstractions” (“To Veil” 288). For Cloud, one of the dominant ideographic images 
recurrent in depictions of Afghan people during the war with Afghanistan is one that 
reinforces the notion of a <clash of civilizations> in which “women’s oppression is a 
marker of an inferior society” and the cause for war comes in the saving of “brown 
women from brown men” (“To Veil” 289). Understanding photographs like this 
photograph of England becomes important in this regard for it is ideology that justifies 
war in terms of the liberation of oppressed people, namely women, from militant men 
that appears to be at work in the iconic photographs of Abu Ghraib, which featured only 
male prisoners being tortured.  
In another photograph of England that originally aired on CBS, England mocks a 
male prisoner, pointing at his genitals and giving a thumbs up sign (see figure 16). The 
prisoners in the photograph are naked and hooded. The prisoner England mocks is sitting 












Fig. 17. England mocking prisoner, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 
April 2004. Photograph available online at 
http://www.vanceholmes.com/court/trial_america_news.html. 
For Dora Apel, the sexualized nature of the photographs and the witnessing of naked 
male prisoners (often forced to perform sexual acts) by female solders is just one way the 
torturers at Abu Ghraib attempted to feminize their male captors. This feminization of 
male prisoners is central to the ways in which the perpetrators of violence at Abu Ghraib 
asserted their dominance over their captors. As Apel explains, 
Just as the lynching rituals threatened men with castration, at Abu Ghraib, terror 
also took the form of threatening the masculinity of the prisoners, using dogs to 
menace and attack naked prisoners and allowing women soldiers to sexually 
humiliate them and even to handle and mock their genitals, point and laughing 
while taking pictures. (95) 
In another photograph that originally aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes II, England, a cigarette 
placed precariously in her mouth, mocks a line of naked male prisoners who have their 
heads covered. In this photograph, a victorious female is used to express dominance over 
her naked male captors. 
The fact that England has become one of the most notorious of the Abu Ghraib 
perpetrators of violence also warrants some consideration. Although, as Cloud, Yuval-
Davis, Apel and others rightly point out, photographs documenting the exploitation of 
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male Iraqi prisoners by female American soldiers serve as ideographic images, 
representing assumptions of U.S. domination over a sexualized Iraqi other, one must also 
question other types of dominance these types of photographs illustrate. Shelia Jeffreys 
argues that the use of England and other female soldiers in the Abu Ghraib photographs 




Fig. 18. England mocking a line of prisoners, in “Court Martial in Iraq.” 60 Minutes II. 
CBS. 28 April 2004. Photograph available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html. 
According to Jeffreys, the military, unlike other historically masculine institutions 
women seek to enter, requires masculinity to function (18). Within military institutions, 
women are not only offered as a sexualized ‘other’ to defend and to die for, but also 
represent “masculinity and the othering of women and homosexuality.” Jeffreys explains 
that in training, U.S. “soldiers are insulted with female epithets” (18). Degradation of 
women is also considered a key factor in the high numbers of sexual abuse and violent 
sexual assault reported by female U.S. service members each year. For example, the 
Miles Foundation, a feminist organization dedicated to combating the problem of sexual 
assault and domestic violence within the U.S. military setting “collated 129 complaints of 
rape [by female service members] in the 18 months up to April 2004” (Jeffreys 20). For 
Jeffreys, the violent abuse of women in the U.S. military is consistent with a larger 
pattern of warfare in which women have been predominately used to send messages of 
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masculinity and dominance to the “other side,” which often come in the form of rape and 
sexual violence. She argues,  
The use of US women soldiers by both the Iraqi combatants and the US military 
to send messages to the other side, shows that militaries see themselves as 
engaged in struggles between groups of masculine men for whom women are 
viewed as symbols of femininity. (Jeffreys 21) 
Jeffreys sees the case of Lynndie England, a low-ranking reservist, as an example of a 
pattern within the Abu Ghraib prison in which women “were employed to send a message 
form a conquering group of men to those they had conquered” (21). Whether or not one 
agrees with Jeffreys claims, it is important to note the systematic use of women as 
perpetrators of violence and as specific tools of humiliation over the prisoners. 
The practice of recording and sharing the photographs, with the perpetrators’ 
families and ultimately with the American public and people around the world, is also a 
practice that warrants consideration. Mary Ann Tetreault claims that this practice of 
sharing helps to reinforce the identities of the powerful (the perpetrators and the 
spectators of violence). Citing Rene Girard, whose work on ritual violence focuses on the 
ways in which violence and sacrifice helps reinforce a sense of community, Tetreault 
argues, “Sacrifices break the bodies of victims before the eyes of the community in 
rituals that remind its members of the core values they share” (39). While this sharing of 
core values may have been the original intention of the perpetrators of violence at Abu 
Ghraib, it is important to realize that the rhetorical function of these bodies in pain does 
not end with the captors’ intentions. As these images circulated among different viewing 
publics around the globe, the message from the torturers at Abu Ghraib was interpreted in 
many different ways. In fact, as subsequent chapters in this project illustrate, members of 
the mainstream press, U.S. political leaders, and the American public at large often 
expressed outrage and horror as a result of the violent actions featured in the Abu Ghraib 
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photographs. Importantly, U.S. political leaders and members of the mainstream press 
often made explicit attempts to distance American national identity from the tortures 
featured in them (see chapters 2 and 3). As Grindstaff and DeLuca argue, “the rhetorical 
body is agile, able to serve opposing ideological purposes” (320). So, while the Abu 
Ghraib photographs work rhetorically to solidify the dominance of American captors 
over their Iraqi victims, other rhetorical discourses – public political language and 
mainstream media accounts – worked to distance the violent means through which 
American dominance is maintained from an idealized notion of a democratic American 
national citizenry. In this way, the photographs work both to protect notions of American 
power and dominance and to threaten the democratic ideals central to dominant 
understandings of American national belonging. These opposing purposes became clear 
as challenges to the dominant ideologies of the photographs at Abu Ghraib (present in re-
appropriations of the Abu Ghraib images) began to make their own mark on public 
consciousness. 
Iconic Photographs: Used in Protest 
Polling data from the time period surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison scandal 
paints a disturbing picture of public opinion regarding the scandal. Although the Abu 
Ghraib photographs undoubtedly created a sense of shock and disgust among members of 
the American national community who refused to identify with violent torturers, these 
reactions failed to translate into a significant shift in public opinion about the war in Iraq 
or President Bush. Gallup opinion polls conducted before and after the Abu Ghraib 
photographs were leaked suggest that while the scandal did trigger some public backlash 
against the war in Iraq, most of the decline in public support for the war occurred before 
the scandal. Lydia Saad, writer for Gallup News Service wrote on June 14, 2004, 
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The trend shows that just before the Abu Ghraib revelations, Americans had 
already concluded that things were going badly for the United States in Iraq: 64% 
felt this way in April, compared with 60% today. Also, even before the Abu 
Ghraib abuse came to light, the percentage saying the United States had made a 
mistake in sending troops to Iraq had risen to its current level in the low 40s. 
Neither of these negative assessments has increased since the Abu Ghraib scandal 
broke. (4)9 
This data suggest that although support for the war in Iraq was on a decline in 2004, the 
Abu Ghraib photographs did little to increase negative assessments on the war. A similar 
study conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes in association with 
Knowledge Networks found that when informed about the series of legal memoranda 
outlining the Bush Administration’s policy regarding the treatment of detainees (see 
Chapter 2), a mere 37% of participants agreed with statements made by the President 
denying the connection between these policies and the violent actions that occurred at 
Abu Ghraib (par. 8).10 However, while the majority of participants polled agreed that the 
Bush administration’s policy contributed to the Abu Ghraib violence, this opinion did not 
seem to translate into direct political reaction. For when these same participants were 
asked, “How do you think the way that President Bush has handled the issue of the 
treatment of detainees in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay will affect the likelihood that you 
will vote for him in November,” only 37% of the participants polled said that they would 
be less likely to vote for President Bush (“U.S. Public Rejects” par. 9). In addition, 22% 
said they would be more likely to vote for Bush. 
However, although the Abu Ghraib photographs did little to spark major public 
outcry against the war in Iraq or against the Bush administration’s policy on torture, re-
appropriation of the Abu Ghraib photographs has become a common strategy for some 
antiwar protestors in the U.S. and abroad (Hesford 31). Although this dissertation focuses 
                                                 
9 These percentages are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national sample of 1,000 
adults, aged 18 and older. 
10 Based on a nationwide poll conducted in July of 2004 with a sample of 892. 
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primarily on dominant assumptions about American national violence, I recognize that 
the process of hegemony is one in which dominant assumptions are continually being 
challenged by those whose interests are not being served by them. And, while critical 
uses of Abu Ghraib imagery are not a central feature of my research, they provide 
important insights into the political struggles incited by the photographs and enacted in 
the name of national identity.  
In their work on parodies of the Iwo Jima image, Edwards and Winkler argue that 
a central function of an ideographic image is the way in which the abstractions of the 
image can transcend the original image’s historical and political context and gain 
meaning though its association with news contexts and symbols. They explain, 
As a representative form, the parodied Iwo Jima image transcends its historical 
referents, gains meaning from its subsequent symbolic associations, and helps 
create and reaffirm the identity of the body politic through its ideographic 
functions. Like representative anecdotes and representative characters, such forms 
provide instructive perspectives on varied, multiple situations by summing up the 
culturally-defined essences of human motivations. (501) 
In this next section, I examine just a few examples of the ways in which members of both 
American and Iraqi publics have used re-appropriations of the Abu Ghraib photographs 
in order to resist dominant ideological messages. Utilizing the ideographic abstractions of 
the images, these re-appropriations challenge dominant narratives of American imperial 
dominance associated with the Abu Ghraib photos. I examine four examples of such re-
appropriation, two American examples and two examples from Middle Eastern countries.  
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Critical Re-appropriation of Images in the U.S. 
The following two examples provide insight into how the Abu Ghraib 
photographs were re-appropriated and used for resistance purposes in the United States. 
The first set of images (see figure 19) depicts a poster campaign created by Los Angeles-
based graphic design group, Forkscrew Graphics. Each of the four posters depicts one 
element of the Iraq War.   
Fig. 19. iRaq posters, available online at http://www.bloodforoil.com/iRaq-posters/. 
Set against brightly colored backdrops, each poster has a silhouetted image of a person 
involved in a violent action associated with the war. These silhouetted images are 
highlighted by white wires and a white logo “iRaq,” imaged after the popular “iPod” 
advertisement campaign, which features black silhouetted images highlighted by the 
highly-recognizable white wires of the iPod earbuds. Three of the four silhouetted images 
depict soldiers shooting guns and throwing grenades, the final image in the series depicts 
the hooded man on the box. Silhouetted against a bright orange backdrop the hooded man 
stands on a box, white earbud wires attached to his fingers, replacing the electrical wiring 
of the original photograph. Making their statement against war through an allusion to 
 
 51
commercial advertising for a popular commodity, these posters seem to not only be 
making a comment about the violent actions of the Iraq War, but also the 
commercialization of the ways in which the Iraq War is understood by the American 
public. Torture becomes a recognizable product of war just as the iPod has become a 
recognizable product within consumer culture. As Dora Apel explains, 
Alluding to the Pop art multiples associated with Andy Warhol, the slick colorful 
posters suggest the commercialization of the war, evoking Halliburton and the 
staggering profits it has made on noncompetitive contracts. The posters further 
imply the commodification of torture itself as central to the occupation of Iraq. 
(97) 
As Apel suggests, the iRaq posters, which were originally posted by antiwar protestors 
associated with Forkscew’s design company among actual iPod posters in subway 
stations in New York and L.A. in 2004, serve as an advertisement for the commodity of 
war. Just as the original iPod campaign advertises “10,000 songs in your pocket. Mac or 
PC,”, the iRaq posters advertise, “10,000 Iraqis killed. 773 U.S. soldiers dead.” Making, 
as Apel explains, the selling of torture as a war product “ironically complete” (97). 
On July 9, 2004, just a few months after the Abu Ghraib photographs were 
released to the public, six men in Pennsylvania (dubbed “The Smoketown Six” by the 
press) were arrested for attempting to recreate one of the Abu Ghraib images in protest of 
the Iraq War (see figure 20). The men wore “thong underwear and formed a human 
pyramid in anticipation of President Bush’s motorcade procession through Lancaster 
County [PA]” (“‘Smoketown Six’ Stripped to Thongs” par. 1). They were arrested and 













Fig. 20. Smoketown Six in protest, available online at 
http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/protest/11525prs20041014.html. 
Charges against the protestors were eventually dropped and, in December of 2004, the 
Smoketown Six filed a lawsuit against the Pennsylvania State Police, citing violations of 
their First Amendment rights. However, in mainstream media coverage of the 
Smoketown Six demonstration, the fact that six men wore thong underwear in protest, not 
the U.S. policy against which they were demonstrating, seemed to garner the most 
attention. The protest’s potential in sparking a violent reaction from Bush supporters was 
also central to media commentary. For example in an editorial appearing in a local 
Lancaster news paper the author defends the actions taken by Pennsylvania police 
arguing, “The officers very well may have prevented a tasteless protest of the president’s 
Iraq policy from evolving into violence in which the protesters or supporters were hurt” 
(par. 17). The willingness of American citizens to use the images of Abu Ghraib critically 
in protest and the simultaneous dismissal of this symbolic, peaceful demonstration 
against state-sanctioned violence is just one illustration of the complicated ideological 
contention surrounding Abu Ghraib. 
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Critical Re-appropriation of Images in the Middle East 
The images of Abu Ghraib were not only re-appropriated and used in protest in 
the United States, but citizens of Middle Eastern countries have also used re-appropriated 






Fig. 21. “Iraq Today.” Photograph available online at 
http://www.nuigalway.ie/geography/undergrad/ti326.html. 
The first image (see figure 21) is a photograph of an Iranian couple walking past a 
mural in Tehran, Iran.11 The mural in the photograph highlights two of the iconic Abu 
Ghraib images: the image of Lynndie England subduing a prisoner on a leash and the 
image of the hooded man on the box. The Abu Ghraib images both appear in decorative 
frames and a caption painted on the image of the hooded man reads “Iraq Today” 
(Hesford 29). However, in this photograph, the images of Abu Ghraib appear in the 
background with an Iranian couple appearing in the foreground at the center of the frame. 
According to Wendy Hesford, whose work focuses on the ways in which the images of 
                                                 
11 The mural was painted by an unidentified artist. This photograph was taken by photographer, Behrouz 
Mehri. 
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Abu Ghraib have been staged in resistance, the presence of the Iranian couple in the 
photograph, along with the artistic framing of the Abu Ghraib images themselves, serves 
to interrupt the trauma of the original images. She explains,  
[T]he presence of the couple walking past the mural, captured in the photograph – 
like the decorative frames –interrupts the mimetic consumption of violence by 
staging the integration of the ordinary and the extreme, and drawing attention to 
representations of difference. (33). 
As Hesford points out, the couple in front of the mural serves as a representation of 
difference between the extraordinary (the torture) and the ordinary (a couple walking 
down the street). However, as Hesford also points out, the placement of the couple at the 
center also creates a critical context in which the Abu Ghraib photographs can be read. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the iconic Abu Ghraib photographs, as exemplified 
by the photograph of Lynndie England, rely, in part, on images of powerful female 
captors and their powerless male victims to reinforce America’s position of dominance 
over a militant Arab threat. As one can see, this power dynamic is placed in a larger 
context with a veiled woman and an Arab man at the center of the “Iraq Today” 
photograph. Hesford explains, 
The robed and veiled Muslim woman walking in from to the mural might be seen 
by some as a shadow figure of the hooded detainee. In fact, the Bush 
administration justified the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, in part, as an act that 
would liberate Muslim women from control by their religion and their men. (33). 
Although Hesford’s critique seems to buy into the clash of civilizations discourse put 
forward by the Bush administration as a reason for “liberating” Iraq (Hesford seems 
critical of the fact that the Muslim woman is still veiled despite the presence of the 
ongoing war), her critique of the re-appropriated photograph, as well as the existence of 
the originals, points to the important rhetorical function of the image.  
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In another mural, painted in a Shiite section of Baghdad, Iraq known as Sadr City 
by Iraqi artist Saleheddin Sallat (Apel 96), depicts the hooded man on a box and the 






Fig. 22. Salaheddin Sallat. “That Free Dom For Bosh.” Photograph available online at 
http://www.therevealer.org/archives/timely_000397.php. 
In this photograph the hooded image of the Abu Ghraib prisoner on a box is matched by 
an image of the Statue of Liberty on a pedestal. Liberty, too, has her face hooded, a white 
hood reminiscent of those warn by members of the Ku Klux Klan. Unlike the original 
image of the hooded man in which the wires attached to his fingers do not appear to be 
attached to any sort of electrical mechanism, the wires of the hooded man in the mural 
are attached to a breaker box. The Statue of Liberty, rather than holding the torch 
representing freedom and the welcoming of refugees into the United States, has her arm 
raised to pull the switch on the breaker box in order to electrocute the prisoner. The 
caption painted on the mural points to the irony of the Abu Ghraib photographs in the 
context of the Bush administrations war of liberation, expressing “That Freedom for 
B[u]sh.” 
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These are just a few examples of the ways in which the iconic photographs of 
Abu Ghraib have been utilized in protest. By re-appropriating the images in the 
photographs, these protest images use the dominant ideographic content of the images to 
challenge the dominant ideological assumptions about America’s mission in Iraq. These 
re-appropriated images also problematize the ideographic content of the images 
themselves. However, while resistance to the dominant message of the iconic images is 
present, there is darker side to the photographs at Abu Ghraib that even the re-
appropriated images do not attempt to reveal. In the final section of analysis, I explore 
images from Abu Ghraib that I label veiled. These images were never released in the 
mainstream media, their existence hidden by a shroud of complicated discourse and an 
imbalance of power. 
Veiled Photographs 
The following images, virtually ignored by the mainstream media, appear on web 
logs, websites for women’s advocacy groups, and on neoconservative websites. These 
photographs are similar to the iconic Abu Ghraib photographs insofar as they are digital 
photographs taken by an anonymous photographer. However, these photographs, which I 
have labeled “veiled,” differ from the iconic photographs in two distinct and important 
ways. First, these are the only Abu Ghraib photographs whose “authenticity” has been 
questioned. Second, these are the only Abu Ghraib photographs that feature women as 
the victims of violence.  
By focusing on the victimage of Arab men, particularly Arab men at the hands of 
American women, the iconic photographs of Abu Ghraib paint a picture of control that is 
consistent with the dominant justifications for war made by the Bush administration, 
particularly that Iraq needed to be saved from itself and specifically that Iraqi women 
needed to be saved from their religion and from their men. However, as Lila Rajiva 
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explains, “It is in this view the story of the women of Abu Ghraib, or, more accurately, 
the absence of a story about them, one of those singular absences that more than any 
misstatement reveals the falsity of the propaganda of liberation” (Language 132). The 
abuse of women and children at Abu Ghraib by U.S. troops has not been widely reported 
nor adequately dealt with in the mainstream press.12 And, as Rajiva argues, 
Assaults, rapes, abductions, body searches, prostitution, honor killings, stripping 
and photographing in detention, torture – together these make a picture of 
extraordinary and random sexual violence ravaging [Iraq]. If anything, observers 
have not adequately grasped the depth and extent of the suffering of Iraqi women, 
a suffering equal to that of the men. (Language 137) 
The fact that certain types of pictures have been widely reported in the news while others 
have failed to surface makes the photographic images of Abu Ghraib even more 
complicated and important. As Rajiva rightly asks, “Were we to have the same sort of 
photos of women on the front pages as we did of the men, what would become of the 
mask of the liberator?” (Language 148). In recognizing that the iconic photographs of 
Abu Ghraib primarily depict the suppression of Iraqi men and ignore the abuse of Iraqi 
women, one must examine whether or not these iconic photographs challenge dominant 
assumptions of the war in Iraq or merely reinforce the notion of a <clash of 
civilizations>. 
Questions of authenticity have a unique relationship to the photographic medium. 
According to Susan Sontag, the assumed authenticity or “realness” of a photographic 
image is something that permeates language used in reference to photographic practices. 
She explains that differences between photography and art are delineated “by the 
convention that artists ‘make’ drawings and paintings while photographers ‘take’ 
photographs” (46).  In this respect, photographs have a unique place in the realm of 
“facts.” Where as an artist’s rendering of a particular violent act evokes thoughts and 
                                                 
12 For a detailed account of these reports please see Rajiva, Language, 133-138. 
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feelings that “things like this happened,” Sontag points out that photographs, which 
unlike artistic renderings can be used as evidence in court, claim “to represent exactly 
what was before the camera’s lens” (47). Because such assumptions of transparency 
infiltrate our assumptions about what photographs are (windows that show “what really 
happened”), Sontag argues, we often forget what photographs do: “to photograph is to 
frame, and to frame is to exclude” (46).  And while, as Sontag explains, “it has always 
been possible for a photograph to misrepresent,” concerns of misrepresentation, in the 
form of staging and enhancement, are particularly prominent in an age of digital 
photography (46). Within these concerns of “authenticity,” misrepresentation in 
photographs is thought to occur when the photograph does not “really” show what it 
claims to show. According to Sontag, “A photograph – or a filmed document available on 
television or the internet – is judged a fake when it turns out to be deceiving the viewer 
about the scene it purports to depict” (46). In the analysis that follows, I examine these 
assumptions of authenticity that have permeated what little public discussion surrounds 
the veiled photographs. In these debates, the “true” or “real” nature of the photographs is 
problematized not because the sexual violence depicted in them is thought to be “fake,” 
but because the scene in which the violence occurs is called into question.  
In the following photograph a woman is forcefully sodomized by a group of 
soldiers (see figure 23). The woman, who appears to be wearing a robe similar to the one 
worn by the hooded man on a box (see figure 1) is sexually violated by one male soldier 
as another holds her by her hair, and a third gropes her breast. The third man also appears 






Fig. 23. Woman being raped, available online at 
http://www.vialls.com/myahudi/rape.html. 
In another photograph, the same woman is held at gunpoint and is forced to perform oral 
sex on a male soldier (see figure 24). These photographs differ from the iconic 






Fig. 24. Woman forced to perform oral sex at gunpoint, available online at 
http://womensspace.wordpress.com/2006/07/08/the-rape-of-iraq-part-2-
warning-may-trigger/. 
First, unlike the simulated sexual acts featured in the iconic photographs 
(simulated oral sex with contact prevented by hoods), the violent sexual acts in these 
veiled photographs are not simulated. Second, unlike the iconic photographs in which the 




perpetrators are obscured by what appear to be gas masks. The perpetrators also ignore 
the camera, intent on the violence at hand. Third, because the violence in the veiled 
photographs is sexual assault, there exist, to my knowledge, no agent-absent veiled 
photographs. The sexual violation featured in the photographs dictates that the agent 
always be present, even when the face of the agent is not visible or within the 
photographic frame. Finally, unlike the vast majority of the iconic photographs in which 
the faces of the male victims are hooded, making the victims anonymous, the faces of the 
female victims in the veiled photographs are clearly identifiable. A final set of 
photographs features close up shots of women being forced to perform oral sex. The 
close nature of the frame not only focuses attention on the sexual act, but also shows the 





Fig. 25. Women forced to perform oral sex, available at 
http://www.vialls.com/myahudi/rape.html. 
There is another major difference between this set of photographs and the 
photographs I am labeling iconic: a heated, politicized debate regarding whether or not 
these photographs feature the “real” rape of female captives in Iraq or “fake” rape staged 
by the pornography industry. In May of 2004, a Pennsylvania-based human rights 
organization, Universal Community of Friends, posted these photographs, and others like 
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it, on its website.13 The organization claims to have originally pulled the photographs off 
of an Internet pornography site, Iraqbabes.com.  This site has since been removed from 
the web but, according to Universal Community of Friends, the pornography site claimed 
that the photographs featured “the real rapes of Iraqi women” by U.S. military personnel.  
The Universal Community of Friends is not the only organization that posted 
commentary regarding these photographs to its website. On May 4, 2004, 
WorldNetDaily.com, a conservative online news organization featured a story, authored 
by Sherrie Gossett, assuring readers that the photographs were “fake” because they 
appeared on pornography sites: 
An investigation has revealed that most of the photos are taken from the 
American pornographic website ‘Iraq Babes,’ and the Hungarian site, ‘Sex in 
War,’ which is linked to by the American site. Both websites are linked to by 
violent pornography sites and both describe Iraqi women -- played by ‘actresses’ -
- in vulgar terms. (Gossett “Bogus GI rape” par. 4) 
In a follow-up article posted on May 12, Gossett chastises The Boston Globe for running 
the photographs alongside a story questioning their validity and warns readers that the 
photographs are “being disseminated by anti-American propagandists,” listing the 
Committee for the Defense of Saddam Hussein and “Arabic newspapers” (“Boston 
Globe” pars. 2-16).  However, The Boston Globe article that sparked Gossett’s response 
also emphasizes the “inauthentic” nature of the photographs claiming, 
The images, depicting men in camouflage uniforms having sex with unidentified 
women, bear no characteristics that would prove the men are US soldiers or that 
the women are Iraqis. And there is nothing apparent in the images showing they 
were taken in Iraq. Unlike the photographs widely publicized last week, the 
                                                 
13 The photographs featured in this chapter are not the only photographs that exist. However, with these 
photographs, just as with those I have labeled iconic, an attempt has been made to provide an emblematic 
example of the violence that is depicted. Photographs similar in composition to those I am labeling veiled 




images appear to have been taken outdoors in a sandy area with hills in the 
background. (Slack par. 3)14 
Websites concerned with women’s rights, such as womensspace.wordpress.com have 
since questioned the motivations behind discrediting the photographs in this manner, 
pointing out, as Catherine MacKinnon does, that dismissing violent sexual acts as 
legitimate if “pornography” merely underscores problems with the porn industry. For, as 
MacKinnon explains, the difference between “real” rape and pornography rape is that, “in 
pornography, women are gang raped so they can be filmed” (15). 
Whether or not one believes the set of photographs I have labeled veiled to be 
“real” or “fake,” their existence and the political controversy that surrounds them are of 
central importance for understanding what the photographs depicting the violent actions 
at Abu Ghraib, both iconic and veiled, do. Although reports on the status of women at 
Abu Ghraib prison have not been adequately dealt with in the mainstream press, there are 
many reports that mention the sexual abuse of female prisoners (see chapter 3). In 
addition, reports by various human rights organizations, alternative and international 
news sources, and even the U.S. government’s own investigations of Abu Ghraib prison 
have all noted the abuse of women. For example, in his 2004 report stemming from his 
investigation of abuse allegations at Abu Ghraib, Major General Antonio Taguba lists 
several acts of abuse including, “videotaping and photographing naked male and female 
detainees,” “a male MP guard having sex with a female detainee,” and “sodomizing a 
detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick” (Taguba 416-417). Taguba’s 
suggestion that a male guard was “having sex” with a female prisoner is problematic. As 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that only a small number of Abu Ghraib prisoners were ever detained inside the 
actual prison building. Most of the thousands of prisoners detained at Abu Ghraib during the time of the 
photographed torture were, in fact, detained outside. Those accused of violence against prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib have also repeatedly claimed that wearing uniforms lacking identifying insignia was common 
practice among military intelligence agents in charge of interrogations at Abu Ghraib. For more on these 
points please see chapter 3. 
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Lila Rajiva rightly considers, “Do soldiers and enemy prisoners usually have consensual 
sex? Doesn’t the element of power involved make that on its face an improbability, if not 
an impossibility?” (“Iraqi Women” par. 2). However, as Rajiva also recognizes, Taguba’s 
report offers “a hint of something festering under the surface” despite the fact that “few 
mainstream journalists in the West appear to have asked any hard questions about the 
inexplicable absence of women from the torture pictures” (“Iraqi Women” par. 2). 
Indeed, one cannot help but wonder, with all of the outrage and documented abuse of 
male prisoners that ran in the mainstream press, why hasn’t there been more concern 
about the women of Abu Ghraib prison?  
The prominence of the iconic photographs and the ways in which the veiled 
photographs were framed point to an answer. If we understand the Abu Ghraib 
photographs as ideographs or high order abstractions representing common ideologies 
about what war is and what fighting it might look like, then the circulation of certain 
photographs and not others seems to suggest that the violent actions depicted in the iconic 
photographs fit into an American national understanding of war: an understanding in 
which Arab males are understood to be potential terrorists and can, therefore, be 
subjected to violence. Similarly, an insistence, by certain audiences, that the veiled 
photographs fit into the realm of pornography rather than the realm of war crime says 
something else about shared attitudes surrounding the types of victimage and violence 
that can be enacted by “our side.” Susan Sontag argues that “Photographs that everyone 
recognizes are now a constituent part of what a society chooses to think about, or declares 
that it has chosen to think about” (85). By stifling access to the photographs made 
available during the investigations of Abu Ghraib, the U.S. government, in the name of 
national security, ultimately chose what the American public could think about or 
associate with. By failing to ask hard questions of the government, the U.S. media and, in 
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some sense, the American people have also made a choice. The photographs depicting 
sexual violence against Iraqi women call into question not only the nature of America’s 
mission in Iraq, which involves the suppression of terrorism and the liberation of Iraqi 
people, but they also call into question the true victims of violence in Iraq. For if women, 
who by nature of their gender, do not fit Western definitions of terrorists, can be detained 
and sexually brutalized, then the dominant narrative which insists that only hardened 
criminals and plotting terrorists are ever knowingly taken into U.S. custody falls flat. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have examined the rhetorical nature of the photographic images 
of Abu Ghraib by considering the extent to which these images adhere to or undermine 
public alignment with dominant assumptions regarding national identity and the politics 
of war. I have shown that the iconic photographs, those photographs featured prominently 
in mainstream media accounts of the Abu Ghraib incidents, work in the same manner as 
their historical counterparts (photographs of war and lynch mob trophy photographs) in 
that they highlight the power, ambivalence, and dominance of the captors, while 
simultaneously feminizing and fetishizing their anonymous victims. Iconic agent-absent 
photographs construct the viewer as the agent of the Orientalist gaze; iconic agent-present 
images may deflect accountability onto specific agents (framed in news media, as we 
shall see in chapter 3, as “a few bad apples”). I have also shown that these iconic 
photographs not only came to serve as a type of visual shorthand for the incidents of 
torture that occurred in the Abu Ghraib prison, but that these images also served as 
rhetorical opportunities for activists who re-appropriated these images, using them to call 
America’s national narrative of the war on terror into question despite an overall muted 
response by the American public at large. However, and perhaps most importantly, I have 
argued that the existence of a second category of Abu Ghraib photographs, those I have 
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labeled veiled, point to larger, unresolved issues regarding the violent actions that have 
occurred inside Abu Ghraib prison. These photographs, which feature the violent sexual 
assault of Iraqi women by unidentified military personnel, suggest that the iconic 
photographs of the incidents at Abu Ghraib, as shocking and as violent as they are, are 
not the whole story. The existence of these images, along with the politicized debates 
surrounding them, points to the rhetorical function of images of violence. Images of 
violence work, as Susan Sontag suggests, as their own type of rhetoric: “They reiterate. 
They simplify. They agitate. They create the illusion of consensus” (6). The veiled 
images leave some torture practices unquestioned and some victims unseen, retaining the 
American prerogative of secrecy. 
Although I have emphasized the rhetorical significance of the images of violence 
at Abu Ghraib in this chapter, it is important to keep in mind that these images do not 
exist in a vacuum. Much political, social, and mediated debate has surrounded and 
attempted to reframe the Abu Ghraib photographs since they were first leaked to the 
media in 2004. However, it is also important to note that the political and mediated 
rhetoric surrounding the types of violent actions prominently featured in the Abu Ghraib 
photographs did not begin with the appearance of the photos in the press. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the political discourse surrounding detention, interrogation, and the use 




Chapter 2:  Private Persuasion, Public Denial: Politics, Torture and the 
Interpretation of Law 
[T]win pressures – fear of not doing enough to stop the next attack, and an equally 
present fear of doing too much and ending up before a court or grand jury – lie 
behind the Bush administration’s controversial legal policy decisions about the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Geneva Conventions, military commissions, 
interrogation techniques, Guantanamo Bay, and more. (Jack Goldsmith 12)15 
 ‘Look, let me make very clear the position of my government and our country,’ 
Bush said in the Oval Office. ‘We do not condone torture. I have never ordered 
torture. I will never order torture. The values of this country are such that torture 
is not a part of our soul and our being.’ (Bush, qtd. in “I Have Never Ordered 
Torture”) 
Although the Abu Ghraib photographs have become a type of visual shorthand 
representing the acts of violence that occurred there, the violent acts captured on film 
make up only a small piece of what is a complicated political, legal, and rhetorical 
construct establishing the meaning of torture in the context of the War on Terror, 
undertaken after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 
11, 2001. In framing this new war, the Bush administration focused on the terrifying, 
irrational, and inhuman character of the enemy and on the need for the United States to 
prevent future attacks. Within this rhetoric of self-defense, the Bush administration and 
other political elites in support of the war reasoned that preemptive violence was 
necessary (Davis and Cloud). The gathering of intelligence became a means to this end. 
Set against the background of the traumatic and devastating September 11 attacks, 
the rationale of the Bush administration’s legal policy decisions, noted above by Jack 
Goldsmith, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General, becomes excruciatingly clear. In the 
aftermath of tragedy the President promised to defeat terrorism at any cost, and gathering 
                                                 
15 Jack Goldsmith is currently a law professor at Harvard University. From October 2003 to June of 2004, 
Goldsmith served at Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. 
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intelligence on al Qaeda and other terrorist networks seemed a logical step in that 
direction (Lewis). Lacking “human intelligence,” or spies inside these terrorist networks, 
the Bush administration “focused on the hope of getting information by questioning 
captured terrorist suspects” (Lewis xiii). As early as September 25, 2001, a series of legal 
memoranda began to circulate among individuals in the White House, the Pentagon, the 
U.S. State Department and the Department of Justice. Within these memos, the Bush 
administration sought, and was eventually granted, the “right to interrogate prisoners with 
techniques possibly outlawed by the Geneva Conventions and by American military and 
civil law” (Greenberg xvii). These legal memoranda, which ultimately consisted of 
thousands of pages, were encoded in complicated language and securely classified to 
ensure that only a few select individuals within the Bush administration ever saw them.  
It seems strange to the average observer that these documents, shrouded in secrecy, could 
rightly call into question international treaties and laws of war outside of a U.S. or 
international court. However, as Jack Goldsmith explains, 
[M]ost legal issues of executive branch conduct related to war and intelligence 
never reach a court, or do so only years after the executive has acted. In these 
situations, the executive branch determines for itself what the law requires, and 
whether its actions are legal. In theory the President himself must construe the law 
as part of his constitutional duty to ‘faithfully execute’ the law, for he must know 
what the law requires before he can enforce it. (32) 
It is in these memoranda that President Bush, through the office of the Attorney General, 
construed torture law. And, as the language of the memos makes quite clear, this law was 
interpreted with an acute awareness of the ethical and legal debates surrounding torture.  
Although these so-called “torture memos” date back to the start of President 
Bush’s war on terror, the American public did not become aware of their existence until 
the summer of 2004, just a few short months after the Abu Ghraib photographs were first 
leaked to the press. These memoranda, first uncovered by critical journalists from The 
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Washington Post and ultimately released by the U.S. government, not only outlined many 
torture techniques prominently featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs, but also linked 
these techniques directly to President Bush and top members of his cabinet. With their 
cold bureaucratic language outlining specific thresholds of pain deemed acceptable for 
use against a terrorist enemy, these memoranda clearly contradicted the notions of 
freedom and democratic American national identity President Bush had crafted as part of 
America’s war on terror. Having been released to the public in the middle of the 
President’s run for re-election, these memoranda also seemed to open space for critique 
from his political opponents. However, the torture memos never served as significant 
political fodder for Bush’s political opposition. In fact, it was John Kerry, Bush’s 
opponent, who ultimately came under harsh scrutiny from the press and the American 
public for his war record, not Bush. In November of 2004, just months after the Abu 
Ghraib photographs and corresponding legal memoranda were made available to the 
public, President Bush was re-elected to the White House. 
In this chapter I examine the political language surrounding the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal. I compare the so-called torture memos to public political statements about 
Abu Ghraib made during the 2004 Presidential campaign and consider the ways in which 
these two types of political discourse define torture in terms of American national 
identity. In this chapter, I am asking a number of interrelated questions: How does the 
rhetoric of the private political discourse surrounding torture differ from the public 
political discourse regarding the Abu Ghraib prison scandal? What role (if any) did the 
so-called torture memos play in shaping public political discourse surrounding Abu 
Ghraib? Did these memos shape public perceptions of U.S. interrogation practices and/or 
enable political opposition to the war in Iraq? If so, how? And, in what ways is political 
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discourse, both public and private, shaped by dominant understandings of the relationship 
between national identity and violence?  
In order to answer these questions, this chapter explores two sets of political texts. 
The first set of texts I examine contains the legal memoranda that circulated among top 
members of the Bush administration between September 25, 2001 and April 16, 2003. An 
analysis of these texts explores the ways in which violence is explained and justified and 
to what extent these justifications depend upon dominant understandings of American 
national identity. The second set of political texts I examine includes the public addresses 
made by political officials in reaction to the exposure of the Abu Ghraib incidents. 
Because the violence at Abu Ghraib was made public during an election year, I analyze 
the public addresses made by President Bush, members of the Bush administration, and 
Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry. In this section of analysis I examine the 
ways in which these public addresses (speeches, Presidential debates, and news 
conferences) frame the violence at Abu Ghraib and examine the impact (if any) the Abu 
Ghraib scandal had on the election.  
These texts were essential to defining an enemy in such a way as to make the 
mistreatment of them legal. This legalization of torture, in turn, is very much dependant 
upon an understanding of American national citizens as freedom-loving victims needing 
protection from an irrational terrorist threat, a threat that must ultimately be controlled to 
insure the safety and integrity of the American people. In this chapter I argue that the 
public political language that the Bush administration used to frame the war on terror 
ultimately motivated members of the Bush legal team to reinterpret national and 
international laws regarding the treatment of so-called enemy combatants (a label for the 
enemy that came out of this reinterpretation). By couching the treatment of prisoners in 
terms of legal standards, the U.S. government had only to answer to the law; at the same 
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time, as analysis will show, the administration rewrote the law to suit its needs. While it 
is important for the purpose of this project to understand the persuasive power of the law, 
it is also important to understand the ways in which the language of the law was 
ultimately shaped by certain ideologies regarding the identity of America as a nation, the 
identity of America’s enemies, and the prerogative of each to impose violence on the 
other. I argue that the ways in which the Bush administration reinterpreted the law 
ultimately shaped the ways in which both the Bush campaign and the Kerry campaign 
could (or would) address the incidents at Abu Ghraib publicly during the 2004 
Presidential election. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal, by exposing members of the 
American military as torturers, had the potential to problematize what it means to be an 
American citizen. However, as the following analysis will show, this threat to an 
idealized American national identity constituted in and by democratic values was 
managed rhetorically by the Bush administration in such a way that acts of torture were 
neutralized and the American people were ultimately distanced from them.   
LEGAL LANGUAGE AND THE ENACTMENT OF STATE VIOLENCE 
Assumptions about violent actors are instrumental in shaping the ways in which 
acts of violence come to be understood. In the case of Abu Ghraib, potentially violent 
actors fall into two distinct categories: the state and the terrorist. The term state, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, refers specifically to the governmental controlling body of a 
nation. Within this definition, members of the U.S. armed forces, government agencies 
(like the FBI and the CIA), police, and even top-ranking governmental officials (like the 
President of the United States) are all understood to be members of the state. 
Accordingly, the types of violent actions performed by state actors are understood as 
state-sanctioned violence. This distinction, between state-sanctioned violence and other 
types of collective violence, is important because, as Charles Tilly explains, 
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“Government agents and allies regularly employ violence as they pursue their own ends. 
Soldiers, sailors, police, jailers and guards enjoy legal rights – even legal obligations – to 
use violent means on behalf of governments” (19).  
Max Weber first argued that the state legally and legitimately employed violence 
toward political ends in the early 1900s. According to Weber, “a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (“Politics” 1). Weber argued that the state had an intimate 
relationship with violence in that violence often defined the power of the state and the 
state, in turn, used this power to deem violence legitimate when it served the state’s 
political purposes. As he explains, “the right to use physical force is ascribed to other 
institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is 
considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” (Weber “Politics” 1). Mahmood 
Mamdani recognizes the importance of Weber’s assumptions and argues that powerful 
nation-states, the United States in particular, have become dominant world forces because 
of their ability to produce and legitimize state violence at home and around the globe. He 
argues, “The nation-state centralized the formerly dispersed means of violence into a 
single fist, capable of delivering an awesome blow to all enemies of the nation, internal 
and external” (Mamdani 5). One of the ways in which the state can deliver this blow is 
through its influence in writing and interpreting national and international law. Robert 
Cover a law professor and longtime civil rights activist argues that interpretation of the 
law and state violence cannot be understood apart from one another. He explains, 
Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: 
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his 
freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also 
constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about 
to occur. When interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind 
victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of 
violence. (Cover 1601)  
 72
Cover is right to observe that national law, in many ways, can be understood in terms of 
its role as a system that legitimizes and rationalizes state violence. For Cover, whose 
work focuses on state-sanctioned imprisonment, the violence of the law is most obvious 
to the person or persons punished under its rule (1608). Importantly, Cover also 
recognizes that ideological justifications for the violent acts of the law are made to 
benefit the perpetrators of legal violence. Cover explains, 
I do not wish to downplay the significance of such ideological functions of law. 
But the function of ideology is much more significant in justifying an order to 
those who principally benefit from it and who must defend it than it is in hiding 
the nature of the order from those who are victims. (1608) 
For Cover, ideological assumptions that reside within the language of the law help justify 
state violence. In fact, the ability of the law to persuade state actors into enacting violent 
actions is, for Cover, one of the law’s most powerful functions (1613). 
Rhetorical analysis is an important resource for scholars in this regard. As Marouf 
Hasain, Jr. argues, it is the examination of rhetorical acts within the law that allows critics 
to understand more fully the ideological assumptions that legal assertions often take for 
granted. Hasain’s most recent work explores historical and contemporary uses of the 
terms “necessity” and “military necessity,” with a particular focus on how these phrases 
are used in defense of modern-day military tribunals. He argues, 
[T]he complex issues surrounding these tribunals are not simply matters that can 
be resolved through formalistic legal analyses that discover the ‘right’ 
interpretation of key precedents, statues, or military codes. In the wake of 9/11, 
we are living in a world where we are having to renegotiate the ways we think 
about legal just and the spirit behind these laws. (2) 
Similarly, I argue that understanding the rhetorical, as well as the legal, functions of the 
so-called torture memos, can help scholars and critics understand how violent acts 
become legally justified. Rhetorical analysis can also help us to understand how legalized 
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violence is ultimately explained to and percieved by the publics in whose name this 
violence becomes enacted. 
Violence and the state have a very close and powerful relationship in so far as 
each legitimizes the other. However, the relationship between violence and the state is as 
dangerous as it is gratifying in that while violence offers the state control, violence also 
poses a constant threat to state power. A way for the state to control the threat of violence 
is to promote the illegitimacy of the types of violence that threaten it. This makes the 
state a unique participant in interactions with violent actors deemed a terrorist threat.  
The label terrorist is one primarily attributed to people whose actions are seen as 
a threat to the legitimacy of the state, but those acting on behalf of the state are often 
those with the power to define terrorist threat. Common definitions of terrorism used by 
state agencies are complicated and, by no means, universal. The U.S. Code defines 
terrorism in terms of actions that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State” and appear 
to be intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” to “influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion,” or to “affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping” (18 USC 113b, sec. 2331, 2004). The 
National Counterterrorism Center defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents” (i). According to the FBI, terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” 
(http://jackson.fbi.gov/cntrterr.htm). Although these different state actors define terrorism 
in different ways, each definition deems terrorist violence illegitimate in comparison to 
the state or in terms of state law.  
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The term terrorism is understood as “the use of violence or force, or the threat of 
such, directed upon innocents, civilians, or noncombatants, in order to achieve political 
objectives” (Kapitan and Schulte 173). The term terrorist is recognized as a label that 
“automatically discredits any individuals or groups to which it is affixed; it dehumanizes 
them, places them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and 
portrays them as people who cannot be reasoned with” (Kapitan and Schulte 178). This 
chapter raises the question: When are violent actors labeled as terrorists and when are 
they not, even when they meet the definition of terrorism elaborated above? The 
definitions used by the state agencies charged with controlling terrorist threat 
purposefully exclude the state as a potential agency of terror. This exclusion of the state 
is important because, as Kapitan and Schulte explain, “At the level of overt actions 
committed by states, there are numerous examples that are not usually labeled as 
‘terrorist,’ though they qualify as such under those definitions that allow for state 
terrorism” (176).16 Brian Martin also recognizes the ways in which state definitions of 
terrorism excludes state actors. He explains, “Politicians and others define and think 
about terrorism in a way that excludes the role of ‘respectable’ states in terrorism. 
Terrorism is commonly defined as the use of violence by nonstate groups and so-called 
‘rogue states’ against civilians for political purposes” (Martin 7). By making terrorist 
violence illegitimate and excluding state actors as terrorist threats, definitions of terrorism 
currently perpetuated in mainstream political language dismiss the social, political, and 
economic motivations of the people who use violence against a state, while 
simultaneously reinforcing state violence.  
                                                 
16 These examples include, “the destruction of Gronzy by Russian forces during the Chechnya war of 1999, 
the U.S. bombing of Tripoli, Libya in April 1986, resulting in the deaths of over 100 civilians, the US naval 
bombardment of Lebanese villages in the Chouf mountains in October 1983, and the Israeli aerial and land 
bombardment of Beruit in the summer of 1982 that resulted in the deaths of 5000-6000 civilians” (Kapitan 
and Schulte 176). 
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POLITICAL LANGUAGE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
Although the graphic images of the violence at Abu Ghraib began to circulate in 
the spring of 2004, members of the Bush administration were concerned with the 
possibility of these types of acts long before the incidents at Abu Ghraib occurred. The 
first set of political texts I examine contains legal memoranda, a series of so-called 
“torture memos” that began circulating among members of the Bush administration as 
early as September 25, 2001. These memoranda, authored by members of the Bush legal 
team, high-ranking U.S. security officials, and even President Bush himself, were written 
and circulated with the intent to authorize and document the “coercive interrogation” or 
torture methods used by members of the United States military in Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib. In 2005 two lawyers, Karen Greenberg and Joshua 
Dratel, gathered these documents as the U.S. government declassified them. Their 
published volume, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, consists of thousands 
of pages, containing twenty eight internal memoranda and nearly a dozen official U.S. 
reports concerning the legality of torture techniques used by the U.S. government. These 
memoranda are important because they illustrate the persuasive means (appealing to self-
defined law and the construction of national identity in terms of a terrorist other) through 
which political elites, top members of the Bush administration and the Bush legal team, 
justified the use of torture by members of the U.S. military. These memoranda are also 
important because their authors never intended to make them public, and the 
justifications for torture methods that these memos contain differ drastically from the 
public political discourse surrounding Abu Ghraib that occurred in the midst of the 2004 
Presidential election. I examined 27 internal memoranda that were circulated between 
September 25, 2001 and April 16, 2003. The documents analyzed in this chapter are 
emblematic examples of the memoranda examined.  
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The second set of political texts I examined includes the public addresses made by 
political elites in reaction to the exposure of the incidents at Abu Ghraib. Because the 
violence at Abu Ghraib was made public during an election year, I analyzed the public 
addresses made by President Bush, members of the Bush administration, and Democratic 
Presidential candidate John Kerry between April 28, 2004 (the day CBS first broke the 
story of Abu Ghraib) and ending December 2, 2004 (one month after President Bush was 
reelected). The following table (see Table 2.1) represents the results of focused key word 
searches in online historical archives made available through www.whitehouse.gov. 
These archives contain public addresses (e.g. press conferences and campaign speeches) 
made by the Bush administration over the course of the Bush presidency. A search 
containing the search terms “Iraq” or “al Qaeda” between April 28, 2004 and December 
2, 2004 yielded 473 documents. Within this body of documents 16 contained the terms 
“abuse” or “abusing” in reference to the incidents at Abu Ghraib. The term “torture” 
limited the original search to 104. Of these, the term “torture” was used 9 times in 
reference to the incidents at Abu Ghraib and 95 times in reference to actions made by 
Saddam Hussein prior to U.S. invasion of Iraq. The term “Abu Ghraib,” when added to 
the original search for “Iraq” or “al Qaeda” limited documents to 9 and the term “picture” 
when added to the original search limited documents to 5. I closely examined all 







Table 2.1: Incidence of Addresses Made by the Bush Administration Referencing Torture 
Category Number of Addresses 
Total 1338 
Containing Iraq or al Qaeda 473 
Iraq or al Qaeda + abuse or abusing 
(referencing violent actions at Abu Ghraib) 
16 
Iraq or al Qaeda + torture (referencing 
violent actions at Abu Ghraib) 
9 
Iraq or al Qaeda + torture (referencing 
violent actions of Saddam Hussein) 
95 
Iraq or al Qaeda + “Abu Ghraib” 9 
Iraq or al Qaeda + picture (referencing the 
Abu Ghraib photographs)* 
5 
Source: News Archives (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004) available at 
www.whitehouse.gov 
* An initial search revealed that President George W. Bush uses the more colloquial term 
“picture” rather than the terms “photo” or “photographs.” 
While public addresses made by the Bush administration are readily available in 
online archives, public addresses made by the Kerry campaign during the 2004 
Presidential election proved more difficult to collect. The following table (see Table 2.2) 
represents the results of focused key word searches in an online historical archive made 
available through www.presidentialrhetoric.com. This archive contains public addresses 
(e.g. press conferences and campaign speeches) made by the Kerry campaign during John 
Kerry’s run for the presidency in 2004. A search containing the search terms “Iraq” or “al 
Qaeda” between April 28, 2004 and December 2, 2004 yielded 30 documents. Within this 
body of documents none of the other search terms, “abuse,” “torture,” “Abu Ghraib,” or 




Table 2.2: Incidence of Addresses Made by the Kerry Campaign Referencing Torture 
Category Number of Addresses 
Total 41 
Containing Iraq or al Qaeda 30 
Iraq or al Qaeda + abuse or abusing 
(referencing violent actions at Abu Ghraib) 
0 
Iraq or al Qaeda + torture (referencing 
violent actions at Abu Ghraib) 
0 
Iraq or al Qaeda + torture (referencing 
violent actions of Saddam Hussein) 
0 
Iraq or al Qaeda + “Abu Ghraib” 0 
Source: (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004) available at presidentialrhetoric.com 
Because availability of addresses made by the Kerry campaign is limited, I 
conducted an additional search within news archives in LexisNexis. The motivation for 
this search was to expand my analysis of Kerry rhetoric by examining direct quotations of 
Kerry speeches and comments available in U.S. news sources. The following table (see 
Table 2.3) represents the results of a LexisNexis search containing the combined search 
terms “‘John Kerry’ AND remarks OR speech OR interview AND campaign AND ‘Abu 
Ghraib’ AND Bush AND torture OR abuse ‘Iraq’ or ‘al Qaeda’” between April 28, 2004 
and December 2, 2004. This search yielded 362 documents. Examination of these 
documents revealed 69 documents containing direct quotations by John Kerry regarding 
the incidents at Abu Ghraib. I closely examined all 69 documents containing direct 
quotations. The documents analyzed in this chapter are an emblematic example of the 
documents examined.
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Table 2.3: Direct Quotations from Kerry Campaign as Quoted in U.S. Newspapers 
Category Total Number of Articles Number of Articles 
Containing a Direct 
Quotation from Kerry 
Campaign 
“John Kerry” AND remarks 
OR speech OR interview 
AND campaign AND “Abu 
Ghraib” AND Bush AND 
torture OR abuse 
362 69 
Source: “U.S. Newspapers and Wires” (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004) as indexed by 
Lexis Nexis 
Private Persuasion: The Torture Memos as a Matter of Detainment 
The events of September 11, 2001 induced a moment of social crisis. As the 
newly elected leader of the United States, George W. Bush, and his legitimacy in the 
Presidential office, also came under attack. It was not long after the attack on September 
11, 2001 that President Bush, in an address delivered to Congress and the American 
people, defined America’s national crisis in the stark terms and strict divisions that 
eventually permeated the internal memoranda that would ultimately decide the fate of the 
prisoners held at Abu Ghraib years later. On September 20, 2001 Bush argued,  
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists.  From this day forward, any nation that continues to 
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile 
regime. (par. 29) 
Similarly, in the very first memo of The Torture Papers, a process begins whereby 
terrorists come to be defined, not as equal persons or nations in relation to the American 
people and the United States, but as an enemy unworthy and ineligible for protection 
under American and international laws. Within this process George W. Bush, President 
of the United States, is given the ultimate authority to rule over the country’s military 
actions in defense against this terrorist enemy threat. It is in this first memo whereby the 
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stark division between “us” and “them” is codified in the legal language of the American 
nation-state.  
John C. Yoo wrote the first memo in a series of memos that would later be named 
the “torture memos,” on September 25, 2001.17 In this memo Yoo outlined the 
constitutional authority of the President to use force against terrorists, establishing 
President Bush as an all-powerful leader in control of American enemies. This ability to 
control the enemy depended, in part, on the identification of the enemy as a terrorist, and 
thus an illegitimate perpetrator of violence. In the memo Yoo argued, 
[T]he [P]resident has broad constitutional power to take military action in 
response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. 
Congress has acknowledged this inherent executive power in both War Powers 
Resolution and the Joint Resolution passed by Congress on September 14, 2001. 
(3)  
This power given to the President under the law allowed him not only to retaliate against 
those deemed responsible for the September 11 attacks, but also any person or 
organization the President considered to be involved with the attacks in any way. In fact, 
in the memo Yoo asserted that the President was within his right to attack any 
organization associated with terrorism, whether or not that organization was involved in 
the events of September 11: “The President may deploy military force preemptively 
against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not 
they can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11” (3). Yoo concluded 
this memo by arguing that the President had supreme power under the law to deploy the 
military whenever he saw fit. However, most importantly, Yoo drew this conclusion by 
defining the enemy other over which the President had supreme control: 
                                                 
17 John C. Yoo served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General from 2001 to 2003.  For more information 
regarding Yoo’s legal background see Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: 
The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxxiv. 
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Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that 
participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the 
Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or 
organizations that cannot be demonstrably linked to the September 11 incidents, 
but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security of the United States and 
the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas. (24) 
In this assertion, the category terrorist not only encompasses an extremely large amount 
of potential suspects, but the essential element of a terrorist relegates him or her to a 
position dependent upon his or her relationship with the United States. Rather than being 
comprised of individuals with their own social, economic, and political motivations, 
terrorist groups are understood in terms of security threats to the American nation-state. 
In other words, the terrorist is defined solely by the extent to which he or she poses a 
threat to the people of the United States. As will be discussed in more detail below, this 
definition of the enemy in terms of threat allowed the Bush administration to deny the 
enemy legal recognition. By refusing the enemy protection under the law, the Bush 
administration could legally justify the use of torture to control it.  
President Bush executed this invested power in an executive military order issued 
on November 13, 2001. In this order the President addressed his power to detain terrorists 
and outlined the procedures by which he could treat those he identified as terrorists. He 
reiterated the assertion that individuals who were deemed terrorists were not protected 
under the law of the United States or under international laws. President Bush defined the 
enemy as people who were not citizens of the United States, who were members of al 
Qaeda “at the relevant times,” and had  
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts or international 
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or 
have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its 
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy. (26)  
Included in this definition are states that have sponsored or “knowingly harbored” 
individuals the President defines as terrorists (Bush “Military Order” 26). Once again, 
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within the language of the law, members of the state not only defined America’s enemies, 
but also asserted the legitimate right to control that enemy in the name of the American 
nation.  
One aspect of America’s control over its enemy was the state’s ability to detain 
persons defined as such. On December 28, 2001 Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals 
Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo advised General Counsel to the U.S. Department of 
Defense, William J. Haynes II, that the U.S. Federal Courts did not hold jurisdiction to 
hear petitions of habeas corpus from prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Latin 
term habeas corpus translates literally to “you have a body.” Used within the law, a writ 
of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate in which the court determines whether or not the 
state or another governing body detains a prisoner legally. When a person files a writ of 
habeas corpus, he or she does so to challenge the legality of the terms under which 
another person has been imprisoned. By declaring that prisoners held at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba could not challenge the legality of their imprisonment in U.S. court, this 
memo ultimately became “the basis of the government’s legal strategy of trying to 
prevent detainees from challenging their detention” under U.S. law (Greenberg and 
Dratel xxv). In this memo the power of the American nation-state to control the persons 
deemed an enemy threat resided solely in the understood sovereignty of the American 
nation and the territorial space over which U.S. law could grant a person legal rights or 
recognition of a legal “body.”  Therefore, it was determined that persons detained in 
Cuba, who were not U.S. citizens, could not appeal to U.S. law because their place of 
detainment was in a physical space outside the territorial borders of the United States. 
However, with this determination, Philbin and Yoo cautioned against the possibility for 
alternative interpretations of the law: 
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If an alien detainee is both outside the United State’s sovereign territory and 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court, then it is clear that no habeas 
jurisdiction exists. We have explained above that we believe GBC meets those 
conditions. A non-frivolous argument might be constructed, however, that GBC, 
while not a part of sovereign territory of the United States, is within the territorial 
jurisdiction of a federal court. . . . This is because ‘sovereignty’ over territory and 
‘jurisdiction’ over territory could mean different things. A nation, for example, 
can retain its sovereignty over its territory, yet at the same time allow another 
nation to exercise limited jurisdiction within it. (34) 
Philbin and Yoo expressed concern over the possibility for alternative interpretations of 
the law because, as they explained, “such a result could interfere with the operation of the 
system that has been developed to address the detainment and trial of enemy aliens” (34). 
Specifically, if the U.S. courts allowed a petition of habeas corpus, a detainee could 
“challenge the legality of his status and treatment under international treaties, such as the 
Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 
(Philbin and Yoo 36). If a detainee were allowed a petition of habeas corpus he or she 
could also challenge “the use of military commissions and the validity of any charges 
brought as violation of the laws of war under both international and domestic law” 
(Philbin and Yoo 36). Philbin and Yoo ultimately concluded that prisoners detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba did not have the right to petition for habeas corpus. This 
conclusion benefited the U.S. government in that by denying the enemy habeas corpus, 
state actors lessened the possibility that the legitimacy of state actions could be called 
into question. 
Private Persuasion: The Torture Memos as a Matter of Treatment 
The refusal by the Bush administration to recognize so-called terrorists as 
anything other than a threat to the United States led to a similar refusal to honor human 
rights in accordance with U.S. and international law. As early as January 9, 2002, 
members of the Bush administration and the Bush legal team began circulating a series of 
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memoranda concerning whether or not the Geneva Conventions and other international 
laws designed to protect human rights in times of war applied to members of al Qaeda or 
the Taliban militia in Afghanistan. A memo written by John Yoo and Robert Delabunty 
ultimately concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not apply in either case: 
We conclude that these treaties do not protect members of the al Qaeda 
organization, which as a non-State actor cannot be a party to the international 
agreements governing war. We further conclude that these treaties do not apply to 
the Taliban militia. This memorandum expresses no view as to whether the 
President should decide, as a matter of policy, that the U.S. Armed Forces should 
adhere to the standards of conduct in those treaties with respect to the treatment of 
prisoners. (38) 
The rationale behind this decision relied on the assumption that the Geneva Conventions 
were designed to govern the legal relationships between nation-states, not between 
nation-states and enemy others who were considered “private, subnational groups or 
organizations” (Yoo and Delabunty 42). Yoo and Delabunty argued that members of al 
Qaeda did not follow appropriate rules of war, and, therefore, the United States was not 
required to treat them in a way that was governed by international treaties. As Yoo and 
Delabunty explained, 
Al Qaeda members have clearly demonstrated that they will not follow these basic 
requirements of lawful warfare. They have attacked purely civilian targets of no 
military value, the refused to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but 
instead hijacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; they have 
deliberately targeted and killed thousands of civilians; and the themselves do not 
obey the laws of war concerning the protection of the lives of civilians or the 
means of legitimate combat. (50) 
In the case of the Taliban, it was determined that even though Afghanistan, as a nation, 
was witness to the Geneva Conventions, Afghanistan was a failed state under the Taliban 
regime and, therefore, the United States was not obligated to conduct a war against the 
Taliban regime within the confines of Geneva.  
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On January 16, 2002 the first suspected al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners arrived at 
the prison facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At this point in history, the queries in the 
memoranda became more specific to the practices of imprisonment and interrogation that 
were occurring there. In a memo written on January 25, 2002, Alberto Gonzales outlined 
the arguments that allowed the President to refuse members of al Qaeda and the Taliban 
recognition as prisoners of war in accordance with Geneva Convention III, whose 
purpose is to assure legal treatment of POWs.18 The decision to couch detainment and 
treatment practices under Geneva III is, by itself, important and revealing. Under the third 
Geneva Convention, prisoners of war are persons who are a part of the armed forces, a 
militia, or another armed group. Geneva IV, on the other hand, refers to the treatment of 
civilians. By focusing on Geneva III, members of the Bush administration ultimately 
determined that those imprisoned at Guantanamo, and eventually Abu Ghraib, were not 
considered civilians under the law. 
This January 25 memo authored by Gonzales was written in response to claims 
made by then Secretary of State Colin Powell who, in earlier memos, had argued that 
POW status should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Powell, who asked for 
reconsideration following the Gonzales memo, argued, 
The Secretary of State believes that al Qaeda terrorists as a group are not entitled 
to POW status and that Taliban fighters could be determines not to be POWs 
either as a group or on a case-by-case basis. . . . any determination that 
Afghanistan is a failed State would be contrary to the official U.S. government 
position. The United States and the international community have consistently 
held Afghanistan to its treaty obligations and identified it as a party to the Geneva 
Conventions. (124) 
                                                 
18 Alberto R. Gonzales was appointed as legal counsel to President George W. Bush in January of 2001. 
For more information on Gonzales’s legal background, see The Torture Papers, xxxii. 
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In his memo to the President, Gonzales advised that the arguments made by Powell were 
legally “unpersuasive” and suggested that the President deny POW status to all members 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban without giving case-by-case consideration as to that status: 
On January 18, I advised you that the Department of Justice had issued a formal 
legal opinion concluding that the Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GPW) does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. I also 
advised you that DOJ’s opinion concludes that there are reasonable grounds for 
you to conclude that GPW does not apply with respect to the conflict with the 
Taliban. I understand that you decided that GPW does not apply and, accordingly 
that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war under the GPW. 
(118)  
The memo outlined characteristics of the Taliban and al Qaeda that made them ineligible 
for the consideration of POW status, a status that would have given them the protection 
of their rights as human beings under U.S. and international law. Members of al Qaeda 
were not given POW status because “Afghanistan was a failed state” at the time of the 
September 11 attacks (Gonzales 118). The Taliban and its forces were denied POW status 
because the “Taliban and its forces were, in fact, not a government, but a militant, 
terrorist-like group” (Gonzales 119). It was here that the definition of the enemy became 
even more problematic. On the one hand, there is a conflation of terms when al Qaeda, a 
secret group of so-called terrorists, is conflated with Afghanistan, a failed nation-state. 
More explicitly, the Taliban and its forces are defined as a terrorist enemy. If al Qaeda, 
Afghanistan, and the Taliban are defined as terrorists, then the denial of POW status in 
this way essentially instilled the President with the legal rights to control theses newly 
defined enemies through any use of military force he deemed necessary. 
This memo from Gonzales is important because it is emblematic of the ways in 
which U.S. enemies ultimately came to be defined under U.S. law. Defining the enemy in 
this way, not only allowed the President to determine who was considered a terrorist 
enemy, but it also allowed the President to change the nature of war in order to better 
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control this enemy. Addressing the President directly, Gonzales stated, “As you have 
said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war. It is not the traditional clash between 
nations adhering to the laws of war . . . ” (119). President Bush ultimately decided that 
the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda, but did apply to the war in 
Afghanistan (“Humane Treatment” 134). However, he determined “that the Taliban 
detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war 
under Article 4 of Geneva” (“Humane Treatment” 135). He also determined that because 
Geneva did not apply to al Qaeda, “al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of 
war” (“Humane Treatment” 135). By defining enemy terrorists in terms that deny them 
political or social legitimacy, the Bush administration denied the enemy protection within 
the law. Denying the enemy protection under the law, in turn, changed the nature of war 
and opened the door for what is deemed legal when fighting one. Most importantly, 
controlling the legal status of the enemy and altering the nature of war, gave the Bush 
administration the ability to change the ways in which laws applied to the U.S. in a 
manner that allowed the U.S. to better control its enemies while remaining perfectly 
within its legal rights. 
Private Persuasion: Information Seeking as the Legalization of Torture 
Thus far, I have shown how in a series of memoranda, the Bush administration 
defined an enemy deemed unworthy of protection under international law while 
maintaining the legal legitimacy of state actions. In August of 2002, the nature of the 
memoranda shifted from more abstract debates regarding whether or not U.S. enemies 
were worthy of human rights protections to more specific debates regarding which 
violent actions could be used to interrogate prisoners while maintaining this legal 
legitimacy. These memoranda subsequently led to the legalization of the torture 
techniques used to control the enemy of the United States. These memoranda also outline 
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many of the very same actions that were eventually captured in the photographs 
documenting the torture at Abu Ghraib. 
In a memo written to Alberto Gonzales on August 1, 2002, Jay S. Bybee outlined 
what could be described as torture under the law.19 He argued the term “torture,” as 
outlined in the law, only applied to extreme interrogation techniques. In this document 
Bybee was primarily concerned with the legal interpretation of two sections of the 
Torture Convention, a statute that outlined the legal parameters of interrogation 
techniques. The first Section, Section 2340, defined the act of torture as an act 
“committed by a person acting under the color of the law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to 
lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custodial or physical control” (Bybee 
173). The second section, 2340A, made it a criminal offense for any person “outside of 
the United States [to] commit or attempt to commit torture” (Bybee 173). Accordingly, in 
order to convict a person for participating in illegal acts of torture, a prosecutor must 
show that torture occurred outside of the United States, that the defendant “acted under 
the color of the law,” that the victim was in the defendant’s custody or physical control, 
and that the defendant intended to inflict pain on the victim. After outlining the legal 
details of what was deemed an act of torture, Bybee concluded that torture, by definition, 
only applied to extreme acts: 
[W]e conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by Sections 2340-2340A, 
covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the 
victim to endure.  Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to 
that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure. 
Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but it 
also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Additionally, such severe mental pain can arise 
only from the predicate acts listed in Section 2340.  Because the acts inflicting 
                                                 
19 Jay S. Bybee was appointed Assistant Attorney General by President George W. Bush in 2001.  For 
more information regarding Bybee’s legal background see The Torture Papers, xxxi. 
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torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though they might 
constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the 
level of torture. (213-14, emphasis added)  
By setting the physical pain threshold at a level equal to organ failure and by identifying 
a range of techniques as “cruel, inhumane, or degrading,” but not torturous, Bybee 
expanded torturous actions deemed legal. He did this in reference to a new type of war 
and to the legitimacy of the President and the state: 
Further, we conclude that under the circumstances of the current war against al 
Qaeda and its allies, application of Section 2340A to interrogations undertaken 
pursuant to the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers may be unconstitutional. 
Finally, even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or 
self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal 
liability. (213-14)  
For Bybee, invoking human rights protections for detainees considered to be terrorists by 
the United States government was unconstitutional because invoking these protections 
threatened Presidential (read state) power. If the acts outlined in this memo by Bybee 
were recognized as acts of torture, the legitimacy of state power could be called into 
question. By narrowing the scope of actions considered torture under the law, Bybee 
essentially opened the space for communication in which high-ranking members of the 
U.S. military asked for, and were granted, the legal right to use torture techniques in 
interrogations of suspected terrorists.  
On October 11, 2002, a series of memoranda circulated among military lawyers 
attempting to set the parameters for legal interrogation methods for use against suspected 
terrorists. In one memo Jerald Phifer framed a “problem” with existing guidelines for 
interrogation procedures. According to Phifer, existing guidelines were seen to “limit the 
ability of interrogators to counter advanced resistance” (227). In this correspondence, 
Phifer outlined three existing categories of interrogation techniques. Category I consists 
of so-called standard techniques, which encourage interrogators to reward detainees for 
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giving information. Phifer also explained that, under Category I, if the detainee was 
“determined by the interrogator to be uncooperative,” the interrogator could yell at the 
detainee (not directly in his ear or to the level that would cause physical pain), and 
deceive the detainee by identifying himself with a “country with a reputation for harsh 
treatment of detainees” (227). Category II interrogation techniques include: the use of 
stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours, the use of falsified 
documents, and the “use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days,” upon request (Phifer 
227). Other techniques outlined in Category II include interrogating the detainee in an 
environment other than the standard interrogation booth, deprivation of light and auditory 
stimuli through use of hood placed over the detainee’s head, the use of 20 hour 
interrogations, removal of all comfort items (including religious items), removal of 
clothing, forced grooming (shaving of facial hair etc. . .), and using detainees individual 
phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress (Phifer 228). Category III is the most 
restricted category of interrogation techniques, which, as Phifer explained, “are required 
for a very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees (less than 3%)” (228). 
Category III techniques include the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee 
that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family, 
exposure to cold weather or water, the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce 
the misperception of suffocation, and the use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such 
as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing (Phifer 228).  
In his memo that outlines interrogation techniques in great detail, Phifer never 
questioned the validity of the techniques. Rather Phifer’s only concern was whether or 
not these categories of interrogation would restrict members of the U.S. military as they 
attempted to procure information from detained suspected terrorists. It is important to 
note that these guidelines for treatment not only depend on an understanding of the 
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enemy terrorist as less than human, but also that these guidelines are based not on what 
types of information suspected terrorists might have, but rather on a general 
understanding that the U.S. government does not have the information it needs.  
Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, eventually approved the use of most 
of the interrogation methods outlined in Categories I-III by approving a recommendation 
written by William Haynes on November 27, 2002: 
I believe that all join in my recommendation that, as a matter of policy, you 
authorize the commander of USSOUTHCOM to employ, in his discretion, only 
Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III (‘Use of mild, 
non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the 
finger, and light pushing’). While all Category III techniques may be legally 
available, we believe that, as a matter of policy, a blanket approval of Category III 
techniques is not warranted at this time. (237) 
The methods outlined in Category II, a Category of which Rumsfeld officially approved, 
are methods featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs. In the photographs, detainees are 
held in standing stress positions, they are deprived of light through the use of dark hoods, 
their clothes have been removed, and they are threatened with dogs. And, although 
Rumsfeld did not officially approve of the harshest of the interrogation techniques (those 
listed in Category III), in the margins of the original document, Rumsfeld wrote, 
“However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” (Haynes 
236). These remarks, which Rumsfeld signed with his initials “DR,” trivialized the 
harshness of the interrogation methods approved.  
A few months after Rumsfeld approved the “counter-resistance” techniques 
outlined in the Haynes memo, Rumsfeld issued a memo in which he rescinded his 
authorization of the techniques until a committee comprised of members of the 
Department of Defense could fully review the legal implications of more aggressive 
interrogation techniques. The final draft of this working report on “detainee 
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interrogation” lists 35 possible “interrogation methods.” Rumsfeld, in the end, approved 
24 of these techniques (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Interrogation Techniques Approved by Donald Rumsfeld 
Counter-resistance Technique Description 
Direct Asking straightforward questions 
Incentive/removal incentive Providing reward or removing privilege, 
above and beyond those that are required 
by the Geneva Convention, from detainees 
Emotional Love Playing on the love a detainee has for an 
individual or group 
Emotional Hate Playing on the hate a detainee has for an 
individual or group 
Fear Up Harsh Significantly increasing the fear level in a 
detainee 
Fear Up Mild Moderately increasing the fear level in a 
detainee 
Reduced Fear Reducing the level of fear in a detainee 
Pride and Ego Up Boosting the ego of a detainee 
Pride and Ego Down Attacking or insulting the ego of a 
detainee, not beyond the limits that would 
apply to a POW 
Futility Invoking the feeling of futility in a detainee 
We Know All Convincing the detainee that the 
interrogator knows the answer to questions 
he asks the detainee 
Establish Your Identity Convincing the detainee that the 
interrogator has mistaken the identity for 
someone else 
Repetition Approach Continuously repeating the same question 
to the detainee within interrogation periods 
of normal duration 
File and Dossier Convincing the detainee that the 
interrogator has a damning and 
incriminating file, which must be fixed 
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Mutt and Jeff A team consisting of a friendly and a harsh 
interrogator 
Rapid Fire Questioning in rapid succession without 
allowing detainee to answer 
Silence Staring at the detainee to encourage 
discomfort 
Change of Scenery Up Removing detainee to a setting that is more 
pleasant 
Change of Scenery Down Removing detainee to a setting that is less 
comfortable 
Dietary Manipulation Changing the diet of a detainee; no 
intended deprivation of food or water, e.g., 
hot rations to MREs 
Environmental Manipulation Altering the environment to create 
moderate discomfort 
Sleep Adjustment Adjusting the sleep times of the detainee, 
not deprivation 
False Flag Convincing detainee that individuals from 
a country other than the U.S. are 
interrogating him 
Isolation Isolating detainee from other detainees 
Source: Rumsfeld, Donald. “Counter-Resistance.” Memo to General James T. Hill. 6 
April 2003. Memo 27 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen 
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 
 As these memoranda make clear, the White House was highly involved in setting the 
parameters for the treatment of U.S. captives very early in the War on Terror. However, 
as the analysis below will illustrate, the Bush administration publicly and vehemently 
denied any knowledge of the violent actions taken against prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 
Public Distance: The Bush Administration Under Fire 
The second set of political texts I examine includes the public addresses made by 
political officials regarding the incidents at Abu Ghraib. In what follows, I analyze the 
public addresses made by President Bush, members of the Bush administration, and 
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Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry. I examine the ways in which these public 
addresses (speeches, Presidential debates, and news conferences) frame the violence at 
Abu Ghraib and examine the impact (if any) the exposure of Abu Ghraib had on the 2004 
Presidential election.  
The President’s first public response to the photographs of the incidents at Abu 
Ghraib occurred in the White House Rose Garden two days after the photographs were 
released in the press. After making a prepared statement alongside visiting Canadian 
Prime Minister, Paul Martin, President Bush opened up the floor for questions from the 
press corps. One reporter asked, “What is your reaction to the photos of U.S. soldiers 
abusing Iraqi prisoners? How are you going to win their hearts and minds with these sort 
of tactics?” (Bush, “Welcome” par. 20). The President responded, 
Yes, I shared a deep disgust that those prisoners were treated the way they were 
treated. Their treatment does not reflect the nature of the American people. That’s 
not the way we do things in America. And so I – I didn’t like it one bit. But I also 
want to remind people that those few people who did that do not reflect the nature 
of the men and women we’ve sent overseas. That’s not the way the people are, 
that’s not their character, that are serving our nation in the cause of freedom [sic]. 
And there will be an investigation. I think – they’ll be taken care of. (pars. 20-21) 
This statement made by the President characterizes the consistent public stance he and his 
administration would make in regard to the incidents at Abu Ghraib throughout his run 
for reelection: The President was disgusted, the actions made by a few soldiers did not 
reflect the character of America or America’s citizens, and the Bush administration 
would investigate the situation, bringing those responsible to justice. These three themes 
in Bush’s rhetoric will be more fully explored below. In addition, a fourth theme will also 
be examined: The Bush administration consistently insisted that torture could be linked to 
America’s enemy, Saddam Hussein. Although these four themes (disgust, distance, 
promise of justice, and reification of Saddam Hussein as the real torturer) most often 
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appear together within the public rhetoric of the Bush administration, I will explore each 
rhetorical move separately in the analysis that follows. 
Public Distance: Surprise and Disgust 
After President Bush expressed his shock and disgust regarding the Abu Ghraib 
photographs on April 30, the Bush administration did not again address the situation 
publicly until then National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, gave an interview 
to the Arab television station Al Arabiya on May 3, 2004. In this interview a reporter 
from Al Arabiya spoke to Rice specifically about the Abu Ghraib photographs and about 
America’s stance on the situation. When asked about the Abu Ghraib photographs, the 
first statement Rice made was in regard to President Bush’s personal feelings regarding 
the photographs. She explained, “The President spoke about these terrible pictures the 
other day when he said that he was personally sickened by them. And we all feel 
outraged at these pictures” (par. 2). A few days later, the President, himself, reiterated 
these feelings of disgust in an interview with Arab language channel, Alhurra Television.  
When asked about the photographs, the President stated, “First, people in Iraq must 
understand that I view those practices as abhorrent” (par. 5). In this interview Bush not 
only expressed his personal disgust for the violence depicted in the photographs, but he 
also explained that he first learned of the incidents when the photographs were released.  
[T]he first time I saw or heard about pictures was on TV. However, as you might 
remember, in early January, General Kimmitt talked about a investigation that 
would be taking place about accused – alleged improprieties in the prison. So our 
government has been in the process of investigating. (par. 9) 
In this rhetorical move, the President distanced himself from any knowledge of the 
incidents and, thus, any responsibility for them. However, as is discussed in more detail 
below, even as President Bush created distance between himself, his office, and the 
incidents, he reassured the American public that its government was working to correct 
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any wrongdoing. The President made a similar statement during a press conference on 
May 6, held in honor of a visit from the Jordanian King. President Bush stated,  
I assured him [the King] Americans, like me, didn’t appreciate what we saw, that 
it made us sick to our stomachs. I also made it clear to His Majesty that the troops 
we have in Iraq, who are there for security and peace and freedom, are the finest 
of the fine, fantastic United States citizens, who represent the very best qualities 
of America: courage, love of freedom, compassion, and decency. (par. 18) 
In this statement President Bush distanced himself, a political leader, from the Abu 
Ghraib incidents by identifying himself with the average American citizen: “Americans, 
like me, didn’t appreciate what we saw.” The President also emphasized the distance 
between himself and Abu Ghraib in another statement making reference to Donald 
Rumsfeld. Bush stated, “I should have known about the pictures and the report” (par. 47). 
In expressing his shock about the violent actions, President Bush portrays himself as just 
another American citizen disgusted by the photographs. Speaking to a press corps 
reporter the President stated, 
The acts were abhorrent, Steve. They sickened me to my stomach. I know they 
sickened yours too. You’re a decent American. Any decent soul doesn’t want a 
human being treated that way. And it is – it’s a stain on our country’s honor and 
our country’s reputation. I fully understand that. And that’s why it’s important 
that justice be done. (par. 50) 
This statement separates the President from any direct responsibility for what happened at 
Abu Ghraib and helps him identify with the American people, sharing the common 
feeling of shock and disgust regarding the violent actions that had taken place there. This 
expression of solidarity with the American people along with expressions of shock and 
disgust about the incidents were not reserved for Bush’s encounters with the press, but 
also became a part of Bush’s rhetoric on the campaign trail.  
It is important to note that the stump speeches the President made while 
campaigning were essentially the same as he moved from city to city. However, 
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beginning May 8, 2004, the President concluded his speech at a Rally in Wisconsin by 
mentioning the Abu Ghraib photographs: 
Our men and women in the military are taking great risks and they’re doing great 
work. Like you, I was disgusted about the pictures I saw on TV, about the 
humiliation given to the prisoners in Iraq. No American can stand for that. That 
doesn’t reflect us, nor does it reflect the character and the decency and the honor 
of the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States of America. I 
have seen their decency and I have seen their unselfish courage. And I assure, 
ladies and gentlemen, the cause of freedom is in really good hands. (par. 39) 
While in past speeches, the President had consistently ended on this note of freedom 
being in good hands (e.g. “Remarks by the President at Ohio” par. 55; “Remarks by the 
President at Michigan” par. 62; and “Remarks by the President at Republican National 
Committee” par. 46), in speeches that were given during rallies and conventions that 
closely followed the release of the photographs, the President altered the conclusion to 
address Abu Ghraib (e.g. “Remarks by the President and the First Lady at Iowa” par. 65; 
and “President Remarks at Victory 2004” par. 44). During his remarks at the American 
Conservative Union, the President stated, 
Our men and women in the military are taking great risks on our behalf. We’ve 
got a fantastic United States military. The conduct of a few inside an Iraqi prison 
was disgraceful. Their conduct does not represent the character of the men and 
women who wear our uniform. Nor does it represent the character of the United 
States of America. (par. 47) 
This remark is also indicative of the second theme within the rhetoric that the Bush 
administration uses to frame Abu Ghraib. Along with his expressions of surprise and 
disgust, the President, as well as top members of his cabinet, also consistently framed the 
incidents at Abu Ghraib as un-American and did much rhetorical work to distance 
America as a nation and America’s mission in Iraq from these violent actions. 
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Public Distance: Torture is Not the American Way 
One way that the Bush administration attempted to separate not only itself, but 
also the American nation and American soldiers stationed in Iraq, from the violent 
actions at Abu Ghraib was to define the perpetrators of the actions as Abu Ghraib as un-
American. Within this framing of the Abu Ghraib incident, the perpetrators of violence 
became a “bad few” that did not reflect the character of the American people and did not 
uphold the sanctity of American laws. In her interview with Al Arabiya Condoleezza 
Rice stated, 
Americans do not do this to other people. Those pictures were awful because 
America – American men and women in uniform, active and reserve, are serving 
in Iraq at great sacrifice. People are losing their lives. We came there to help 
liberate the people of Iraq. We came there to build schools, and to build clinics, 
and we want very much that the images of Americans should be the images of 
helping the Iraqi people. It’s simply unacceptable that anyone would engage in 
the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. (par 4) 
In this statement Rice clearly distinguished the actions at Abu Ghraib from actions that 
Americans “do.” Also, while she made a point to associate the violence with un-
American-ness, she gave a definition of what was American. Americans “liberate,” 
“build,” and “help;” they do not torture. In an interview with Alhurra, the President also 
distanced the American nation from the violence at Abu Ghraib by labeling the actions 
un-American and explicating the actions that reflect the true character of the American 
people. He claimed, 
First, people in Iraq must understand that I view those practices as abhorrent. 
They must also understand that what took place in that prison does not represent 
America that I know. The America I know is a compassionate country that 
believes in freedom. The America I know cares about every individual. The 
America I know has sent troops into Iraq to promote freedom – good, honorable 
citizens that are helping the Iraqis every day. (par. 5) 
Just like Rice, Bush listed the characteristics that “truly” represent America, while 
denying the perpetrators of violence association with the American nation. Along with 
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defending the nature of the American nature in general, Bush defended the character of 
the American men and women stationed in Iraq as part of U.S. military operations.  In an 
interview with Al Arabiya, the President stated, 
[I]t’s very important for the people of the Middle East to realize that the troops we 
have overseas are decent, honorable citizens who care about freedom and peace; 
that are working daily in Iraq to improve the lives of the Iraqi citizens, and these 
actions of a few people do not reflect the nature of the men and women who serve 
our country. (par. 7) 
The material motivations for this rhetorical move are easy to understand. One could 
imagine that when the official purpose for having troops in another country is called into 
question, support at home for the war (and tolerance of it abroad) could diminish.  In an 
interview with Al-Ahram International, the President not only expressed his regret to the 
families of the victims at Abu Ghraib, but he also expressed regret that America’s 
intentions in Iraq could be misunderstood: 
I’m also sorry because people are then able to say, look how terrible America is. 
But this isn’t America, that’s not – Americans are appalled at what happened. 
We’re a generous people. I don’t think a lot of people understand that. So I’ve got 
to do a better job of explaining to people that we’re for a lot of things that most 
people who live in the Middle East want. We want there to be peace. We want 
people to have a living. We want people to send their kids to schools that work. 
We want there to be health care. We want there to be a Palestinian state at peace 
with its neighbors. We want there to be reform. We want people to have a chance 
to participate in the process. (par. 5) 
In this remark Bush attempted to identify with the Iraqi people through shared beliefs, 
while simultaneously distancing America and the American people from violent acts. 
While Bush expressed concern for America’s image abroad, he also expressed concern 
for America’s image at home. In a radio address on May 8, the President stated, “More 
than 700 Americans have given their lives. The brave and honorable soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines who are serving and sacrificing in Iraq – not the 
few who have let us down – show the true character of America” (par. 5). President Bush 
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not only distanced himself and the nation from the violence, but he reassured Americans 
at home that the American military reflected American national character. On June 22 the 
President was even more explicit in his attempts to distance himself from torture: 
Let me make very clear the position of my government and our country. We do 
not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The 
values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being. 
(“President Welcomes” par. 21) 
In one speech, the President went as far as to suggest that Abu Ghraib prison be shut 
down in order to help America and the rest of the world forget the disgraceful acts that 
happened there. While speaking in Pennsylvania he stated, 
A new Iraq will also need a humane, well-supervised prison system. Under the 
dictator, prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture. That same 
prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who 
dishonored our country and disregarded our values. America will fund the 
construction of a modern, maximum-security prison. When that prison is 
completed, detainees at Abu Ghraib will be relocated. Then, with the approval of 
the Iraqi government, we will demolish the Abu Ghraib prison, as a fitting symbol 
of Iraq’s new beginning. (par. 27) 
This process of rebuilding Abu Ghraib prison as a way to rebuild America’s character in 
the eyes of the world is linked to the idea of due process and investigation that also 
permeated the rhetoric of the Bush administration in its framing of Abu Ghraib.  
Public Distance: America will Investigate the Problem 
In addition to expressing shock and disgust and assuring American citizens and 
people around the world that the violent actions at Abu Ghraib were not part of 
America’s national character, the Bush administration also assured the people of the 
United States and citizens around the globe that the incidents were being properly 
investigated. This rhetorical move, which relies to a large extent on the reification of the 
law, illustrates perhaps the largest contrast between the political language of the internal 
memoranda and the public political discourse that framed the incidents at Abu Ghraib. 
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For example, in an interview with Alhurra, President Bush admitted wrongdoing on the 
part of a few un-American soldiers and claimed that the willingness of the U.S. 
government to investigate the situation was part of what defined American national 
character. He claimed, 
[I]n a democracy, everything is not perfect, that mistakes are made. But in a 
democracy, as well, those mistakes will be investigated and people will be 
brought to justice. We’re an open society. We’re a society that is willing to 
investigate, fully investigate in this case, what took place in that prison. (par. 6) 
What is interesting about this statement is that Bush uses the Abu Ghraib scandal and the 
handling of that scandal as a way to define the American nation. This definition of 
America as having good will, relies, in part, on an assumption that due process under the 
law is important and effective. Bush claimed, “People will be held to account. That’s 
what the process does. That’s what we do in America. We fully investigate; we let 
everybody see the results of the investigation; and then people will be held to account” 
(par. 14). In his press conference with the King of Jordan, Bush also relied heavily on a 
faith in the law. It was the process of the law that, for Bush, defined the character and the 
goodness of the American nation. Bush explained, 
But part of what this ongoing investigation will do, will answer that question, 
answer your questions, so we better understand the process, the procedures, and 
more importantly, to make sure that it doesn’t happen again. So as I told His 
Majesty, I said, we will – people will be brought to justice in a way 
commensurate with how our system works. (par. 48) 
President Bush was not the only member of his administration to express faith in the 
good character of the nation and due process of the law. In an interview with Fox News, 
Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the military had had a handle on the situation 
long before the photographs had been leaked to the press. He explained, 
I think it’s also important to point our, though, that these abuses were uncovered 
by the military. They’re being investigated by the military. This isn’t something 
the press uncovered. This is something that was being handled as is appropriate 
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through the regular military channels and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
(par. 11) 
This reliance on the process of law as a way to make up for the un-American actions of a 
few allowed the Bush administration to distance itself from Abu Ghraib. In this interview 
with Fox News, Cheney even suggested that the release of the photographs by the press 
was something that could hinder the due process of the law. He claimed, 
But there are questions here and terms of the release of this kind of information 
that can adversely affect, for example, courts martial, could, in some cases, be 
detrimental from the standpoint of people who are innocent. So there are lot of 
legal issues around the question of what you release and when you release it, and 
how this material should be treated. So I believe – I think this is correct, the 
Department is going to make this material accessible to Congress, but then there 
will have to be a decision made what and at what point any additional photos are 
released to the public. (par. 13) 
When asked by the interviewer whether or not the incidents at Abu Ghraib were a result 
of the desire to get more intelligence out of people detained there, Cheney admitted the 
prominence of desire to get intelligence out of “guilty parties,” but stressed that there is 
“a right was to do it and a wrong way to do it,” ultimately concluding that “I don’t think 
this case, you want to call these methods legitimate” (pars. 26-27). What is important 
about this statement is that Cheney distances the White House and the rest of the 
operations in Iraq from Abu Ghraib by claiming that those captured in the photographs 
were not in accordance with the law. However, just a few sentences later, Cheney 
reinforced a notion of the enemy that need not be treated under the law in the first place, 
an argument consistent within the so-called torture memos. He stated, 
If you remember in Afghanistan, and the war on terror, generally, if you’ve got 
somebody who is wearing civilian clothes, killing civilians, no abiding by the 
laws of the war, then you’ve got a set of circumstances in which you’ve got 
unlawful combatants. And those people do not need to be treated under the 
Geneva Convention. A lot of the folks down in Guantanamo fall into this 
category. We, nonetheless, announced a policy that they would be treated in 
accordance with the standards, for example, that we adhere for the Geneva 
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Convention. They’re well treated. They’re fed, medical care, and so forth. (pars. 
29-30) 
Cheney assured the public that the United States was acting in accordance with the law, 
while simultaneously reinforcing the definition of an enemy that does not deserve 
protection under the law. Cheney’s remarks are also interesting because even though this 
interview is concerned with what happened at Abu Ghraib, Cheney brings up 
Guantanamo as an example of how the United States is acting in accordance with the law. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, concern for the treatment of prisoners at 
Guantanamo sparked the reinterpretation of the law in the first place. 
Bush, like Cheney, insisted that the U.S. government held actions under the 
scrutiny of the U.S. law. Bush claimed, “What I’ve authorized is that we stay within the 
U.S. law” (“G8 Summit” par. 38). This faith in the letter of the law and this framing of 
the United States as a nation set on justice also permeates Bush’s rhetoric in his statement 
in support of the victims of torture on June 26. This statement is important because it 
helps to illustrate how earlier reinterpretation of the law allowed Bush to state that 
American forces acted legally. It is also important because it is the last time that Bush 
spoke about Abu Ghraib on the campaign trail during his run for reelection. 
On June 26, 2004, nearly one month after the incidents at Abu Ghraib hit the 
news, President George W. Bush made a public statement in support of victims of torture 
around the world. In his opening statement, President Bush remarked,  
Today, on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, the 
United States reaffirms its commitment to the worldwide elimination of torture. 
The non-negotiable demands of human dignity must be protected without 
reference to race, gender, creed, or nationality. Freedom from torture is an 
inalienable human right, and we are committed to building a world where human 
rights are respected and protected by the rule of law. (par. 1) 
Unlike the internal memorandum, written by Jay S. Bybee, which outlined the parameters 
of torture in terms of death or organ failure and identified a range of interrogation 
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techniques that were “cruel, inhumane, or degrading,” but not torturous, the address made 
by President Bush insisted on meeting the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity” 
and protecting the “inalienable human right” that comes in “freedom from torture.” 
Although the two documents, the internal memo and the public speech, seem to take 
different stands on the subject of torture, it is important to recognize that the former 
validates the latter. For example, in his speech, President Bush asserted, “American 
personnel are required to comply with all U.S. laws, including the United States 
Constitution, Federal statutes, including statutes prohibiting torture, and other treaty 
obligations with respect to the treatment of all detainees” (par. 2). Because the 
interpretation of Federal statutes prohibiting torture made by John Bybee and other 
members of the Bush legal team had previously (in 2001) set wide parameters for the use 
of “coercive interrogation techniques” under the law, the President, in 2004, could 
demand accountability under the law without challenging the legality of the incidents at 
Abu Ghraib. 
It is also important to recognize the ways in which President Bush, while 
bolstering the sovereignty of the American nation through the legal sanctity of American 
violence, simultaneously distances the nation from violent acts. President Bush asserted, 
“The American people were horrified by the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq. These acts were wrong. They were inconsistent with our policies and our values as a 
Nation” (par. 4). In this statement Bush recognized the wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib, but 
denied any connection of wrongdoing to the American nation-state. And, in the following 
section of his speech, Bush not only excluded the American nation-state from 
involvement in acts of wrongdoing, but also defined America’s national mission as one 
that protects its citizens and people around the world from such wrongdoing. Bush 
explained,  
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It is often American men and women in uniform who fight for the freedom of 
others from tyrannical regimes that routinely use torture to oppress their citizens. 
From Nazi Germany to Bosnia, and Afghanistan to Iraq, American service 
members have fought to remove brutal leaders who torture and massacre. It is the 
American people and their contributions that have helped to rebuild these 
traumatized nations to give former victims hope. (par. 5) 
In this rhetorical move, the President not only distanced American national violence from 
the violence of torture, but he also defined the American nation in terms of its role as 
protector from the torture of foreign others, their “tyrannical regimes” and “brutal 
leaders.” 
Public Distance: The True Threat of Torture is Saddam Hussein 
 The association of torture with leaders of other countries is the final, and perhaps 
most important rhetorical theme that permeates the Bush administration’s public rhetoric 
concerning the incidents at Abu Ghraib. While the President and prominent members of 
his cabinet expressed shock and disgust, proclaimed the violent actions at Abu Ghraib un-
American, and defended America’s character in terms of due process of the law, they also 
distanced themselves and the United States from torture by reinforcing associations 
between torture and former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. 
Even before President Bush publicly accounted for the incidents at Abu Ghraib, 
his speeches along the campaign trail emphasized the evil and torturous nature of 
America’s enemy, Saddam Hussein. In fact, as part of the President’s prepared statements 
in the Rose Garden, after which he responded to questions regarding the incidents at Abu 
Ghraib. Bush stated, 
A year ago, I did give the speech from the carrier, saying that we had achieved an 
important objective, that we’d accomplished a mission, which was the removal of 
Saddam Hussein. And as a result, there are no longer torture chambers or rape 
rooms or mass graves in Iraq. As a result, a friend or terror has been removed, and 
now sits in a jail. (par. 12). 
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As examination of the Bush rhetoric has shown, in the time frame analyzed, Bush 
associated torture with Saddam Hussein a total of 95 times. For example in a rally in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, Bush stated, “My opponent admits that Saddam Hussein was a threat. 
He just didn’t support my decision to remove Saddam from power. . . .We showed the 
dictator and a watching world that America means what it says. Because [our] coalition 
acted, Saddam’s torture chambers are closed” (par. 46). As scrutiny from the press 
increased and Bush was asked about Abu Ghraib in more press conferences, he not only 
associated torture with the former Iraqi leader, but he also used this association as 
leverage to bolster the character of the American people and to defend the process of the 
American legal system. For example, in an interview with Alhurra Television, Bush 
stated, 
We’re a society that is willing to investigate, fully investigate in this case, what 
took place in that prison. That stands in stark contrast to life under Saddam 
Hussein. His trained torturers were never brought to justice under his regime. 
There were no investigations about mistreatment of people. There will be 
investigations. People will be brought to justice. (pars. 6-7) 
In this statement the President seems to suggest that because the Abu Ghraib photographs 
have been made public and because the Bush administration is willing to investigate the 
legality of the treatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the incidents that occurred under 
U.S. rule cannot be held to the same standard of as the incidents that may have once 
occurred under Hussein’s. Similarly, in an interview with Al-Ahram International the 
President argued that the transparency of the system made the incidents at Abu Ghraib 
under U.S. rule less devastating than those under Hussein’s. He claimed, 
And it is, again – what the Arab world must understand is a couple of things. One, 
under a dictatorship, these – this wouldn’t be transparent. In other words, if there 
was torture under a dictator, we would never know the truth. In a democracy, 
you’ll know the truth. And justice will be done. And that’s what people need to 
know. (par. 58) 
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Once again, the President expresses faith in the American legal system and uses this faith 
in due process to distance himself and the American people from the violent incidents in 
the Abu Ghraib photographs. In a statement of commitment to operations in Iraq given at 
the Pentagon May 10, the President stated, 
[B]ecause America is committed to the equality and dignity of all people, there 
will be a full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse of Iraqi detainees. 
The conduct that has come to light is an insult to the Iraqi people, and an affront 
to the most basic standards of morality and decency. One basic difference 
between democracies and dictatorships is that free countries confront such abuses 
openly and directly. (par. 16) 
As this and other statements made by Bush illustrate, the law becomes the saving grace in 
the Abu Ghraib scandal because, by putting faith in the law, the Bush administration 
could absolve itself of responsibility and bring “those responsible” to justice. 
Public Distance: John Kerry’s Failure to Challenge Bush Rhetoric 
Thus far, I have focused on the legal language of the so-called torture memos and 
the public rhetoric used by the Bush administration in framing the Abu Ghraib scandal. I 
have argued that the ideological assumptions that framed Bush’s war on terror as early as 
2001 ultimately permeated the Bush administration’s reinterpretation of the law. This 
reinterpretation of the law, in turn, shaped the ways in which the Bush administration 
would publicly address the Abu Ghraib scandal during Bush’s run for reelection. 
However, President Bush was not the only candidate to comment on the violence at Abu 
Ghraib. Since the scandal occurred in an election year, many Democratic hopefuls were 
quick to criticize the Bush administration for its handling of the Iraq war, ultimately 
concluding that the Bush administration should be held accountable for the violent 
actions that had occurred in Abu Ghraib prison. In this section of analysis, I have chosen 
to focus on the public rhetoric of Senator John F. Kerry, who, by March of 2004, was the 
Democratic Party’s presumptive candidate.  
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The Abu Ghraib scandal might have seemed an opportunity to sway the election 
in favor of Kerry. After all, Abu Ghraib happened on President Bush’s watch, giving 
potential fuel to critical fodder for the Kerry camp. However, what will be shown in the 
following analysis is that John Kerry was very limited in his criticisms of the Bush 
administration in regard to Abu Ghraib. Not only have Kerry remarks proved difficult for 
this researcher to find but, as analysis will show, Kerry’s critical rhetoric is confined by 
the very ideological assumptions he attempts to challenge—and those he does not.  
Although my search of news wires archives yielded 69 documents containing direct 
quotations from John Kerry regarding the Abu Ghraib scandal, the actual number of 
statements is much smaller. As early as May 3, 2004, Senator Kerry was quoted as 
saying,  
I am disturbed and troubled by the evidence of shameful mistreatment of Iraqi 
prisoners. We must learn the facts and take the appropriate action. As Americans, 
we must stand tall for the rule of law and freedom everywhere. But we cannot let 
the actions of a few overshadow the tremendous good work that thousands of 
soldiers are doing every day in Iraq and all over the world. (The Hotline par. 15) 
The formulation of this statement contains many of the same rhetorical moves of George 
W. Bush. Like Bush, Kerry expresses disgust over the actions in the photographs. Like 
Bush, Kerry attempts to distance the American people, particularly the soldiers serving in 
Iraq from “the actions of a few.” Like Bush, Kerry puts his faith in the rule of law, stating 
that the investigations need to be transparent and that those responsible need to be 
brought to justice. However, as the pressure on the Bush administration increased and as 
members of the Bush Administration addressed the issue, Kerry’s rhetoric changed. 
While Kerry continued to express shock and disgust over the release of the photographs 
and to distance the character of the American nation from the violence depicted in them, 
he also began to demand accountability and responsibility from the Bush administration 
regarding its potential knowledge and involvement in the Abu Ghraib violence. 
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On May 6, 2004, the Houston Chronicle quoted Senator Kerry as claiming,  
The [P]resident of the United States needs to offer the world and explanation and 
needs to take appropriate responsibility . . . . And if that includes apologizing for 
the behavior of those soldiers and what happened, they ought to do that. (par. 28) 
Along with wanting the Bush administration to take responsibility and apologize for the 
abuse of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Kerry also called for certain questions to be 
answered regarding the incidents: 
With respect to this particular incident, we've got to have the facts . . . . I want to 
know, as I think Americans do: Was this isolated? Does it go up the chain of 
command? Who knew what, when? All those questions have to be answered, so I 
don't want to shoot from the hip on that. (Halbfinger, May 6 par. 8) 
Kerry suggested that top members of the Bush administration were involved in what 
happened at Abu Ghraib and expressed a desire for these members of the administration 
to be held accountable. He also stressed that investigations should be handled 
appropriately and that the American people should not rush to judgment. He was critical 
of the Bush administration’s timeline of response, calling it “slow and inappropriate” 
(par. 10). 
Kerry argued that not only was the response from the Bush administration 
inappropriate, but the President owed an apology to people around the world: 
I believe the [P]resident needs to guarantee that the world is going to have an 
explanation. What happened there has done a disservice to all of [the U.S.] troops 
who serve with great valor and great courage and, I think, with distinction. And it 
also undermines America's own efforts in the region. It has the potential of 
putting our troops, the rest of them, in further jeopardy. It can increase acts of 
terror against America and Americans, and it undermines the overall effort of the 
United States in the region. So I think it's important to have an understanding of 
this as rapidly as possible, and to make that explanation and any other appropriate 
comments to the world. (City News Service par. 1) 
Like Bush, Kerry attempted to distance the American people from what happened; but 
unlike Bush, Kerry wanted the President to take responsibility. Kerry continued his 
criticism, arguing, “As [P]resident, I will not be the last to know what is going on in my 
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command” (Cox News May 6 par. 6). He claimed, “I will take responsibility for the bad 
as well as the good” (par. 6). In another setting he stated, “The chain of command goes 
all the way to the Oval Office. . . .Harry Truman did not say ‘the buck stops at the 
Pentagon’” (AP May 7, par. 11). Along with taking responsibility Kerry argued, “I will 
do everything that I can in my power to repair the damage that this has caused to 
America, to our standing in the world, and to the ideals for which we stand” (St. 
Petersberg par. 17). In each of these claims Kerry demands accountability and expresses 
a desire to repair the image of America’s national character: 
[W]hen you walk in and say, ‘Under the Geneva Conventions, we have a right to 
visit and a right to this treatment’ if we ourselves are not living up to it . . . . This 
is about our soldiers, this is about protecting our young Americans in uniform, 
and this is about living up to America's highest standards of behavior. That’s what 
we’re responsible for, and that’s what a [P]resident should be responsible for.’ 
(Wilgoren par. 17) 
Although Kerry did question the laws under which these things happen, he criticized the 
Bush administration in terms of responsibility and blame and never once argued for an 
evaluation of the law. In fact, even when Kerry made claims asserting that responsibility 
for the Abu Ghraib violence went beyond the “bad few” blamed by the Bush 
administration, he did so while simultaneously asserting his faith in the law: 
 ‘I think the [P]resident is underestimating the full impact of what has happened in 
the world to our reputation because of that prison scandal. The [P]resident himself 
gave a speech in which he said, “Oh, it’s just a few people.” But now, already, 
we’ve seen it’s not just a few people, and there are serious questions about how 
high it goes,’ Kerry added. ‘I believe that it’s vital for us to prove to the world 
that this is really not going to be swept under the rug; . . . we’re going to prove to 
the world we’re willing to show that we will hold people accountable.’ (Johnson 
par. 4) 
While it is important to note that John Kerry did express criticisms of the Bush 
administration in regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal, it is also important to note that this 
criticism was in short supply. Although this researcher was able to find critical statements 
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from Kerry in various news sources, these statements were limited at best. John Kerry 
also failed to criticize the President and his possible connection to the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal during any of his stump speeches along the campaign trail. Abu Ghraib was also 
never brought up in any of the four Presidential debates. Most importantly, however, 
analysis has shown that what little criticism Kerry did launch against the President 
regarding Abu Ghraib was ultimately trapped in the very ideological web these criticisms 
were made against. Like President Bush, John Kerry ultimately used his public remarks 
regarding the Abu Ghraib scandal to come to the defense of American national character 
and America’s mission in Iraq. Like President Bush, Kerry also made clear his faith in 
the law, ignoring (or perhaps failing to recognize) any role that the law might have had in 
perpetrating the Abu Ghraib violence. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have examined the political language surrounding the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal, comparing the so-called torture memos to public political statements 
about Abu Ghraib made during the 2004 Presidential campaign. I have argued that the 
Bush administration, with its war on terror rhetoric, ultimately reinterpreted national and 
international laws regarding the treatment of so-called enemy combatants in such a way 
as to deem America’s enemies unworthy of legal protection. This reinterpretation, I have 
argued, was ultimately shaped by dominant ideologies regarding the identity of America 
as a nation under threat, the identity of America’s enemies, and the prerogative of each to 
impose violence on the other. Analysis has also shown that these dominant ideological 
assumptions ultimately shaped the ways in which both the Bush campaign and the Kerry 
campaign could (or would) address the incidents at Abu Ghraib publicly during the 2004 
Presidential election. Kerry’s failure to challenge the Bush administration’s role in the 
Abu Ghraib incidents and President Bush’s reelection victory also point to the Bush 
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campaign’ s success at neutralizing the threat of the Abu Ghraib photographs in terms of 
national identity and necessity. The public release of the Abu Ghraib photographs and 
torture memos that seemed to serve as a legalized proposal for the violence captured on 
film had the potential to threaten understood notions of an American citizenry committed 
to justice, democracy, and freedom from oppression. Instead, the Bush administration 
successfully managed the issue of torture in such a way that kept its legal position on 
torture under wraps while simultaneously distancing the American public from torturous 
acts, preserving the integrity of America’s democratic ideals. In this way, the Bush 
administration solidified its control over the terms of violence against and enemy other 
and privatized its accountability for these violent practices.  
Although I have emphasized the rhetorical significance of the political language, 
both public and private, that surrounded the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, one must keep in 
mind that politicians were not the only ones talking (or failing to talk) about the violent 
actions featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs. Members of the American mainstream 
media played an integral part in shaping public perceptions of the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal. In the next chapter I discuss the ways in which the mainstream media framed 
both the discourse and the images surrounding detention, interrogation, and the violence 
at Abu Ghraib. 
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Chapter 3:  Torture News: The Framing of Violence at Abu Ghraib 
In the United States, there was little consensus among news organizations on 
whether to reproduce the [Abu Ghraib] photos. While The Daily News of New 
York, The Baltimore Sun, Newsday and The Washington Post each published at 
least one photo on Thursday or Friday, other newspapers, including The New York 
Post and USA Today, did not. ‘If there’s a handful of U.S. soldiers who’ve 
mistreated prisoners,’ said Col Allan, The New York Post’s editor in chief, ‘I don’t 
think that should be allowed to reflect poorly on the 140,000 men and women 
over there who are risking their lives and doing a good job.’(Shanker and 
Steinberg) 
From the outset of the just war against Al Qaeda and its allies – and nothing that 
has occurred diminishes the justice of the cause – the media have too 
complacently accepted the Bush administration’s assertion that it has the right to 
seize foreigners and U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism at will and to hold them 
in secret unrestrained by the due process guarantees of either American or 
international law. (Rutten “Abuse”) 
After CBS first broke the story of Abu Ghraib torture on April 28, 2004, U.S. and 
international media not only began printing and airing the Abu Ghraib photographs, but 
also began writing the captions and the stories that put the photographs into their 
complicated social and political contexts. Not long after 60 Minutes II first aired the 
photographs, print journalist Seymour Hersh, who was one of the first to provide in-
depth, critical reports of the incidents at Abu Ghraib, ran a series of crucial stories in the 
New Yorker.20 As a renowned investigative reporter, Hersh has written dozens of critical 
news pieces and books over the course of his carrier, with coverage ranging from Cold 
War CIA operatives, U.S.-funded Israeli nuclear programs, U.S.-caused destruction in 
Sudan, and countless reports concerning the Iraq War. Hersh even won a Pulitzer Prize in 
1970 for his report on the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and its cover-up by the U.S. 
                                                 
20 Hersh’s first article, published May 10, 2004 prompted CBS to come forward with the photographs on 
April 28. 
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government. Therefore, Hersh’s critique of the U.S. government’s involvement in the 
incidents at Abu Ghraib seemed authoritative. 
However, as reports by Thom Shanker, Jacques Steinberg, and Tim Rutten make 
clear, not all members of the U.S. mass media followed Hersh’s critical lead. Once the 
Abu Ghraib photographs were leaked to the press, media sources scrambled to report on 
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Some reports, like those authored by Hersh, seemed 
critical of the Bush administration’s explanation for the Abu Ghraib violence, namely 
that the United States did not condone torture and that the actions featured in the Abu 
Ghraib photographs were the actions of a few rogue soldiers who did not represent 
American national character. However, many more media accounts accepted this 
explanation unquestioningly and reinforced Bush’s war on terror narrative by 
emphasizing America’s humanitarian motivations for the war and reminding the 
American public of the dangers posed by terrorist threat. In fact, even a few of the more 
critical news pieces, like the one authored by Tim Rutten (quoted above), seemed 
unwilling to abandon dominant assumptions about America’s mission in Iraq despite 
their calls to question America’s secretive, potentially illegal, approach to fulfilling it. 
When one considers the U.S. media’s often touted historical roles as political watchdogs 
in light of this apparent hesitancy on the part of many U.S. journalists to question 
dominant explanations for Abu Ghraib, one can not help but wonder: What role did the 
media play in framing Abu Ghraib violence? 
Because I am interested in the ways in which the American public learned about 
and was encouraged to understand the violent actions at Abu Ghraib, the mainstream 
mass media are important sites for textual analysis. In particular, this chapter explores the 
ways in which the media framed the violence at Abu Ghraib and considers the effect of 
this framing on public perceptions of the scandal. Thus, in this chapter, I am asking, 
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“How did the media shape public perceptions of U.S. interrogation practices and/or 
enable criticism of the Bush administration’s potential involvement in torture? To what 
extent did the mainstream media adhere to the dominant frames of Abu Ghraib violence? 
Did the media provide substantial counterframes to these dominant narratives? And, what 
role did the media play in shaping public perceptions of the relationship between national 
identity and violence?” In pursuit of answers to these questions, I examine mainstream 
media coverage of the incidents at Abu Ghraib beginning April 28, 2004 (the day that 
CBS first broke the story of Abu Ghraib) through December 2, 2004 (one month after 
President Bush was reelected). Using Todd Gitlin’s conception of media framing, I 
explore the similarities and differences between reports outlining violence that is deemed 
a terrorist threat and reports outlining violence understood to be state-sanctioned 
violence.21 In this chapter I examine what I have identified as the three most prominent 
themes in the media coverage of Abu Ghraib: the nature of violence, the victims of 
violence, and the perpetrators of violence.  
Although recent scholarly work concerning media coverage of Abu Ghraib argues 
that the American press failed to provide a counterframe to the Bush administration’s 
dominant narrative (see Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston), my examination of media 
coverage shows that the media did, in fact, provide counterframes; however, critical 
journalists often became trapped in a debate over what types of violence constituted 
torture and when torture might be deemed acceptable. I argue that despite reported 
evidence to the contrary, media sources came to a relative consensus regarding the 
victims of violence, namely that the prisoners tortured at Abu Ghraib were male terrorists 
plotting attacks on the United States. I also argue that although critical counterframes 
                                                 
21 While I recognize that media framing literature has evolved since Gitlin’s provocative work (see Reese, 
et. al), and realize that alternative approaches to media framing are prominent in political communication 
scholarship (see Entman; and Bennett), I have chosen to use Gitlin’s approach because of his focus on the 
ways in which media processes frame violence.  
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often questioned the notion that the violent actions at Abu Ghraib were perpetrated by a 
rogue few, the media neither investigated nor called on the American public to 
investigate the full extent of the Bush administration’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib 
violence. In this way, my examination of media coverage will show how it is ultimately 
the rhetoric of the war on terror that trumps critical critique.  
MEDIA FRAMING: NEWS COVERAGE AS HEGEMONY MAINTENANCE  
In this chapter I am not only concerned with ideology and the processes of 
hegemony through which dominant ideological assumptions are contested and reinforced, 
but also with how this happens on a mass (national) scale. Rhetorical scholars have often 
described how messages are perpetuated (and eventually reinforced) in institutionalized 
forms like the commercial mass media. I assume, as does Stuart Hall, that the media are 
part of the dominant means of ideological production: “What they ‘produce’ is, precisely, 
representation of the social world, images, descriptions, explanations and frames for 
understanding how the world is and why it works as it is said and shown to work” (Hall 
35). However, to blame the media for the proliferation of dominant national ideals is an 
oversimplified and misdirected endeavor. Roger Fowler argues that the language that 
appears in media is not entirely under the media’s control, claiming that political 
institutions and “official” news sources filter language long before it is recreated within 
news stories. Similarly, Deepa Kumar asserts that increasingly sophisticated methods of 
governmental information control and the emergence of a for-profit giant conglomerate 
media system limit the types of information made available to the public through 
mainstream news sources (48-49). Hemant Shah and Michael Thorton also see media 
business as a determining factor in the process of information reproduction, arguing that 
the media package world events in ways that are easily digested by a consumer public 
(19). The media, as research has shown, tell people about their world in language they 
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understand, through a seemingly reasonable framework. By providing information that 
often has its origins in official, government sources the media help maintain not only the 
power structure, but the dominant ideologies that help support that structure.  
In order to better understand how state violence and the violence deemed a 
terrorist threat are represented across a wide variety of mediated texts, this chapter 
examines these representations specifically in relation to what Todd Gitlin has termed 
“media frames.” According to Gitlin, it is important for critics to recognize not only the 
central role that media play in the circulation of dominant ideological views, but also the 
processes through which media institutions gather and frame the information they 
eventually make available to the public. Gitlin, who is primarily concerned with the 
relationship between media outlets and movements for social change, argues that 
journalistic processes often marginalize protest groups and delegitimize their messages 
(3). For Gitlin, violence often becomes a focus of media framing and, as a result, violence 
is often the only thing associated with the social movements that use it (see also Deluca 
and Peeples). I use Gitlin’s conceptions of media framing to examine the ways in which 
violence is reported in media outlets. It is my hope that exploration of the ways in which 
different types of violence are represented illuminates the mediated hegemonic struggle 
to maintain a common understanding of American national belonging.  
Media Frames of Abu Ghraib 
Scholars have already begun to offer specific insights into the media’s coverage 
of the violent incidents that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. In earlier work, W. Lance 
Bennett and Regina Lawrence have argued that certain dramatic events often spur 
independent reporting, allowing the mainstream media to play important agenda-setting 
roles in news coverage of events (Bennett and Lawrence). Like Roger Fowler, Bennett 
has also argued that, due to media practices that rely on official news sources, news 
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stories, particularly those concerning foreign policy issues, often reflect the news cues 
offered by political elites (see Bennett; Bennett and Livingston).  Additionally, Robert 
Entman, has argued when political elites are not united on a certain political issue, 
journalists are more likely to promote independent frames that run counter to official 
narratives (Entman, Projections of Power). Building on these understandings of media 
framing, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston, examine news coverage of Abu Ghraib and 
argue that in spite of the photographic evidence that allowed media outlets to 
independently advance the story of Abu Ghraib, mainstream media sources ultimately 
failed to advance a strong counterframe to the Bush administration’s explanation of the 
events:  
For all the photos and available evidence suggesting a possible policy of torture 
laid bare at Abu Ghraib, the story quickly became framed as regrettable abuse on 
the part of a few troops. The early limited appearance of the torture frame 
followed by its quick demise suggests that event-driven frames, particularly in 
matters of high consequence, are seriously constrained by mainstream news 
organizations’ deference to political power. Lacking any consistent 
counterframing by high-level officials, the national media declined to challenge 
the administration. (481) 
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston provide compelling quantitative data for this claim, 
however, as Robert Entman rightly demonstrates, media coverage of Abu Ghraib was not 
entirely homogeneous: 
Specifically, the coverage did not completely converge on the interpretation 
favored by the White House, that this was an isolated incident traceable to a 
handful of poorly trained miscreants in one prison. Rather journalists (and elites) 
frequently explored the responsibility of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
White House counsel (later Attorney General) Alberto Gonzales, and other 
higher-ups in the administration and military, and the existence of similar 
incidents at other U.S. military prisoners. (“Punctuating the Homogeneity” 216) 
Although my analysis will show that Entman ultimately gives mainstream media too 
much credit in regard to the heterogeneity of news coverage surrounding Abu Ghraib, his 
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critique of Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston is valid.22 While both of these studies 
provide important insight into mainstream media coverage of Abu Ghraib, both fail to 
account for the larger context in which this coverage occurs, namely, the rhetoric of the 
war on terror, which focuses on the horrible nature of the enemy and the need for the 
United States to prevent future attacks (see chapter 2). My examination of media 
coverage will show that it is ultimately the rhetoric of the war on terror that trumps 
critical critique by forcing critical voices into a debate regarding whether or not torture 
(or abuse as the case may be) is a necessary evil in war, ultimately creating relative 
consensus in regard to the character of those imprisoned at Abu Ghraib prison and 
creating a void regarding the rights of the victims of abuse. By adhering to this war on 
terror rhetoric, members of the press, though many question the role of the administration 
in the Abu Ghraib violence, fail to call upon themselves and the American people to 
investigate the government’s role more fully. 
AN ANALYSIS OF ABU GHRAIB NEWS COVERAGE 
In this chapter I examine mainstream media coverage of the incidents at Abu 
Ghraib beginning April 28, 2004 (the day that CBS first broke the story of Abu Ghraib) 
through December 2, 2004 (one month after President Bush was reelected). Texts for 
analysis include national newspapers (The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and 
The Washington Post), national newsmagazines (Time, Newsweek, and The New Yorker), 
nationally broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC), and cable news networks 
(Fox and CNN).23 The following tables (see Tables 3.1-3.4) represent the results of 
                                                 
22 Entman compares media coverage of Abu Ghraib to media coverage of the massacre at Fallujah. 
Entaman rightly asserts that Abu Ghraib coverage is relatively heterogeneous in comparison to media 
coverage of Fallujah, however, as my analysis below demonstrates, Abu Ghraib coverage remains largely 
constrained by the Bush administration’s language surrounding the “war on terror.” 
23 The New Yorker is credited with being one of the first print publications to break the story of Abu 
Ghraib, thus its inclusion in national newsmagazines.  
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focused key word searches in the LexisNexis Print Delivery (R) database, the ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers database, and online archives available at Time.com.24 A search 
of The New York Times containing the search terms “Abu Ghraib” and “torture” or 
“abuse” between April 28, 2004 and December 2, 2004 yielded 573 articles. This sample 
included many articles that only made a passing reference to Abu Ghraib, a few duplicate 
articles, and letters to the editor. Only those articles that focused directly on the events at 
Abu Ghraib or on U.S. policies regarding the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib were 
selected for analysis. Duplicate articles, letters to the editor, and other reader commentary 
were also eliminated, limiting the sample to 363 relevant articles. The same process was 
used to gather and narrow articles from each news source examined in this chapter, 
yielding 381 relevant articles from The Washington Post, 130 relevant articles from The 
Los Angeles Times, 19 relevant articles from Time, 37 relevant articles from Newsweek, 6 
relevant articles from The New Yorker, 118 relevant broadcasts from ABC, 109 relevant 
broadcasts from CBS, 143 relevant broadcasts from NBC, 691 relevant broadcasts from 






                                                 
24 The Los Angeles Times and Time are not available through the LexisNexis database, therefore ProQuest 
was used to retrieve articles for The Los Angeles Times and the online archives available at Time.com were 
used to retrieve articles for Time. 
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Table 3.1: Articles Containing Search Terms “Abu Ghraib” and “torture” or “abuse” in 
U.S. National Newspapers 
Newspaper Number of Initial Hits Number of Relevant Articles 
The New York Times 573 363 
The Washington Post 482 381 
The Los Angeles Times* 184 130 
Source: LexisNexis (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004)  
* Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 3004) 
Table 3.2: Articles Containing Search Terms “Abu Ghraib” and “torture” or “abuse” in 
U.S. National Newsmagazines 
Newsmagazine Number of Initial Hits Number of Relevant Articles 
Time* 49 19 
Newsweek 59 37 
The New Yorker 11 6 
Source: LexisNexis (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004)  
* Source: Online archives available at Time.com (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 3004) 
Table 3.3: Stories Containing Search Terms “Abu Ghraib” and “torture” or “abuse” in 
U.S. National Broadcast Networks and Cable Television News Channels 
Channel Number of Initial Hits Number of Relevant 
Broadcasts 
ABC 136 118 
CBS 141 109 
NBC 163 143 
CNN 842 691 
Fox 193 166 
Source: LexisNexis (April 28, 2004 – Dec. 2, 2004)  
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An initial surface analysis of the total number (2163) of news items revealed three 
prominent themes: the nature of violence, the victims of violence, and the perpetrators of 
violence. The following table (see Table 3.4) contains examples of each of these themes 
and the subsequent media frames.  A close analysis of 560 of the 2163 documents 
revealed consistent focus around these three themes with articles either reflecting 
dominant frames or challenging them with counterframes. In the following analysis, I 
examine each of these themes in detail and explore the extent to which news sources 
confirm claims made by members of the Bush administration and other political elites or 
challenge these dominant frames. As the following analysis will show, the news coverage 
of Abu Ghraib is much more complicated than the simple dichotomy put forth that either 
something is an official frame or it is not. Also, it will become apparent to the reader that 
these three themes I have identified are not separate entities. Each of these themes 
depends upon the other. For example, how one understands the enemy (the prisoners in 
Iraq) has a great influence on how one understands the nature of violence that occurred 
there and the types of people who enacted that violence. Analysis will also show that 
while the Bush administration and other political elites do not officially endorse some of 
the more conservative frames that come out in news debates, the language of the war on 








Table 3.4: Prominent Themes and Subsequent Media Frames of Abu Ghraib 
Theme Sample Dominant Frames Sample Counterframes 
Nature of the violence Detainees were abused at Abu 
Ghraib 
Detainees were tortured at 
Abu Ghraib 
Victims of violence  Detainees at Abu Ghraib are 
terrorists and members of al 
Qaeda 
The majority of detainees 
at Abu Ghraib are innocent 
and being wrongly 
detained 
Perpetrators of violence The violent actions that 
occurred at Abu Ghraib are the 
actions of a few soldiers and do 
not represent the nature of 
America 
The violent actions that 
occurred at Abu Ghraib 
were part of a system of 
violence approved by top 
members of the Bush 
administration 
    
Nature of violence 
One of the major frames within the coverage of the events at Abu Ghraib is the 
frame surrounding the nature of the violence that occurred there. In the following section 
of analysis I will explore this frame in detail. The dominant or official frame regarding 
the nature of the violence at Abu Ghraib framed the actions that occurred there as the 
abuse, not torture, of prisoners by a few rogue soldiers (for more detail on the 
perpetrators of violence see below), and, as Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston point out, 
this official frame is one that is most common throughout media coverage of the Abu 
Ghraib incidents. However, what a detailed qualitative analysis reveals is not only a 
presence of a counterframe describing the actions at Abu Ghraib as systematic torture, 
but also that the presence of these two frames (violence as abuse and violence as torture) 
sparks a debate both in print media and on numerous television broadcasts regarding 
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what torture is, who uses torture, and whether or not it is a useful practice within the 
larger context of the war on terror. 
“We don’t torture”: The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
Regarding the nature of the violence that occurred in Abu Ghraib prison in 2003 
and 2004, the dominant frame supported by the Bush administration and other political 
elites suggested that U.S. captors abused detainees in the prison, rather than tortured 
them. For example, in an article appearing in Time Eric Roston and J.F.O. McAllister 
claimed, “Image after image showed that soldiers at the prison had made sport of abusing 
and humiliating their wards” (par. 2). This frame of Abu Ghraib violence in terms of 
abuse is one that was perpetuated by the Bush administration and other political elites. As 
Esther Schrader and Patrick McDonnell of the Los Angeles Times explained, “President 
Bush on Friday strongly condemned the alleged mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. 
soldiers even as graphic pictures of abuses aired around the world” (par. 1). Thom 
Shanker and Jacques Steinberg, of the New York Times, reported that President Bush 
“was deeply disgusted by reports that Iraqi detainees were abused by American military 
police” (par. 1). Dominant frames that describe the violence at Abu Ghraib in terms of 
abuse, rather than torture, are also predominant in broadcasts that appeared on television 
networks and on cable news networks. In a follow-up broadcast to the 60 Minutes II 
episode that was credited with breaking the story of Abu Ghraib, Dan Rather, on the CBS 
Evening News, claimed, “The US Army tells CBS’ David Martin it is taking firm steps to 
prevent any recurrence of such abuses which the Army emphasizes were few – abuses 
revealed in photographs obtained by 60 Minutes II” (“US Army Responds” par. 1). 
Renay San Miguel with CNN Saturday Morning News reported, “Our top story this hour, 
abuse of Iraqi prisoners, allegedly at the hands of American troops sent to liberate them” 
(“Reactions in Iraq” par. 17). And, Greta Van Susteren, host of Fox on the Record 
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claimed, “A few disgrace us. Graphic, sadistic and pornographic photos of some 
American soldiers allegedly abusing Iraqi prisoners trigger outrage” (“Interview with 
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt” par. 1). As one can see, many newspapers, newsmagazines, 
and news broadcasts followed President Bush’s lead in labeling the violent actions at Abu 
Ghraib abuse, rather than torture.  
What is also apparent is the use, in many reports (see San Miguel; Van Susteren), 
of the word alleged. The word alleged is often used in news stories reporting crime, the 
rationale behind the use of the word being that the persons accused of crimes are innocent 
until proven guilty in the U.S. court system. The word alleged, then, is often used by 
reporters of crime news as a way to emphasize the fact that those accused of crimes have 
not yet been found guilty. However, the placement of the word alleged within these 
reports (as a modifier for the word abuse) not only preserves the innocence of the alleged 
perpetrators of violence, but also works to call the existence of the abuse itself into 
question. For example, as reported by Sewell Chan and Jackie Spinner of The 
Washington Post,  
The commander of the U.S. military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
has been transferred to Iraq to oversee the treatment of 8,000 detainees as part of 
an investigation into alleged sexual and physical abuse at a U.S. Army-run prison 
outside of Baghdad. (par. 1) 
Chan and Spinner also claimed that, “Iraqi prisoners allegedly were subjected to beatings 
and sexually degrading acts” (par. 2). The use of the word alleged as a modifier for the 
actions, not the charges, allows the reader (or viewer in the case of broadcast news) to 
doubt whether or not the actions described “really” are abuse.  
While some news reports, through the use of the word alleged, seem reluctant and 
unwilling to assert whether or not the violent actions at Abu Ghraib constitute abuse, 
many reports that do make claims regarding the definitive abuse of prisoners also make 
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claims as to what the violent actions at Abu Ghraib do not constitute: torture. For 
example, an editorial appearing in The Washington Post claimed, “Taken together, the 
photographs demonstrate some of the most demeaning, humiliating and shameful 
treatment of prisoners imaginable, short of actual physical torture” (“Rule of 
Lawlessness” par. 1). This claim, that the violent actions at Abu Ghraib did not constitute 
torture, was one often purported by President Bush (see chapter 2) and other top members 
of the Bush administration and U.S. military. During a CNN broadcast of Judy 
Woodruff’s Inside Politics, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Bush 
administration’s joint chiefs of staff claimed, “We don’t torture people” (“Abuse: 
Outrage” par. 71). President Bush also explicitly distanced himself, the military, and the 
United States from the torture label. For example, NBC’s Today show aired a clip of 
President Bush who argued, “I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The 
values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being” 
(“White House Answering” par. 2; for similar reports see “Voice on Audiotape”; 
“Human Smugglings”). Similarly, Fox News Military Analyst, Robert Scales, argued, 
“Were these abuses? Yes. Was it torture? No” (“Analysis with Robert Scales” par. 17). 
These claims that the violent actions at Abu Ghraib prison at the hands of U.S. soldiers 
did not constitute torture were qualified in the press in several ways.  
One qualification was that some of the actions depicted in the photographs, 
namely the hooding of prisoners, forced nudity and sleep deprivation, were simply 
interrogation techniques and did not constitute torture. This qualification was one often 
put forward by the U.S. soldiers charged in the Abu Ghraib incident, their legal teams, 
and their families. For example, in an interview with CNN Live Today, Barry Myers, 
Attorney for Staff Sergeant “Chip” Frederick, one of the U.S. soldiers charged in the Abu 
Ghraib incident, defended his client’s actions claiming, “What you see is a form of 
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humiliation employed to gain information. I believe that it is overstatement to call it 
torture. And I believe it is overstatement to call it atrocity” (“Military Reprimands Six” 
par. 9). Similarly, in an interview with Paula Zahn, Frederick’s mother, Jo Ann Frederick, 
claimed that the actions made by her son against the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were part of 
the interrogation process and, therefore, could not even be considered abuse, let alone 
torture: “sleep deprivation and interrupting sleep and that type of thin is different from 
abuse. My son was raised right. He’s never abused anybody” (“Shame on Display” par. 
42). In a debate regarding the nature of torture airing on CNN in June, guest Steve 
Maltzberg, a radio commentator argued, “We’ve got probation crossing the line. It’s 
sensory desensitization crossing the line. It’s putting a hood over somebody’s head, 
crossing the line. These are – this is – these are interrogation methods. This isn’t torture” 
(“Rap Sheet” par. 37). While many reports tried to distance the violence at Abu Ghraib 
from labels of torture (and in some cases abuse), other reports attempted to distance the 
practice of prisoner interrogation from violence completely. For example during an 
episode of Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren, Van Susteren interviewed an 
Army reservist who was an interrogator at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, but was not 
involved in the scandal. In the interview Van Susteren asked, “When we say interrogator 
at Abu Ghraib, what was your job? What did you actually do?” (“Were MPs” par. 6). In 
his reply, Day described interrogations as Abu Ghraib prison as calm conversations 
between U.S. interrogators and prisoners, involving little to no physical contact: “Well, to 
tell you the truth, Greta, most of may interrogations were hardly more than interviews” 
(“Were MPs” par. 7). While this claim serves, to some extent, to distance those charged 
with violent acts against prisoners at Abu Ghraib from other military personnel working 
at the prison (for more on this see perpetrators of violence section below) it also removes 
any association between the interrogation of prisoners and the practice of violence. 
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While the complete disassociation between violence and the actions at Abu 
Ghraib prison is not common, many reports do attempt to minimize the violent actions at 
Abu Ghraib. This leads to a second qualification for violence made by the press, a 
qualification made through the comparison of the violent actions at Abu Ghraib at the 
hands of U.S. soldiers to past actions of violence against prisoners at Abu Ghraib under 
Saddam Hussein. Within these reports violent actions performed by U.S. soldiers are not 
only minimized in comparison to the past violent actions of Saddam Hussein, but many 
reports, following claims made by President Bush (see chapter 2), consistently make 
reference to torture by labeling Hussein’s actions as torture. Within these reports, as in 
claims made by Bush, torture is an action done by Hussein; violent actions by U.S. 
soldiers are minimized by comparison. For example Johanna McGeary of Time argued, 
“Of all places, these atrocities occurred at Abu Ghraib prison, once the infamous home of 
Saddam Hussein’s torture chambers” (par. 3; see also Risen; “Abuses at Abu Ghraib”; 
“Interview with Former Presidential Adviser”).  In an article appearing in Newsweek 
Eleanor Clift argued, “American soldiers using Saddam’s torture chambers to abuse and 
sexually humiliate Iraqis pushes the U.S. presence in Iraq beyond the point where it can 
be saved” (par. 1; for similar accounts see Chan and Amon). David Remnick, of the New 
Yorker, argued that under Hussein, “Torture was routine in Abu Ghraib: isolation, 
beatings, rapes, attack dogs, electric shocks, starvation” (par. 1). T. Christian Miller and 
Greg Miller, of the Los Angeles Times claimed, “The incident at Abu Ghraib prison, 
infamous among Iraqis as Saddam Hussein’s main site for torture and execution has 
embarrassed U.S. military officials and enraged Arabs and Americans” (par. 8; for 
similar accounts see McDonnell, Alonso-Saldivar, and Anderson; Rich). An editorial also 
appearing in the Los Angeles Times claimed, “Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, Abu Ghraib 
prison near Baghdad was known for torture and killings. Now, under U.S. occupation, it 
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again is the subject of outrage, after the Army’s own investigation found ‘systemic and 
illegal abuse’ of Iraqi prisoners” (“Beyond those Sick Images” par. 1). Dana Milbank, of 
The Washington Post, argued, “The photos also invited parallels to Saddam Hussein’s 
regime because the abuse occurred in Abu Ghraib, a prison used by Hussein for torture” 
(par. 11; see also “Analysis of Military Response”). In a broadcast of NBC Nightly News 
anchor Hoda Kotb reported, 
The Abu Ghraib prison, for years the scene of countless atrocities committed by 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, now the focus of a new scandal, with the circulation of 
these photos showing Iraqi prisoners forced to pose in humiliating positions 
allegedly by their jailers, US soldiers in charge of prison security. (“Internal Army 
Report” par. 3)  
In a report featured on ABC’s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, Martha Raddatz 
claimed, “The photographs were shot at the Abu Ghraib prison where Saddam Hussein 
subjected prisoners to hideous torture” (“Outrage at Prison” par. 10). Similarly, Wendell 
Goler, of Fox Special Report with Brit Hume, described President’s Bush’s disgust at the 
photographs of the incidents at Abu Ghraib claiming, “Already, he said, Saddam Hussein 
sits in a jail cell and his torture chambers and rape rooms have been destroyed, but new 
evidence said some American prison Guards had mistreated Iraqi inmates, left the 
president deeply disturbed” (“The President Condemns” par. 14). Jamie McIntyre, of 
CNN reported, “The pictures put Rumsfeld in the uncomfortable position of having to 
explain the difference between the abuse by the U.S. military and the torture and murder 
by the regime of Saddam Hussein” (“British Troops Clash” par. 22).  As one can see, the 
distinction between abuse on the part of the United States and torture on the part of 
Saddam Hussein is consistent with official framing and occurs very often throughout 
media accounts.   
In addition to this comparison between the so-called abuse of Iraqi prisoners by 
U.S. soldiers and the so-called torture of Iraqi prisoners by Saddam Hussein’s former 
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regime, many media accounts specifically claim that while so-called abuses may have 
occurred under U.S. supervision, the actions that constitute abuse are not as bad as the 
violent actions that had once occurred under Hussein’s. For example, Ted Koppel, host of 
NBC’s Nightline, argued 
There is no comparison between what happened at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison 
in the bad, old days under Saddam Hussein and the current allegations of abuse by 
American guards at the same prison. Pick your standard of comparison. Number 
of incidents? Level of brutality? There is no comparison. It used to be the seventh 
circle of hell that was inspired, indeed, demanded by Saddam himself. Even 
assuming the truth of every single charge now being leveled against US military 
guards and against civilian interrogators, it is still not the same. (“Saving the 
Mission” par. 11) 
Similarly, Charles Osgood of CBS’s Sunday Morning argued, “We are the good guys. 
We saved Iraq from a dictator a billion times worse than anything we do there” (“Media 
Coverage of War” par. 4). Bob Faw, reporting for NBC Nightly News argued, “No, the 
prison photos are not as gruesome as torture inflicted by Saddam” (“Potential Lasting 
Impressions” par. 8). John Barry, Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff of Newsweek, in 
what for the most part is a critical piece, claimed that comparisons between Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and the U.S. occupation were unfair: 
As his other reasons for war have fallen away, President Bush has justified his 
ouster of Saddam Hussein by saying he’s a ‘torturer and murderer.’ Now the 
American forces arrayed against the terrorists are being tarred with the same 
epithet. That’s unfair: what Saddam did at Abu Ghraib during his regime was 
more horrible, and on a much vaster scale, than anything seen in those images on 
Capitol Hill. (par. 26) 
Similarly, Richard Wolffe, also of Newsweek argued, “Saddam Hussein was a brutal 
dictator who inflicted dreadful suffering on his people. Whatever was done in Abu 
Ghraib falls short of Saddam’s horrors” (par. 5). These claims that the so-called abuses at 
Abu Ghraib are not equal in number or level of brutality to the so-called torture of 
Saddam Hussein, while often recognizing the occurrence of violent action at the hands of 
 131
U.S. soldiers, simultaneously distance the United States from wrongdoing with 
qualifications that U.S. violence is not as bad as the violence of the enemy.  
These claims are also consistent with attempts made by the Bush administration to 
draw attention away from the Abu Ghraib scandal and toward U.S. justifications for the 
war in Iraq (see chapter 2). In fact, the Bush administration, in an attempt to draw media 
attention away from Abu Ghraib, release photographs documenting the violent actions of 
Saddam Hussein to the press. On May 21, nearly one month after the Abu Ghraib 
photographs were aired in the U.S. mainstream media, Tom Brokaw of NBC Nightly 
News reported, “In the wake of weeks of shocking stories of prisoner abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, the Bush administration is trying to send a strong reminder to the world about the 
brutal treatment of prisoners under Saddam Hussein” (“Saddam Hussein’s Torture 
Victims” par. 1). This story, along with others like it, documented in detail the acts of 
violence that occurred under the Hussein regime, couching U.S. abuse into a much less 
violent category. 
American soldiers are the torturers now 
However, attempts by the Bush administration to label the violent actions at Abu 
Ghraib abuse and to focus on past torture performed by Saddam Hussein were not 
entirely successful. Although the dominant frame outlined the violent actions performed 
by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib as abuse, not torture, some mainstream news reports did 
provide a counterframe regarding the nature of the violent incidents at Abu Ghraib. 
Within this counterframe, the violent actions performed by U.S. soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib were deemed torture. However, the actions by U.S. military personnel were often 
still compared to the actions of Saddam Hussein. And in many accounts the actions of 
U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib, though deemed torture, were often still classified in a less 
 132
violent category than the actions of Saddam Hussein or other known torturers in history. 
For example in an editorial written for the Washington Post, Anne Applebaum argued,  
The American soldiers and civilians responsible for humiliating, torturing and 
possibly murdering Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad over 
the past few months do not belong in the same category as Nazi or Soviet camp 
guards. But their actions do prove, if further proof were needed, that no culture is 
incapable of treating its enemies as subhuman. (“Willing Torturers” par. 4) 
Similarly, television personality Bill Maher, appearing on Larry King Live, argued that 
the actions of U.S. guards at Abu Ghraib prison were not as bad as the torturous actions 
of Saddam Hussein, yet he insisted that the U.S. actions be considered torture, not abuse: 
By the way, I saw the front page of the New York Times today. There is a picture 
of an Iraqi woman holding up a picture of someone who’s gone missing in the 
Iraqi prison system, out Iraqi prison system. I was this exact picture a year ago, an 
Iraqi woman holding up someone who disappeared under Saddam Hussein. Yes, 
Saddam’s torture is worse than ours, but when you have the same picture, it looks 
awfully bad. (“Interview with Comedian Bill Maher” par. 190) 
While Maher insists that U.S. torture is not as bad as the torture that occurred under 
Hussein’s regime, he also insists that the violent actions at Abu Ghraib constitute torture 
and should not be called abuse: 
By the way, they [the Bush administration] use the word ‘abuse,’ Donald 
Rumsfeld did, too, because they don’t want to use the word ‘torture.’ The same 
way Rush Limbaugh was on medication. They tried to say that because they were 
using sleep deprivation or uncomfortable positions, they make it sound like it’s 
not torture. It is absolutely torture. (“Interview with Comedian Bill Maher” par. 
195) 
While this account by Maher and others like it insist, as do members of the Bush 
administration, that the actions that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison under U.S. rule were 
not as bad as those that occurred under the rule of Hussein, within some comparisons 
U.S. actions are argued to be equivalent to or worse than the actions of Hussein. 
Interestingly, critical lawmakers on the left often provided this counterframe. For 
example, in a report airing on Fox Special Report with Brit Hume, argues that reactions to 
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the Abu Ghraib photographs took “distinctly partisan tones” (“Congress” par. 2). The 
report goes on to quote Senator Edward Kennedy as saying, “On March 19, 2004, 
President Bush asked who would prefer that Saddam’s torture chambers still be open? 
Shamefully, we not learn that Saddam’s torture chambers reopened under new 
management, U.S. management” (“Congress” par. 6). While this particular report, 
specifically points to potential political motivations behind the equation of U.S. actions 
with the actions of Saddam Hussein’s regime, similar comparisons to the one made by 
Senator Kennedy appear in several other media reports. Some of these comparisons come 
from Iraqi citizens and other citizens from Middle Eastern countries, and Arabic language 
media. For example, Jim Miklaszewki, reported for NBC Nightly News,  
This man in Baghdad asks, ‘where is the human rights America talks about?’ 
Outraged at the treatment of the prisoners, Arab newspapers and television 
declared the US no better than Saddam Hussein. From Syria, ‘The liberators are 
worse than the dictators. This will increase the hatred of America.’ From Saudi 
Arabia. ‘Abu Ghraib Prison was used for torture in Saddam’s time. What’s the 
difference between Saddam and Bush? Nothing.’ (“Fallout Around World” par. 3) 
In subsequent reports, NBC Nightly News anchor John Seigenthaler reported, “There are 
now revelations tonight about the torture of Iraqi captives at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
and what one US Army general now says about what was going on there” (“General in 
Charge” par. 1). 
Some print media sources, primarily in editorial pieces by staff writers, also made 
comparisons between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the U.S. occupation of Iraq, calling 
the actions made by U.S. prison guards torture. For example, David Ignatius of the 
Washington Post wrote,  
I’ve spent the past week trekking around southern Iraq with the British army, 
revisiting places I saw a year ago during the early days of the war. Back then it 
was easy to write without irony or embarrassment that the country had been 
liberated from the torture chambers of Saddam Hussein. All week long I’ve had in 
the back of my mind the images from Abu Ghraib prison of the young American 
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torturers – sadly, that is the only word that fits – who in their juvenile sadism 
thought it was funny to humiliate Iraqi men. For anyone who believed that war 
had a moral purpose, these photographs are deeply unsettling. (pars. 1-2) 
Similarly, Courtland Milloy, also of the Washington Post argued ironically,  
From the awesome U.S. bombings that were supposed to help quickly end the war 
to allegations that U.S. forces have resorted to Saddam-style torture now that an 
end to the war is nowhere in sight, Operation Iraqi Freedom sure has come a long 
way. (par. 2) 
In an opinion piece in Los Angeles Times, David Shaw commented on the role of the 
media in reporting the story of the incidents at Abu Ghraib. In reaction to speculation that 
the media was overreacting to the Abu Ghraib story, Shaw wrote, “There’s a big 
difference between giving such attention to Janet Jackson’s breasts and Howard Dean’s 
rant and giving it to a seemingly unprecedented and astonishingly well-documented case 
of American soldiers abusing, humiliating, and torturing prisoners. . . .” (par. 4; see also 
Rutten). In another op-ed by Frank Smyth, also of the Los Angeles Times, Smyth 
recounted his own experience of being imprisoned at Abu Ghraib prison under Saddam 
Hussein. Smyth concluded his piece claiming, “Night after night at Abu Ghraib, I 
wondered who could allow, much less participate in, such cruelty. Looking at the recently 
released photos, the answer now seems clear: Torture is done by people just like us” (par. 
13).  
What this section of analysis has shown is that, as Bennett, Lawrence, and 
Livingston suggest, many media accounts seem to adhere to the dominant frame put 
forward by the Bush administration that the actions at Abu Ghraib prison by U.S. soldiers 
constitute abuse not torture. However, what it has also shown is that there is more nuance 
within these accounts. Some reports and opinion essays refer to actions by the U.S. as 
torture, thus providing a counterframe to the dominant frame of abuse. Recognizing the 
existence of these two frames is important because, as the analysis below will show, the 
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friction between these two frames sparks a disturbing debate as to whether or not torture 
is a useful practice within America’s war on terror. 
 “The Ticking Bomb”: What is torture and is it useful? 
In media reports of the Abu Ghraib incident, there was a debate over whether or 
not torture should be considered a useful practice against terrorists. As analysis will 
show, this debate adds a dimension to media coverage that cannot be fully explained by 
the abuse/torture dichotomy. However, as analysis will also show, it is influenced, in part, 
by Bush rhetoric in regard to the war on terror. There are two sides to the torture debate. 
One side, often referred to as the “ticking time bomb” argument, suggests that torture is 
useful against terrorists if torture can garner information that saves American lives (see 
chapter 4). The other side of the debate argues that torture is never useful and that it is, in 
fact, the practice of torture that will eventually endanger American lives. 
The ticking-bomb frame, while not overtly supported by the Bush administration 
can be considered a dominant frame because it fits into the Bush rhetoric that frames the 
war on terror (see chapter 2). Within this frame it is understood that the United States 
government and, subsequently, the United States military on behalf of the government 
will do whatever it takes to assure the safety of the American people. Within this ticking-
bomb frame, it is this principle that the United States government needs to do whatever it 
takes in the war on terror that is invoked to excuse the actions of violence at Abu Ghraib 
prison. For example, in a discussion with journalist Seymour Hersh regarding the nature 
of the violence at Abu Ghraib, Wolf Blitzer, setting aside previous arguments as to the 
brutal nature of the violence committed against Iraqi prisoners, asked, “Was it useful, 
though, this kind of – if there was torture or abuse, these atrocities, did it get information 
vital to the overall military objective in Iraq, based on what you found out?” (“Interview 
with Seymour Hersh” par. 284). Hersh’s response to this question, that torture is never 
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useful, fits into the counterframe to this ticking-bomb frame and will be discussed in 
more detail below, however, it is important to note the way in which this question 
suggests that useful information as an end that would support torturous means.  This type 
of questioning is common among many news sources. For example, CNN’s Paula Zahn 
asked, “Are torture and humiliation ever justified?” (“Shame on Display” par. 2; see also 
“Torture”). Brian Braiker of Newsweek asked, “What constitutes torture and what amount 
of it, if any, can be justifiably used in combating terror” (“The War on Terror” par. 4; see 
“Retired Lieutenant General”; “Was Vietnam Worse”). In a Time article, Amanda Ripley 
questioned the legality of the so-called interrogation methods featured in the Abu Ghraib 
photographs, citing the need for Geneva conventions. However, Ripley seemed to push 
past this notion that legal, humane treatment is necessary, asking in a subsequent 
paragraph, “If such interrogation tactics are legally questionable, are they at least useful?” 
(par. 4). In this statement, as with many accounts of the so-called usefulness of torture, 
Ripley sidesteps the problems of human rights abuse and adherence to international law, 
by suggesting that the end, information, justifies any means. Similarly, Michael 
Slackman, of the New York Times, claimed,  
Few Americans will say they support torture. But what if . . .authorities had 
captured one of those engaged in planning the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, there was 
reason to believe that torture could produce information that would save many 
lives? Under those circumstances, does torture become necessary, if perhaps 
regrettable? (par. 3)  
However, while many media accounts pose questions that suggest the usefulness of 
torture in garnering information from U.S. enemies, many others specifically outline the 
need for torture to protect American lives. For example, in an opinion piece by Charles 
Osgood on CBS’s Sunday Morning, Osgood argued, “Fighting terrorists is a brutal 
business. Now we’re in Iraq. Once we’re there, we have to protect innocent life from 
terrorists. That means interrogating prisoners whom we think are terrorists, sometimes 
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harshly” (“Media Coverage of War” par.  4). In this segment, Osgood argued that harsh 
techniques, like the ones featured in the photographs of Abu Ghraib prison were needed 
to protect people from terrorism. Osgood was also critical of any criticism of the actions 
at Abu Ghraib and, calling on the post-9/11 call for unity, he argued that the United 
States military should consider harsh techniques useful, rather than something to be 
punished: 
Let me ask the media and the Congress a question: Might it have been worth 
stomping on a terrorist’s fingers and toes and depriving him of sleep to find out 
who murdered those four men in Fallujah and making sure they didn’t do it again? 
Media, Congress, get it straight: The US is the main repository of decency on this 
Earth. The al-Qaida can never defeat us if we are united. But we can defeat 
ourselves if we begin to think we are the enemy and lose out confidence in our 
cause. There is no moral equivalency between us and the terrorists. We’re the 
good guys, and if we lose because we didn’t play hard enough, it’s the end of 
everything good in our world. (par. 6; see also Dewar) 
In this statement, Osgood removes blame of any wrong doing from the perpetrators of 
violence at Abu Ghraib and couches the harsh actions as a necessary evil against the 
enemy in the war on terror. Similarly, on a CNN broadcast in which the usefulness of 
torture was debated guest Andy Serwer, of Fortune magazine asked,  
We are dealing with people, some of them mass murderers, for instance, involved 
in 9/11. You’re dealing with people who beheaded U.S. citizens. And are we just 
supposed to sit there and say, come on, could you tell us who you’re reporting to 
and expect them to respond? Do the standards change when the enemy’s 
standards change? (par. 31) 
Once, again, the justification for torture depends on an understanding that the enemy 
cannot be dealt with any other way (for more on this point see below) and on the 
assumption that harsh techniques garner information that can save American lives. 
Similarly, Fox’s Sean Hannity claimed, “Some people can’t accept what the U.S. military 
must do to win the war on terror” (“Guests Debate” par. 3). In another broadcast, Hannity 
spoke about the usefulness of torture with former CIA operative, Wayne Simmons, who 
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argued, “As far as I’m concerned, and this is a personal note; all bets are off. We catch an 
al Qaeda member, we know he’s al Qaeda, his life as he knows I has got to be over” 
(“Does CIA Go Too Far” par. 9). Bill O’Reilly of Fox’s The O’Reilly Factory argued,  
Putting somebody in an uncomfortable position in a cell, I’m doing it because 
now we’re dealing with mass murderers using weapons that are 
incomprehensible. And I am telling you, sir, that if we – if there’s an imminent 
danger and somebody knows something about it, you have to use different rules. 
And the Bush administration should define those rules. (“Unresolved Problem” 
par. 10) 
O’Reilly, like others in the media, justifies torture in terms 9/11 and a new set of post-
9/11 rules. This justification, though not specifically addressed by the Bush 
administration in reaction to the events at Abu Ghraib, is one set by the President’s 
rhetoric surrounding the war on terror. However, just like the dominant frame of abuse, 
there is a counterframe to this debate in regard to the usefulness of torture, one that 
claims that torture does not work and should not be used under any circumstances. 
For example, in response to Wolf Blitzer’s question in regard to the usefulness of 
torture (see above), Seymour Hersh claimed that torture was not a useful method of 
garnering information: “What happens is, people tell you what they think you want to 
hear” (“Interview with Seymour Hersh” par. 287). Under similar questioning on CNN’s 
Sunday Show, radio commentator John McIntire not only argued that torture was not 
useful, but also cited members of the Bush administration and top military officials as 
arguing the same point:  
Well, let me quote someone who had a rare moment of sanity the other day. And 
that was U.S. Attorney General John Ascroft, who said he condemned torture, and 
that it was unproductive. And most terrorist experts would tell you torture doesn’t 
work. The people will just tell you what you want to hear, but not necessarily in a 
useful, real information that could lead to anything. (“Rap Sheet” par. 30) 
Similarly, in an editorial for the Washington Post, Kenneth Roth claimed, “People under 
torture will say anything, true or not” (par. 6; see also “Human Smugglings”; Priest and 
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Stephens; Van Natta; Glanz; Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”). To prove this point, that 
torture creates false confessions rather than useful information, Ian Fisher of the New 
York Times provided a detailed account of a former prisoner held at Abu Ghraib, Saddam 
Saleh Aboud, in which Aboud recounted telling his captors anything they wanted to hear 
with the hopes that they would stop their physical abuse of him: 
‘They asked me about Osama bin Laden,’ he said. ‘I said, “I am Osama bin Laden 
but I am disguised.”’ He said he meant every word. ‘I was only afraid that they 
would take me back to the torture room,’ he said. ‘I would prefer to be 
dead.’(“Ex-Prisoners” pars. 6-7) 
In addition to pointing out that torture practices fail to provide useful information from 
captors, other media accounts argue that torturing terrorists is a slippery slope. For 
example, Shanker Vedantam, of The Washington Post reported, 
Experts have justified torture based on pragmatism, military history and theories 
of just war. But coercive measures should be reserved for extreme cases, these 
experts say, not the situation at Abu Ghraib, where Iraqi detainees were not 
terrorist leaders. Human rights activists said such arguments stand on a slippery 
slope: Once captors are given license to torture, the abuse of large numbers of 
prisoners usually becomes standard operating procedure. (par. 6-7; see also “The 
Disappeared”; Glanz) 
What this debate in the media reveals is that there is more nuance to the strict dichotomy 
of abuse vs. torture. What this debate also shows is that when speaking of abuse and 
torture, there are certain assumptions that are never fully questioned, namely assumptions 
about the nature of the enemy. As will be shown in the analysis below, of the arguments 
surrounding the nature of violence (whether they argue that the violent actions against the 
people imprisoned at Abu Ghraib are abuse or torture, justified or not) none sufficiently 
question the nature of the victim of torture. 
Victims of violence 
As the above justifications for torture express, there is a certain assumption in the 
media coverage of Abu Ghraib that the prisoners held there are terrorists, the “worst of 
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the worst,” murderers, and suicide bombers who either know of or are plotting an attack 
against the people of the United States. While the Bush administration was very careful 
with its rhetoric after the photographs of the Abu Ghraib torture was released to the press, 
insisting that the United States did not torture people, and that it was the official policy of 
the United States to treat prisoners in a way that was “consistent” with Geneva 
Conventions and international torture laws, analysis will show that the rhetoric of the 
press makes this stance a bit more complicated. With very few exceptions, media 
coverage of the Abu Ghraib incidents rested on an assumption that the people inside the 
prison were the enemy. And while there are several accounts that report women, children, 
and other Iraqi citizens being wrongly detained inside the prison, very few media reports 
questioned the existence of these prisoners against the dominant narrative that paints all 
prisoners as a terrorist enemy.  
Outraged by the Outrage: Torturing Terrorists and Enemy Combatants 
The dominant media frame surrounding the nature of Abu Ghraib prisoners 
assumes that the prisoners represent an enemy who cannot be reasoned with (see chapter 
2). This dominant frame features prisoners who are unruly, hard to keep detained, hard to 
get information from, and all the while harboring secrets that pose a threat to the well 
being of the people of the United States. For example, in an article appearing in 
Newsweek, John Barry, Mark Hosenball, and Babak Dehghanpisheh described dangerous 
combat conditions in Iraq that made it hard for soldiers to tell who the enemy was among 
the masses of Iraqi civilians the soldiers were attempting to protect:  
Abu Ghraib Prison sits in the middle of one of Iraq’s nastiest patches. Ever since 
‘major combat’ ended a year ago, snipers hidden in the palm groves that surround 
the vast prison compound have routinely fired on U.S. patrols. The guardrails on 
the highway in front of the prison are mangled for miles from the large number of 
IEDs (improvised explosive devices). Helicopters constantly buzz around. At 
night, soldiers in the guard towers get drawn into raging gun battles. And mortars 
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rain on the prison like a lethal hailstorm. ‘I can’t even count how many mortar 
attacks we’ve had,’ Sgt. Joseph Lane, an operating-room technician in the prison 
hospital, told Newsweek last week. ‘Sometimes there are two or three in a day.’ 
And all this while military police must process thousands of Iraqis each month, 
never knowing who among them is a ‘bad guy’ trying to kill them. (par. 1) 
Many media accounts feature similar dangerous settings. Many media accounts also 
repeat this assumption that, due to the dangerous environment in Iraq, it is hard to tell 
who the terrorists are. For example, Kate Snow, of World News Tonight with Peter 
Jennings reported, “Car thieves mingled with suspected terrorists. Eventually, military 
police were guarding nearly twice as many prisoners as the army recommends” 
(“Sequence of Events” par. 2). There is also an assumption, within many media accounts 
that the prisoners at Abu Ghraib lived in conditions that were better than the living 
conditions of U.S. soldiers. For example, in a printed interview with Harvey Volzer, an 
attorney representing one of the accused Abu Ghraib guards, Volzer described the inside 
of the prison as being similar to hell: “Inside, it’s just hotter than hell. Frankly, the 
detainees almost have it better [than the U.S. soldiers assigned to watch them] because 
they can go outside during the day” (Scelfo par. 10). This account, like many others, 
assumes that the prisoners are treated fairly inside the prison, despite the fact that the 
“outside” to which Volzer refers is a series of tents where thousands of prisoners have 
little protection from the sun and no protection against gunfire and mortar attacks. Volzer 
also neglects to reflect on the fact that the thousands of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib are 
there indefinitely, with no legal representation, no rights, and little hope.  
In addition to setting a scene that emphasizes the difficult working conditions of 
prison guards alongside the fair living conditions of the prisoners, media accounts also 
assume that the prisoners inside Abu Ghraib are all dangerous terrorists.  For example, in 
a televised interview, Fox’s Tony Snow asked former speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich his opinion on hooding and shackling prisoners. Gingrich replied,  
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[M]ost of the people [prisoners] we’re describing were people actively trying to 
kill Americans, many of them acting as terrorists, many of them fighting in 
civilian clothing, which is outside the rules of law. And in some cases you have 
every right to isolate them because you don’t want them talking to each other. 
You’re trying to get intelligence information. (“Top Story” par. 33)  
Senator James Inhofe, of Oklahoma, was also repeatedly quoted in media accounts as 
being “outraged by the outrage” regarding the ways in which prisoners were being treated 
at Abu Ghraib. In an article appearing in the Washington Post Mark Leibovich wrote, 
“[Inhofe’s] dismay was not at the treatment of the prisoners so much as at all the hand-
wringing it has generated. He called the prisoners ‘murderers, terrorists and insurgents,’ 
many of whom have ‘American blood on their hands’” (par. 6).  
This assumption that the prisoners kept at Abu Ghraib prison were terrorists is not 
one that was solely put forward by conservative politicians. In an interview with Fox’s 
Alan Colmes, Senator John Kerry, whose remarks on the events at Abu Ghraib are sparse 
at best (see chapter 2), provides a mixed message, one that ultimately assumes that 
terrorists be treated in a way that protects American lives at all costs. When asked about a 
recent video tape of the beheading of Nicholas Berg, Kerry argued, “[I]t shows the 
emptiness of their – absence of values. It shows that these are thugs, killers, terrorists, 
and they deserve everything we can throw at them. And we will” (“John Kerry Shares” 
par. 58).25 In this statement, Kerry describes terrorists as lawless, deserving anything that 
the United States could give them. However, when Kerry addressed the issue of the 
incidents at Abu Ghraib later in the same interview he stated, 
But that doesn’t change the impact of what has happened in that prison through 
our own efforts, which have put American troops at greater risk, put Americans at 
greater risk, tarnished all of us and, I think, done a great disservice to the effort 
that we have been engaged in over there. I will fight a more effective war on 
terror, because I would never have thrown out of the door or window the 
                                                 
25 Nicholas Berg was a young businessman who was captured and beheaded in Iraq. His beheading was 
videotaped and the tape was leaked to the press. In the video, Berg’s captors claimed that Berg’s beheading 
was an act of revenge for the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.  
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obligations of the Geneva Conventions. Why? Because I know, as a former 
combatant, that, had I been captured, I would have wanted our moral high ground 
with respect to those Geneva Conventions to be in place. (“John Kerry Shares” 
pars. 59-60)  
On one hand, Kerry argues that the Abu Ghraib prisoners and, therefore, deserve 
whatever treatment best protects American lives. On the other hand, Kerry argues for the 
importance of Geneva Conventions during times of war. However, it is important to note 
that Kerry does not couch his Geneva Conventions argument in terms of Abu Ghraib 
prisoner rights, but rather in terms of potential retaliation risks for U.S. soldiers. In this 
statement, Geneva Conventions, and the subsequent human rights that the Conventions 
protect, are not to be respected because the enemy deserves protection, rather Geneva 
Conventions are important for American soldiers and the necessary protection the 
Conventions will provide them. So while Kerry is critical of the violent actions featured 
in the Abu Ghraib photos, he does not advocate respecting human rights of others for its 
own sake nor does he question the assumed terrorist nature of the Abu Ghraib prisoners. 
The assumption that all prisoners at Abu Ghraib are terrorists or suspected 
terrorists is repeated throughout media accounts. For example, David Martin, of CBS 
Evening News reported, “The issue of whether the US has permitted the torture of 
captured terrorists is more than just a legal debate over whether any laws or treaties have 
been violated” (“Senate Judiciary” par. 11). In this report, which critically questions the 
legality of the treatment of Abu Ghraib prisoners, does not question the fact that the 
prisoners might not be terrorists. And, while reports like this one fail to question the 
assumption that all Abu Ghraib prisoners are terrorists, many other media accounts 
openly insist that they are. For example, in an interview with Bob Mann, former press 
secretary for Senator Edward Kennedy, Fox’s Bill O’Reilly discussed what types of so-
called interrogation techniques could be used against prisoners thought to be a terrorist 
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threat to the United States. In his response Mann suggested that the prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib were soldiers, not terrorists arguing, “I think sanctioning physical violence against 
people who are soldiers, it’s not something American people do” (“Personal Story” par. 
63). In reaction to Mann’s comment, O’Reilly abruptly ended the interview, arguing, 
“They’re not soldiers, they’re terrorists. And you’re diverting the issue, but we appreciate 
you coming on today” (“Personal Story” par. 64). Similarly, in a debate appearing on 
CNN regarding the usefulness of so-called harsh interrogation techniques, radio 
commentator Steve Maltzberg argued, “Give me a break. These people are killers. 
They’re animals, these terrorists” (“Rap Sheet” par. 32). As one can see, in these types of 
media reports there is an assumption that the prisoners at Abu Ghraib are terrorist 
enemies. This is an assumption that is rarely, if ever, questioned by members of the press. 
The fact that the media failed to question the assumed terrorist nature of Abu Ghraib 
prisoners is made more interesting when one considers the sheer number of media reports 
that identify prisoners who have been wrongly detained. For many media stories report 
the existence of women, children, and common criminals picked up off of the street. 
Many media stories report the imprisonment of Iraqi citizens who happened to have been 
in the wrong place at the wrong time during U.S. raids on Iraqi cities. As the analysis 
below will show, despite consistent reporting that identifies this discrepancy in the 
dominant frame regarding the terrorist nature of Abu Ghraib prisoners, virtually no media 
reports ever fully question this dominant frame. 
Terrorists or Iraqi Citizens: Prisoners Wrongly Detained 
There are many media reports that identify prisoners wrongly detained in Abu 
Ghraib prison. However, media few media reports dwell on the existence of these 
wrongly detained prisoners or on the implications their existence has for the dominant 
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terrorist frame, which suggests a strong adherence to the dominant frame by members of 
the press.26  
For example, in an interview with Bill O’Reilly, Seymour Hersh recounted 
information from the Taguba Report:  
[T]his was not a prison full of hardened, you know, soldiers, caught in war. These 
were full of civilians. He [Taguba] said upwards of 60 percent of the people in the 
prison had nothing to do with, no bad feelings toward America whatsoever. They 
simply were caught in a random roadside check or they were snatched off the 
street. They should have been processed under the Geneva Convention. (“Talking 
Points, Hersh” par. 85-86; see also Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”) 
In this interview, Hersh also identified violent actions not featured in the iconic 
photographs and identified prisoners not featured in them either, namely women and 
children. He claimed, “There was a special women’s section. There were young boys in 
there. There were things done to young boys that were videotaped” (“Talking Points, 
Hersh” par. 92). In this statement, Hersh points out a discrepancy in the dominant frame 
that suggests that all of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison were hardened terrorists, 
providing a counterframe that suggests women, children, and civilians in general who 
were wrongly accused were also housed there (for more on this point see below). 
However, O’Reilly attempted to discredit this report by Hersh and, sticking to the 
dominant frame, he stated,  
I’m going to dispute your contention that we had a lot of people in there with just 
no rap sheets at all, who were just picked up for no reason at all. The people who 
were in the prison were suspected of being either al Qaeda or terrorists who were 
killing Americans and knew something about it. (“Talking Points, Hersh” par. 
112) 
Similarly, in a report by John Donavan on ABC’s Nightline, Donavan reported, 
Night after night, US soldiers raided the homes of suspected Iraqi insurgents. But 
they also swept up anyone else who might know something because information, 
                                                 
26 Reports by Seymour Hersh are an exception. However, as analysis in this section illustrates, conservative 
members of the press tried to discredit Hersh. 
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intelligence, had become the highest priority. Brothers of suspects were arrested, 
neighbors, sometimes passersby. Suddenly Abu Ghraib prison was jammed 
beyond capacity with some 7,000 detainees. The Red Cross, based on its 
inspections, estimates up to 90 percent of them knew nothing. (“Chain of 
Command” par. 18; see also “Unresolved Problem”; “Does CIA go Too Far”; 
“Evidence High-Ranking”) 
However, just as with the report by Hersh on the O’Reilly Factor, this counterframe in 
the form of information that goes against the dominant frame is ultimately subsumed 
under a larger debate about the usefulness of torture that relies on an assumption that 
those imprisoned by the United States during the war in Iraq are terrorist enemies of the 
U.S. At the close of Donavan’s broadcast host Ted Koppel claimed,  
One of these days, here in the United States, another terrorist cell is going to get 
lucky and we’re going to be picking through the rubble again, carrying off our 
dead and injured. Then, the debate over torture will be essentially over. . . . .But 
there are better times to conduct a debate on the subject than in the immediate 
aftermath of a national tragedy. Now, for example, is a better time. It is difficult 
to argue that there are no circumstances under which torture might be justified. 
The possibility, for example, of preventing the imminent death of thousands of 
innocents. But it should be unthinkable for any defender of the US Constitution to 
argue that there should be no clearly defined rules, no limits, no boundaries, no 
consequences for anyone who exceeds those boundaries. (“Chain of Command” 
par. 63) 
Just as O’Reilly’s report ends by discrediting the counterframe offered by Hersh, Koppel 
discredits the counterframe offered by Donavan, reinforcing the ticking-bomb dominant 
frame that relies on an assumption of Abu Ghraib prison housing terrorist enemies. In his 
concluding remarks, Koppel reminds viewers of the terrorists attacks on 9/11 and 
although he argues for a debate regarding the usefulness of torture, he does not give any 
credence to the claims made earlier in the broadcast that the United States might be 
torturing the “wrong” people.  
In addition to reports in which the wrongly-detained counterframe is disputed and 
the terrorist-enemy dominant frame reinforced, there are several media accounts that 
report incidents of prisoners being wrongly detained, but never question the matter or 
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push the issue further. For example, in an article in The New York Times, Ian Fisher 
recounted the story of Hayder Sabbar Abd, a former Iraqi prisoner wrongly detained at 
Abu Ghraib: “‘The truth is we were not terrorists,’ [Abd] said. ‘We were not insurgents. 
We were just ordinary people. And American intelligence knew this’” (“Ex-Prisoners” 
par. 8). However, although Fisher recounts Abd’s claim that he and the other men 
featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs were not terrorist threats, Fisher focuses, not on 
the mistaken detainment of the men, but on the fact that the men were, for the most part, 
treated well and only “abused” by the few soldiers charged with their mistreatment. 
Fisher claimed,  
Mr. Abd spoke with no particular anger at the American occupation, though he 
has seen it closer than most Iraqis. In six months in prisons run by American 
soldiers, in fact, he said most of them had treated him will and with respect. (“Ex-
Prisoners” par. 9) 
In a similar story that aired on World News Tonight with Peter Jennings Bill Redeker 
reported, 
Today, more than 4,500 prisoners are incarcerated at Abu Ghraib prison. Most, 
who are picked up in random military sweeps, turn out to be innocent and are 
released within three months, given $10 spending money and sent on their way. 
But some of those charged with insurgency and held longer tell stories of lengthy 
interrogations, torture and humiliation. (“Inside Abu Ghraib” par. 2) 
In his report Redeker acknowledges that many soldiers held at Abu Ghraib prison are 
detained for no reason. Redeker seems to justify this fact by claiming that many are 
“released within three months” and given “spending money.” However, Redeker also 
admits that some prisoners are charged with insurgency and held longer, recounting the 
story of Hashem Muhsen who was arrested for “carrying a gun” (“Inside Abu Ghraib” 
par. 2). Redeker claimed, “The US military’s own investigation reveals more than 60 
percent of civilians detained at Abu Ghraib were found to pose no threat to Iraqi security. 
Hashem Muhsen was one of those prisoners” (“Inside Abu Ghraib” par. 2; see also 
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Wilson). However, even as Redeker puts forward a narrative that is counter to the 
terrorist-enemy dominant frame, the character of the victims of violence is not discussed 
further. The dominant frame is never questioned. In fact, as Redeker concluded his report 
he suggested that wrongful detainment was a thing of the past: “Tomorrow, another 
group of prisoners will be released from Abu Ghraib. No one doubts lots of people will 
be interested in their stories” (“Inside Abu Ghraib” par. 3). 
Similarly, in an article that outlines the nature of the so-called harsh interrogation 
techniques utilized by the United States against terrorist enemies, Douglas Jehl and Eric 
Schmitt reported, “Most of the prisoners held in the special cellblock that became the 
setting for the worst abuses at Abu Ghraib apparently were not linked to the insurgency” 
(“Prison Interrogations” par. 3). However, just a few paragraphs later, Jehl and Schmitt, 
contradicted this claim by arguing, 
The Tier 1 cellblock at Abu Ghraib was set aside from the rest of the prison to 
house as many as 600 prisoners designated as ‘security detainees’ because of their 
suspected involvement in or knowledge about attacks on American troops. This 
designation set them apart from the thousands of Iraqis imprisoned as criminals, 
who were held in less-secure sections of Abu Ghraib, and the 100 or so former to 
Iraqi officials designated as ‘high-value detainees’ because of their suspected 
knowledge about Iraq’s weapons programs or other such issues, and who were 
held in a special facility on the outskirts of the Baghdad airport. (“Prison 
Interrogations” par. 11)27  
In this report, Jehl and Schmitt initially seem to question the dominant frame surrounding 
the character of the prisoners housed at Abu Ghraib prison by arguing that the prisoners 
had no intelligence value. However, Jehl and Schmitt ultimately revert back to the 
terrorist-enemy dominant frame asserting that those housed inside the prison were of 
“high-intelligence value” either through their knowledge of terrorist activities or Iraq’s 
so-called weapons of mass destruction. 
                                                 
27 The soldiers charged with abusing prisoners worked at Tier 1 or the “hard site.” 
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Ignored violence and prisoners beyond those photographed 
While many accounts report facts that run counter to the terrorist-enemy dominant 
frame and subsequently revert back to that dominant frame, many more simply report the 
existence of detainees, namely women and children, who do not fit the understood 
description of a terrorist. These reports, many of which go into specific detail about 
violence occurring in the prison not featured in the iconic photographs, do not question 
the terrorist-enemy dominant frame.  
For example, several media accounts report the rape, forced self-sodomy or 
threatened rape of male prisoners. Citing the military investigation summarized by the 
Taguba reports, Martha Raddatz of ABC News reported, “[T]here were threats of rape to 
male prisoners. They were kept naked” (“Special Report Introduction” par. 62; see also 
Shenon). This report concludes with statements by Donald Rumsfeld and other political 
elites who insist that the matter is being investigated by the U.S. government. In another 
report appearing in the New York Times, Ian Fisher chronicled the imprisonment of 
Saddam Saleh Aboud. According to the report, the fact that Aboud shared a first name 
with Saddam Hussein caused his treatment to escalate “into a threat of rape by an 
American soldier named Ivan in the 1-A block of Abu Ghraib prison” (“Iraqi Tells” par. 
2). This report by Fisher, although it outlines in detail the violent and highly sexualized 
treatment of Aboud, concludes with concern for a possible Iraqi reaction to the incidents, 
not for the need to uncover similar, undocumented incidents of violence. Other media 
accounts reported the existence of photographs of forced sodomy of male prisoners. Carl 
Hulse and Sheryl Stolberg of the New York Times quoted Arizona Representative, Trent 
Franks, reporting, “he was particularly offended by a photograph in which ‘a prisoner 
was sodomizing himself,’ with a banana” (par. 8). Similarly, Josh White, Christian 
Davenport and Scott Higham of the Washington Post reported the existence of a 
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photograph in which, “a prisoner in flexible handcuffs is made to use a banana to 
simulate anal sex” (par. 14). An editorial appearing in the New York Times, cited the 
Taguba report which recounts violence, “including sodomizing a prisoner ‘with a 
chemical light and perhaps a broomstick’” (“The Nightmare” par. 4; see also Shenon). 
Though these reports expose more depth to the violence at Abu Ghraib than those actions 
featured in the iconic photographs, each of these reports couches this new information in 
terms of the threat these new photographs and this new knowledge poses to the United 
States. For example, the report by White, Davenport, and Higham concluded with a quote 
from Donald Rumsfeld: “‘Be on notice,’ Rumsfeld said in a standing-room only Senate 
hearing room May 8. ‘There are a lot more photographs and videos that exist. If these are 
released to the public, obviously it’s going to make matters worse’” (par. 19). The New 
York Times editorial that cited Taguba’s accounts of forced sodomy concluded,  
Terrorists like Osama bin Laden have always intended to use their violence to 
prod the United States and its allies into demonstrating that their worst anti-
American propaganda was true. Abu Ghraib was an enormous victory for them, 
and it is unlikely that any response by the Bush administration will wipe its stain 
from the minds of Arabs. (“The Nightmare” par. 7) 
In their report, Carl Hulse and Sheryl Stolberg, although they reported the forced self-
sodomy of Iraqi prisoners coerced by American soldiers, soon shifted focus away from 
American violence back to the violence of terrorist threat: “But on the day when the story 
of the beheading of Nicholas Berg, and American civilian in Baghdad was also in the 
news, other lawmakers said the public should not lose sight of the brutality of terrorists” 
(par. 19). Each of these reports, although they cite new evidence and the existence of 
more photographs that document additional violence against prisoners by American 
soldiers, do not question this violence and do not speculate that additional prisoners 
(other than those featured in the iconic photographs) have been tortured. Rather, these 
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reports focus on the potential danger knowledge of this violence on the world state might 
cause for the people of the United States. 
While some reports focus on violence that goes beyond the violence featured in 
the Abu Ghraib photographs, other reports focus on a set of victims of violence that do 
not fit the profile of terrorists, namely young men and women. One set of reports of this 
nature deals with the existence of young boys inside Abu Ghraib prison. For example, an 
article appearing in the Washington Post written by Josh White and Thomas Ricks, cited 
an then unreleased military report claiming that “MPs were using animals to make 
juveniles – as young as 15 years old – urinate on themselves as part of a competition” 
(par. 2; see also “Abu Ghraib Report”; “Photographs of Abuse”; “How Widespread”). 
Just like reports that expose the rape and threatened rape of male prisoners, these reports 
also frame this new evidence regarding the existence of teen prisoners in terms of 
America’s image, not in terms of concern for the victim. For example, Josh White and 
Thomas Ricks concluded their report by quoting an unnamed Pentagon official, who said,  
[O]ne particular worry at the Pentagon is how the use of dogs against Arab 
juveniles will be viewed in the Middle East. ‘People know that in war, you know, 
you have to break eggs,’ he said. ‘But this crosses the line.’ (pars. 15-16) 
In addition to reports that cite the use of dogs against teen boys there is another set of 
reports that cite the rape of a young male prisoner by an American translator who was 
working with military officials during interrogations. In a report on NBC Nightly News, 
Jim Miklaszewski claimed, “In statements to investigators, Iraqi prisoners claim they 
were sexually fondled by female guards, forced to eat good out of toilets and witnessed a 
US translator rape a young boy” (“More Photos” par. 5; see also Jehl and Scmitt, 
“Afghan Policies”; Risen; “New Images”). While one report (see “New Images”) was 
critical of this new information, citing the existence of a cover-up by the Pentagon, others 
insisted that the problem of violence was being investigated (see “More Photos”) or 
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reminded readers of the horrendous acts of violence that had occurred in the prison under 
Saddam Hussein (see Risen). And although there is some variation as to how the press 
treated this new information, there exists no call for accountability or demand for more 
photographs and information to be released. 
While reports on the existence of extreme violence against teen boys may not be 
surprising considering the flood of information that exploded in the press after the leak of 
the Abu Ghraib photographs, what is surprising is the number of news reports that cited 
the existence of female prisoners and potential photographs of female prisoners. It is 
surprising for a two of reasons, first it is surprising because none of the iconic 
photographs that circulated in the press featured women and, second, because reports that 
claimed that there were female prisoners inside Abu Ghraib or cited the sexual assault of 
these female prisoners did little to call for accountability of this violence or question the 
absence of these photographs in the public sphere. 
There are several reports within the media coverage of Abu Ghraib that make 
mention of female detainees or female prisoners. Many of these media accounts stem 
from the Taguba report, which mentions the sexual assault of female prisoners. For 
example, Patrick McDonnell, Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, and Nick Anderson of the Los 
Angeles Times reported, “female detainees as well as male prisoners were videotaped and 
photographed in the nude” (par. 6). Others, stem from a military public relations 
campaign that allowed journalists to tour Abu Ghraib prison in an attempt to assure the 
public that the human rights violations occurring inside had come to an end.28 Kelly 
Wright of Fox reported, “Outside the prison, angry Iraqis gathered in protest of the abuse. 
They demanded that female detainees be released and that changes be made at the prison. 
General Miller points out there are significant changes already underway” (“President 
                                                 
28 Photographers that accompanied reporters on this tour of the prison were not allowed to photograph 
prisoners. 
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Bush Calms Outrage” par. 12). Writers for the New York Times, Douglas Jehl and Eric 
Schmitt, described the layout of Abu Ghraib, noting, “The seventh cellblock under 
American control, was divided into two parts, 1-A, set aside for ‘high risk’ prisoners, and 
1-B, on the second floor for female prisoners” (“In Abuse” par. 29). Sewell Chan of the 
Washington Post reported,  
While the vast majority of detainees live in tents, the two-story hard site hold 
women and those considered to be particularly violent. The building’s two wings 
– cellblocks 1A and 1B – were where photographs of prisoner abuses were taken 
in November and December. (“Rage is on Display” par. 18)  
Although these accounts merely note the existence of female prisoners and neglect to 
make any connection between this and the possibility of female prisoner abuse, there are 
a number of reports that do mention the abuse of female prisoners. Jaime McIntyre, of 
CNN reported, “Among the abuses still under investigation: beatings, a possible murder, 
and even the rape of an Iraqi female prisoner by an American military police officer” 
(“British Troops Clash” par. 36). Douglas Jehl, Steven Myers, and Eric Schmitt of the 
New York Times cited a Military investigation report claiming,  
The document also categorizes a sexual assault case of abuse at Abu Ghraib last 
fall that involved three soldiers . . . who were later fined and demoted, but whose 
names the Army has refused to provide. As part of the incident, the document 
says, the three soldiers ‘entered the female wing of the prison and took a female 
detainee to a vacant cell.’ ‘While one allegedly stood as look-out and one held the 
detainee’s hand, the third soldier allegedly kissed the detainee,’ the report said. It 
says that the female detainee was reportedly threatened with being left with a 
naked male detainee, but that ‘investigation failed to either prove or disprove the 
indecent-assault allegations.’ (pars. 14-16; see also Graham). 
Other reports cite the stories of women detainees who had smuggled letters out of the 
prison claiming they had been raped and sometimes impregnated by the U.S. soldiers 
holding them captive. Ian Fisher of the New York Times reported, “women who were 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib smuggled out leaflets claiming that they had been raped” (“Ex-
Prisoners” par. 7; see also Cody; Scelfo and Norland). Viveca Novak of Time reported, 
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“Three interrogators were later cited for violations of military law in their handling of the 
two females, ages 17 and 18. Senate Armed Services Committee investigators are 
probing whether the two women were sexually abused” (par. 1). While these media 
accounts cite the rape and sexual abuse of female prisoners, they do little to call attention 
to the challenge this abuse poses to the terrorist-enemy dominant frame.  
Additionally, there are some accounts that frame the rape of female prisoners as 
consensual sexual encounters between the female detainees and their male captors. This 
unfortunate framing comes from the military’s own wording in its investigation 
summarized in the Taguba report which cited “a male MP guard having sex with a female 
detainee” (416). Many media reports kept this wording, which completely denies the 
power dynamic between the soldiers and their captors by suggesting that the sexual 
encounter was consensual. Peter Williams reporting for NBC Nightly News claimed, 
“investigators say male MP guard had sex with a female prisoner” (“American Soldiers 
Accused” par. 7; see also Thomas, Barry, Klaidman, Hosenball, Lipper, Isikoff, Wolffe, 
Gutman, and Wingert). John Donvan reporting for ABC’s Nightline reported,  
What doesn’t help, the details from the Army’s own investigation, verbatim 
‘punching, slapping and kicking detainees. Jumping on their naked feet. 
Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees. Forcing groups 
of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and 
videotaped. A male MP guarding having sex with a female detainee.’ (“Conduct 
Unbecoming” par. 30; see also “Prisoner Abuse Scandal”) 
Because there is documentation by the Army’s own investigators of the sexual abuse of 
female detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and because many reports note the existence of 
this abuse, it is interesting to note that of the 560 documents I closely examined for the 
analysis section of this chapter, only five reports directly address the veiled photographs 
(see chapter 1). In one report, David Sander of the New York Times mentions the possible 
existence of these photographs, musing about the political ramifications the release of 
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such photographs could cause for the Bush campaign in the then upcoming Presidential 
elections. Sander wondered, “Should he [President Bush] order the release of the 
remaining photographs and videos – even if they contain graphic images, as rumored, of 
assaults or rapes?” (par. 9). Sander concluded that the President needed a better strategy 
for dealing with the bad press of Abu Ghraib. Neil MacFarquhar, also of the New York 
Times, cited a newspaper in Cairo that published a story on the gang rape of Iraqi women 
in Abu Ghraib prison, “The opposition daily Al Wafd in Cairo published a front-page 
picture that it said showed the gang rape of an Iraqi woman by United States soldiers. Its 
authenticity could not be verified, and Al Wafd did not disclose its source” (par. 24). As 
one can see, although MacFarquhar recognizes the existence of the story, he denies the 
possible existence of the photographs by questioning the story’s authenticity and 
questioning the sources from which the Egyptian newspaper gathered its information. 
The only other mentions of the violent sexual assaults featured in the veiled photographs 
appear on the Fox News Network. In these reports, journalists and talk show guests 
vehemently denied any rape of Iraqi women and claimed that the photographs depicting 
rape were fake, pornographic photographs. In a discussion appearing on The O’Reilly 
Factor concerning the Bush administration’s reaction to the Abu Ghraib incidents, 
O’Reilly, and his guest Salameh Nematt (an Arabic language newsperson), express 
criticisms of President Bush’s apologies made to Arabic language news stations 
regarding the incidents at Abu Ghraib. In response to Nematt, who claimed that the 
apologies by President Bush and his administration were an overreaction, O’Reilly stated, 
I understand tour point, but when you have an Egyptian newspaper that fakes a 
photo, as had happened yesterday, and says that soldiers gang raped a Muslim 
woman, when you have – you’re a Jordanian. In your country, the most vile 
reporting about Americans. And you see this propaganda on al Jazeera every 
single day. You can understand how embarrassed we are in the United States 
because we take a high moral ground and how they would want every Arab to 
know that they are just appalled this happened. (par. 18) 
 156
In a similar report, Fox’s Jim Angle reported,  
The general manager Abdul Rahman al Rashid of al Arabiya television is 
denouncing some Arab newspapers for publishing photos on their front pages that 
they say show prisoner abuse, when in fact the photos weren’t even taken in Abu 
Ghraib prison. Al Rashid, in an Arab newspaper report translated by Middle East 
Research Center, says those photos are actually scenes taken from adult films. He 
claims the individuals in those photos look happy, not like abuse prisoners. 
(“Political Grapevine” par. 3) 
In another report on Fox, guest Brent Bozell (the president of Media Research Center) 
argued,  
In the press there is a lot of rumors and speculation. How many stories have we 
heard in the press about the rapes that were taking place, about the murders that 
were taking place? And guess what? None of that has been proven true yet. Also, 
what you’ve got is pictures that have been doctored. (“Is Mainstream Media” 
pars. 42-43)  
What this report and the analysis in this section illustrate is that although reports exist in 
the press that outline violence and victims not featured in the iconic photographs, there is 
little call in the press to push the matter further. This failure on behalf of media accounts 
to question the dominant frame put forth by the Bush administration that those 
imprisoned at Abu Ghraib are a terrorist threat suggests an essential adherence to this 
dominant frame. However, while there is virtually no argument within the mainstream 
media as to the need to question the nature of the victims at Abu Ghraib, there is much 
dispute in the press as to the nature of their captors.  
Perpetrators of Violence 
As recent scholarship concerning news coverage of the Abu Ghraib violence has 
claimed (see Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston), the dominant media frame concerning 
the perpetrators of violence focused on the notion that those committing violent acts at 
Abu Ghraib were “a few bad apples” whose actions did not represent the character of the 
United States military or the American people. However, media coverage of the events 
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did contain a counterframe that suggested involvement in Abu Ghraib violence 
originating in the White House and the Pentagon. The following analysis concerning the 
perpetrators of violence is divided into two sections. First, I look at the perpetuation of 
the few-bad-apples dominant frame. This coverage focuses on the notion that there were 
only a few involved in the violence and their actions had personal, psychological 
motivations. Second, I focus on the counterframe that suggests possibilities for violence 
ranging from poor leadership, to the use of private contractors (who are not subject to the 
same legal standards as members of the United States military), to those accounts that lay 
responsibility at the feet of Donald Rumsfeld and even President Bush himself.  
A Few Bad Apples 
As Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston suggest, the dominant frame regarding the 
perpetrators of violence inside Abu Ghraib prisoners focuses on the notion that only a 
few rogue military personnel, working in secret in the middle of the night, were 
responsible for the violence featured in the iconic photographs. This dominant frame 
purported by the President, members of his cabinet, and top U.S. military officials 
attempted to distance the actions featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs from the 
character of the United States and its people. For example, in an interview appearing on 
CNN Live Saturday, General Weseley Clark argued,  
We came to free, not imprison. With our character, we don’t torture or maim or 
coerce. And if the mission was endangered by the prospects of our use of heavy 
force against insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf, and it was so endangered, it is no 
less endangered by the loss of credibility caused by the misconduct of a few 
American soldiers. This mission is in trouble. (“Explosion in East Jerusalem” par. 
34). 
In this statement and others like it, the incidents at Abu Ghraib are said to not fit the 
character of the United States and the violence that occurred in the prison is said to have 
been caused by a few. These few, in turn, are said to damage the image of the United 
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States and are often blamed for putting fellow American soldiers, and subsequently the 
lives of all Americans, at risk from terrorist violence. Similarly, a report by David 
Hawkins for CBS, chronicled reactions to the Abu Ghraib photographs by U.S. soldiers 
serving in Iraq. The report emphasized the disgust felt by the soldiers regarding the 
actions at Abu Ghraib and focused on the differences between the soldiers charged with 
violent crimes and the character of those in the United States military in general. The 
report featured Staff Sergeant Robert Parker who claimed,  “There are a few bad apples, 
but we want to make sure that the American people know that’s not the Army’s way of 
doing business” (“Prison Abuse Revelations” par. 10; for similar accounts see Chan 
“U.S. to Cut Iraq Prison Population”; Billips). In an article by Sewell Chan, appearing in 
the Washington Post, Air Force General Richard B. Myers, was quoted as saying, 
“‘Where a handful of people can sully the reputation of hundreds of thousands of people 
that are over there trying to give a better life to 50 million people, it’s a big deal, because 
we take this very seriously” (“U.S. Official: Abuse Allegations” par. 2; see also 
McDonnell, Alonso-Zaldivar and Anderson; “Six Soldiers Face Criminal Charges”; 
“Iraqi Prison Abuse Widespread”). In reaction to the scandal, Donald Rumsfeld also 
made several attempts to distance the character of the people of the United States from 
the violent actions that occurred in Abu Ghraib prison. In a CBS report by Wyatt 
Andrews, Rumsfeld was quoted as saying, “[I]t’s been a body blow for us, but it doesn’t 
represent America” (“Donald Rumsfeld Visits Iraq” par. 5; for similar see “Secretary 
Rumsfeld Receives”; “Rumsfeld Promises Punishment”). General Geoffrey Miller, the 
Army Commander sent to oversee Abu Ghraib operations and rectify the problems there 
once the stories of violence began leaking to the press, also attempted to distance the 
character of U.S. military personnel from the actions that had taken place at Abu Ghraib. 
In an interview appearing on Good Morning America, Miller claimed, 
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I find those pictures inappropriate and we’re all ashamed of any of our soldier or 
leaders who would do inappropriate actions. These are the actions of a very small 
number of leaders and soldiers. We’re doing our very best to correct these and get 
better everyday. (“Iraqi Prison Abuse Scandal” par. 5)29 
In an article written for the Washington Post Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, 
spokesman for the United States Army, defended the U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq 
claiming, 
 [E]ven though every one of those 135,000 condemn the actions you saw in the 
photos, they still want you to understand that they’re out there doing a good job, 
trying to do the right thing and trying to accomplish the mission. (“MP to be 
First” par. 14; see also Milbank “U.S. Tries to Calm”; Schrader and McDonnell; 
“US Marines Turn to Former Saddam General”) 
Kimmitt, in an interview with Matt Lauer on Today, also claimed, “The fact is what we 
see here is cases of individual criminal conduct. And nobody gave them the order to 
break the law. Nobody gave them the order to violate their integrity” (“Brigadier General 
Mark Kimmitt” par. 6; see also “Images of Abuse”).  
Even then Secretary of State Collin Powell, known for speaking against the war in 
Iraq, was quoted in an article appearing in The Los Angeles Times asserting that the 
violent incidents were the acts of a few soldiers:  
‘Yes, I’m deeply concerned at the horrible image this has sent around the world,’ 
Powell said. ‘But at the same time, I want to remind that world that it’s a small 
number of troops who acted in an illegal, improper manner.’ (Hendren and 
McDonnell par. 14; for similar see “Six Soldiers Charged”; “Former Hostage 
Hamill”)  
Senator John McCain, who carries incredible ethos on the subject and was one of the few 
Republicans to speak out against Abu Ghraib due to his own status as a former prisoner 
of war, also attempted to distance the character of the United States from the violent 
                                                 
29 In this statement, Miller’s use of the word “leader” refers to U.S. military officers and immediate 
commanders, not political leaders. 
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actions documented in the Abu Ghraib photographs. In an interview on CBS’s The Early 
Show, McCain claimed,  
[A]ll of us are sorry because this kind of behavior is so abhorrent because it’s not 
the way Americans behave and the tragedy of all this is that so many brave young 
Americans are besmirched by this because 99 percent – an overwhelming 
majority of American servicemen and women would never engage in such 
activity. (“Senator John McCain” par. 8; see also “Interview with Senator 
McCain”)  
This dominant frame was also put forward by the military’s own Abu Ghraib 
investigations. Richard Serrano, of the Los Angeles Times, reported, “The investigators 
said Tuesday that they had found no reason to believe that any of the soldiers’ superiors 
bore responsibility for the abuse” (par. 4).  
While members of the political elite and the U.S. military put this dominant frame 
forward, journalists and television pundits also perpetuated this frame. For example, 
commenting during a guest appearance on Nightline, Rami Khouri, of The Daily Star, 
argued, “The President can stand up, like a man, and make an apology. I mean, if this was 
the work of a few, rogue Americans, make that clear to the Arab people” (“Saving the 
Mission” par. 45; for similar see “Talking Points, Hersh”). In an editorial appearing in the 
New York Times, Pal Krugman, following a statement made by President Bush, claimed, 
“President Bush said that ‘it does not reflect the nature of the American people.’ He’s 
right, of course: a great majority of Americans are decent and good” (par. 2; see also 
“The President Condemns”; “Interview with Louis Cantori”; “Interview with Former 
Army Interrogator”). In an article appearing in Time Nancy Gibbs wrote,  
I thought war was hard to explain to a child. But compared to this, war is easy. 
When my daughter saw the pictures flashed on the Today show and wanted to 
know ‘Why are there wires attached to that man’s hands?’, I could not bring 
myself to explain that this is designed to maim a man’s soul: in a culture that 
sanctifies masculine pride and sexual privacy, you strip him and make him 
masturbate in front of a mocking female captor, or put him on a leash or pretend 
you are going to electrocute him. But I did have to explain that the bad guys – this 
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time – were seven U.S. soldiers, of whom it might be said that seldom has such 
harm been done to so many by so few. (par. 1) 
Some media accounts, particularly those appearing on Fox News Network, not only 
reported the dominant frame, but also explicitly attempted to discredit counterframes. For 
example on Fox’s Big Story Weekend Edition Catherine Herridge, a Fox news 
correspondent, reported on a series of claims made by journalist Seymour Hersh 
regarding the involvement of the Pentagon and the White House in the Abu Ghraib affair: 
“According to a New Yorker press release, the ‘roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie 
not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists but in a decision approved last 
year by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld . . .” (“Interview with Frank Gaffney” 
par. 4). However, though Herridge presents the counterframe provided by Hersh, the 
show’s guest, Frank Gaffney, a former Assistant Defense Secretary, soon discredits this 
frame. Gaffney argued, 
Well, look, it must be acknowledged that Sy Hersh has made a career of 
conspiracy mongering for partisan purposed and has most recently been leading 
the press pack attacking both the institution of the Pentagon and Donald Rumsfeld 
personally. I think what he has demonstrated yet again in this report is an 
indifference to genuine national security interests and concerns. Specifically, he is 
compromising a so-called special access program, which was first and foremost 
about the timely targeting and ability to go after people who intelligence tells us 
are out there plotting terrorist operations, al Qaeda and otherwise. (“Interview 
with Frank Gaffney” par. 17-18) 
It is interesting to note that though Gaffney never directly addresses Hersh’s concern 
about whether or not Bush higher-ups were involved in perpetrating the violence against 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Gaffney attempts to discredit Hersh by claiming his attacks are 
politically motivated and not in the interest of the safety of the United States. Gaffney’s 
criticism of Hersh also revolves around the ticking-bomb defense (see above). Criticism 
of the U.S. government’s potential involvement in the Abu Ghraib incidents, within many 
media accounts, was framed as a threat to American national security.  
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In addition to claims made by political elites and members of the press that the 
violent actions at Abu Ghraib were the work of a few rogue soldiers who did not 
represent the character of the American nation, reports often portrayed those accused of 
violence at Abu Ghraib as sexual deviants, sadistic individuals who enjoyed inflicting 
pain on their captors. This part of the dominant frame is important, because it reinforces 
the notion that the violent actions that had occurred within the prison were not part of a 
systematic problem or, even worse, part of U.S. policy in Iraq, but that the violent actions 
instead stemmed from the character of the individuals involved. Painting the soldiers 
charged with crimes at Abu Ghraib prison as monsters, in turn, reinforced the notion that 
their actions could not represent the United States and that the problem, being an 
individual one, could be fixed internally through U.S. military investigations without 
political fuss or public intervention. 
For example, Julie Scelfo and Rod Norland, of Newsweek, claimed, “It’s difficult 
to escape the conclusion that the Abu Ghraib tortures were just having a good, yet 
sadistic, time” (par. 3). In an article appearing in the Los Angeles Times, Richard Serrano 
and Patrick McDonnell, quoted an army investigator, Tyler Pieron, as saying, “‘Taking 
pictures of sexual positions, the assaults, and things along that nature were done simply 
because they could. It all happened after hours’” (par. 28; see also Higham, Stephens, and 
White). In another article appearing in Newsweek author Brian Braiker interviewed 
Michael Milburn, a psychologist at the University of Massachusetts and asked Milburn to 
explain the psychological reasoning for the actions at Abu Ghraib. Milburn concluded 
that the reasons for the abuse at Abu Ghraib was not systematic, governmental problems, 
but rather a result of the need for power by the prison guards. Milburn claimed, 
The role of a prison guard really dehumanizes the people who occupy it and 
comes with it the ultimate aphrodisiac of power. There’s no coincidence that a lot 
of the abuse becomes sexualized. There has always been a fusion of sexuality and 
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power – it’s a way of getting off; it’s a high to exercise that power. (“See no Evil” 
par. 29) 
In an interview with Fox’s Bill O’Reilly, Arizona Representative J.D. Hayworth claimed 
the actions were those of “sick” individuals: “While there are sick individuals in every 
society, the difference is we are going to deal with these wrong doers” (“Talking Points, 
Hayworth” par. 47). In an interview on Fox, Janis Karpinski, the Brigadier General who 
was in charge of Abu Ghraib at the time the violence against the prisoners occurred, 
claimed, “It’s still hard for me to believe that soldiers, anybody in uniform – anybody 
would perform such acts and take pictures of themselves almost enjoying it” (“Interview 
with Brig. Gen Janis Karpinski” par. 24; see also Shenon). What is interesting about this 
statement is that Karpinski is one of the few who ultimately defended the actions of the 
soldiers under her command, claiming that they were ordered by members of another unit 
to perform the actions that they were (see below). However, in this statement, Karpinski 
expresses her concern that, in the photographs, the soldiers charged with crimes against 
prisoners seem to be enjoying their treatment of the prisoners. Even television 
commentator Bill Maher, who was critical of the use of the word abuse over torture (see 
above), claimed that sick individuals performed the actions. Maher claimed,  
It is absolutely torture. These people are sadists. That’s the one thing I don’t think 
people have been bringing out. How much they enjoyed it, these guys in the 
picture and the woman smiling and smirking. Even if they were ordered to do this, 
which in a way, they were, I don’t think they were ordered to smile, I don’t think 
anyone said, and you have a crap-eating grin on your face, soldier, when you 
punch that Iraqi man. (“Interview with Comedian Bill Maher” par.  195) 
The fact that the soldiers were smiling is problematic for a number of media accounts. 
For example, Sarah Boxer, of the New York Times, claimed, “Soldiers are cheerfully 
tormenting their captives for the camera” (par. 9). An editorial, also in the New York 
Times claimed that soldiers were “gleefully brutalizing prisoners” (“The Torture Photos” 
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par. 2). In an article appearing in the Washington Post, Scott Higham and Joe Stephens 
claimed,  
Prisoners posed in three of the most infamous photographs of abuse to come out 
of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were not being softened up for interrogation by 
intelligence officer but instead were being punished for criminal acts or the 
amusement of their jailers. (par. 2) 
This notion that the guards charged with violent acts against prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
were sick individuals, acting on their own accord and for their own amusement was 
reinforced by one of the U.S. military’s own investigations. In August of 2004, the 
military released the Schlesinger report, an independent investigation headed by James 
Schlesinger. As CNN’s Paula Zahn explained, “‘There was chaos at Abu Ghraib,’ With 
those words, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger today began briefing reporters 
on a new independent investigation into the abuse of prisoners and detainees in Iraq” 
(“Broken Olympic Dreams” par. 1). A video clip of Schlesinger at the press conference 
follows this commentary by Zahn. In the clip, Schlesinger claimed,  
It was sadism on the night shift at Abu Ghraib, sadism that was certainly not 
authorized. It was a kind of ‘animal house’ on the night shift. That is reflected in 
the fact that there was no such activities during the day shift. (“Broken Olympic 
Dreams” par. 4; see also “Commission Finds Major Failures”; “Harsh Report 
Released”)  
In this report and others like it, the violence at Abu Ghraib is described as unsanctioned 
and unruly. What is interesting is that many reports not only peg the guards charged with 
violent acts against prisoners at Abu Ghraib as sick individuals abusing prisoners for 
amusement, but many reports focus specifically on one individual: Lynndie England. 
For example, Christian Davenport and Michael Amon of the Washington Post 
argued, “It is the images of England that have become synonymous with the abuse” (par. 
7). James Dao, of the New York Times reported, “Private England is perhaps the most 
prominently displayed person in a series of photographs taken in the Abu Ghraib prison 
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near Baghdad that show members of the 372nd Military Police Company abusing 
prisoners” (par. 3). Similarly, in a report by Lynn Duke, also of the Washington Post, 
England is described as the “face of the scandal” and an icon of abuse:  
It is a quiet spectacle. That is what England inspires. People look at her to find 
some meaning, some answers in the face that, in fairness or not, quickly became 
the improbable face of the ugly prison abuse scandal. Many other faces have 
emerged, but England’s remains iconic – and tragically so, considering that a 
child is coming into Lynndie England’s embattled world, and considering that the 
new mother could end up in jail in a case that has polarized the nation. (par. 7; for 
similar see Zernike, “Prison Guard”; Zernike, “The Woman with the Leash”) 
In this account, England is not only a part of the scandal, but comes to represent it. 
Similarly, Heidi Collins of CNN claimed, “Tonight, she’s the infamous face of Abu 
Ghraib, taking on prisoners with a grin, a dangling cigarette and a dog collar. Now 
Private 1st Class Lynndie England in court taking on the U.S. Army” (“Private 1st Class 
Lynndie England in Court” par. 1).  
Other than a focus on England being the face of Abu Ghraib violence there is a 
focus, in many media accounts on the notion that England enjoyed the violent actions in 
which she partook. Much of this emphasis comes from sworn statements made by 
England herself. As Kate Zernike, of the New York Times reported,  
In a sworn statement to investigators, Pfc. Lynndie England explained the 
mystery of why soldiers at Abu Ghraib took pictures of detainees masturbating 
and piled naked with plastic sandbags over their heads by saying, ‘We thought it 
looked funny so pictures were taken.’ (“Prison Guard” par. 1)  
Paul Liberman and Dan Morain of the Los Angeles Times reported, “Four will face 
hearings beginning Monday, including Graner and his pregnant girlfriend, Pfc. Lynndie 
England, who down played their actions as ‘basically us fooling around.’” (par. 4; see 
also “Pvt. England in Court”). Josh White, of the Washington Post, reporting statements 
made by the prosecuting attorneys, emphasized the notion that England enjoyed the 
abuse:  
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‘She was having fun,’ said Capt. Crystal Jennings, one of three prosecutors on the 
case, emphasizing that England was an administrative clerk who had no official 
business on Tier 1A of the prison, where the most serious abuse occurred. 
‘There’s no indication she was there for military purpose . . . . There were no 
orders. There’s no evidence that Pfc. England was given any order to do these 
things.’ (par. 5).  
White also describes England’s actions in such a way that becomes quite common in the 
media coverage of her. In many media accounts, England’s participation in sexual acts 
with “other U.S. soldiers,” namely her boyfriend at the time and the father of her child, 
Charles Graner become central to description of her. As Josh White, of the Washington 
Post explained,  
England also appears in a number of sexually explicit photographs – some of 
which show her having sex with another soldier – offenses that alone could result 
in significant prison time. It is unclear when England would face trial though a 
decision could be made within weeks or months. (par. 9; for similar see “Who 
Gave the Orders?”; “The Photographs: Violent and Sexual Scenes”) 
Similarly, Kate Zernike, of the New York Times reported,  
Private England, wearing a maternity version of military camouflage, appeared to 
suppress a smile as investigators described a videotape that showed her having 
sex with Cpl. Graner, who prosecutors say was a ringleader of the abuse and 
Private England says is the father of the child she is carrying. Her mother sat 
stern-faced in the observation gallery, her eyes darting from the witness stand to 
her daughter as an investigator described photographs of Private England topless 
and engaged in what he called oral sex. (“The Woman with the Leash” par. 6) 
Within these reports, England is portrayed as an over-sexualized individual. This focus 
on England and her sexualized nature, in turn, reinforces the dominant frame that 
assumes that the individuals charged with violence against the Abu Ghraib prisoners 
acted on their own and were motivated by personal desires.   
It is not only interesting that the focus of much media coverage was on Lynndie 
England, the face of the scandal, but it also seems as though England became a symbol, a 
gateway for assumptions about the fundamentalist, terrorist nature of the victims (see 
enemy-terrorist dominant frame section above). For example, Barbara Ehrenreich 
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discusses England’s status as the iconic symbol of prison abuse in terms of gender 
equality and in terms of the West playing into the hands of the Islamic fundamentalist. 
She explained, “Here, in these photos from Abu Ghraib, you have everything that the 
Islamic fundamentalists believe characterizes Western culture, all nicely arranged in one 
hideous image – imperial arrogance, sexual depravity . . . and gender equality” (par. 5). 
Later in the article, Ehrenreich discusses the role of women in the Abu Ghraib violence 
and her disappointment that women could be involved in sexual sadism on an equal rate 
to men:  
A certain kind of feminism, or perhaps I should say a certain kind of feminist 
naiveté, died in Abu Ghraib. It was feminism that saw men as the perpetual 
perpetrators, women as the perpetual victims and male sexual violence against 
women as the root of all injustice. Rape has repeatedly been an instrument of war 
and, to some feminists, it was beginning to look as if war was an extension of 
rape. There seemed to be at least some evidence that male sexual sadism was 
connected to our species’ tragic propensity for violence. That was before we had 
seen female sexual sadism in action. (par. 9). 
In this critique, there is an assumption on Ehrenreich’s part that it is only males that are 
the victims of violence and Ehrenreich, like many other members of the media, ignores 
the scattered reports of women as the sexual victims and the suppression by the U.S. 
government of the photographs that document them. This assumption not only ignores 
the history of sexualized violence that has long been an integral part of imperial 
occupation and domination, but it also ignores the potential counterframe: perhaps the 
culpability for violence resided much higher up the chain of command. 
Chain of Command: How Far up Does Responsibility Go? 
Although many media accounts adhere to the dominant frame that a few rogue 
guards acted on their own with a sick, perverted sadism driving their violent actions, 
there are many other media accounts that question this assumption. Many media accounts 
suggested the documented violent actions at Abu Ghraib were the result, not of a few 
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rogue sadistic soldiers, but of a system that put untrained personnel into a situation with 
poor leadership, which resulted in the abuse. This account is an interesting one because, 
on the one hand, it suggests that there is a systematic problem, rather than an individual 
one, and it also suggests that there were more people involved in the abuse than those 
charged with violent actions against prisoners. On the other hand, this poor training and 
poor leadership frame is one that was eventually put forward by members of the political 
and military elite. When members of the political and military elite put forward this 
frame, the chain of command only goes as far as those directly in charge, thus, officials in 
the Pentagon and White House remain free from blame.  
Many reports follow claims made by military officials who, though they admit 
that there were bad conditions, still insist that it was a few bad soldiers and that poor 
leadership failed to discipline these soldiers. For example, in a report by Army inspector 
general Lt. Gen. Paul T. Mikolashek, Mikoleshek claimed that the actions were those of a 
few, but that the actions were allowed to happen due to poor leadership creating a climate 
for abuse. As Eric Schmitt, of the New York Times reported,  
Unlike General Taguba’s report, General Mikolashek’s inquiry found no evidence 
that systematic problems caused any of 94 alleged abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan 
from September 2002 to June 2004. Instead, his five-month inquiry attributed the 
abuses to the ‘unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals, coupled with the 
failure of a few leaders to provide adequate monitoring, supervision and 
leadership over those soldiers.’ (par. 3) 
This account, while suggesting that others were involved in creating a climate for abuse, 
puts the majority of blame on the soldiers charged. In many reports the blame stops at the 
head of the Abu Ghraib prison, Janis Karpinski. For example, in a report appearing in the 
Los Angeles Times T. Christian Miller and Greg Miller claimed, “The prison has been 
beset with leadership problems, according to U.S. sources. Gen. Janis Karpinski, a 
reservist in charge of prison operations, was suspended after reports of abuse of as many 
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as 20 prisoners surfaced last fall” (par. 26). Esther Schrader, also of the Los Angeles 
Times, claimed “there were too many inmates and not enough guards. Training was 
inadequate and superiors rarely made rounds. The U.S. guards’ morale was flattened 
when their hopes of returning home soon were disappointed” (par. 6). A report by Evan 
Thomas, Julie Scelfo, Trent Gegax, and Pat Wingert described the prison as a complete 
breakdown in all discipline and authority:  
No one in charge. Other witnesses describe a complete breakdown of military 
discipline and authority. Inside the prison, none of the men and women of the 
372nd Military Police Company bothered to salute their superiors. Badges of rank 
disappeared; authority was confused. Everyone, CIA, military intelligence, private 
contractors, wore indistinguishable fatigues. (par. 4) 
Taguba’s report is also cited in this argument for poor training and leadership. For 
example, Daryn Kagan of CNN claimed, “Major General Antonio Taguba says there was 
a failure of leadership, lack of training and no supervision at the prison” (“Role of 
Military Intelligence” par. 2; see also “Failure of Leadership”; “Chain of Command”). 
While these reports essentially adhere to the few-bad-apples dominant frame, they do 
show that this frame is nuanced and that many reports that stick to this assumption admit 
that there is the possibility that others were involved who may have contributed to the 
Abu Ghraib violence. 
While these accounts only deviate slightly from the few-bad-apples frame, 
however, there are accounts that are more critical. One of the first concerns that became 
apparent in mainstream media accounts was the fact that there were more people in many 
of the iconic photographs than there were people charged with abuse. For example, an 
editorial appearing in the Los Angeles Times claimed,  
‘A few bad apples’ was the dismissive phrase used by the White House after 
photos of brutality by U.S. forces in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison leaked out. The fact 
that there were numerous soldiers, including alleged Army intelligence officers, in 
some of the pictures immediately chipped at that claim. (“Twisting American 
Values” par. 4) 
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 In an interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC, Seymour Hersh insisted that not 
all of the people featured in the iconic photographs were being charged with crimes. In 
the interview Hersh described a set of photographs in which an Iraqi prisoner is being 
bitten by a dog. Responding to the photograph, Stephanopoulos, clarified saying, “And 
it’s my understanding that no one in that photo is one of the seven people who’s already 
been facing court-martial” (“Interview with Seymour Hersh” par. 5). To this Hersh 
responded,  
It is a completely different unit. Seven people facing court-martial are frm the 
372nd MP Company at the prison. That is the 320th Battalion, MP Battalion, so 
we’re talking about a bigger unit, it’s also based at the prison, but these are a 
whole another set of people. (“Interview with Seymour Hersh” par. 6) 
Similarly, Brian Ross of ABC reported, “The still photographs show at least three 
soldiers who have not been identified nor charged, including a soldier with a menacing 
dog” (“New Images” par. 5). Jim Miklaszewski of NBC reported,  
As shocking as these photos appear, Pentagon officials now fear this kind of 
mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners may be more widespread than first thought. The 
Pentagon and military are conducting at least six investigations to determine if 
these abuses are part of a larger systemic problem. (“Army Report Confirms” 
(par. 2; see also “Prisoner Abuse at Abu Ghraib; “The Washington Post Releases 
New Video”)  
While these accounts assert that there are more people in the iconic photos than there are 
people charged with abuse, many other reports noted the use of private contractors as a 
potential contribution to the violence at Abu Ghraib. For example, Robert Scheer of the 
Los Angeles Times claimed,  
President Bush is again refusing to take responsibility for any of the horrors 
happening on his watch. This time it is the abuse of Iraqi prisoners carried out by 
low-ranking military police working under the direct guidance of military 
intelligence officers and shadowy civilian mercenaries. (par. 1) 
Scheer, who is one of a few members of the mainstream press to directly demand 
accountability from the President regarding the violent actions at Abu Ghraib, recognized 
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that that evidence and military reports seemed to suggest that there were more people and 
agencies involved than just the few guards on trial for the abuse of prisoners. Scheer 
argued,  
The president has called the now-exposed pattern of violence an isolated crime 
performed by ‘a few people.’ Yet the Pentagon’s own investigation of the 
incidents shows that not only was the entire Abu Ghraib prison out of control, it 
was the MP’s immediate superiors who ‘directly or indirectly’ authorized 
‘sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses’ of the prisoners as a way to break 
them in advance of formal interrogations. (par. 2) 
Another report, by T. Christian Miller also of the Los Angeles Times claimed that it was 
the use of contractors that made Abu Ghraib legally problematic: 
Three civilian employees who allegedly participated in the abuse of Iraqi 
prisoners have yet to face any disciplinary action, their employers said Monday, 
raising within the Pentagon the issue of accountability for thousands of private 
contractors in Iraq. A senior U.S. official involved in detention issues said the 
Defense Department was struggling to determine a legal basis upon which to 
pursue prosecution of the civilians, who were working as interrogators and 
translators at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad when Iraqis were sexually and 
physically abused by Americans there. ‘One of the issues that people are dealing 
with is who can investigate them,’ the official said. ‘In the military chain, it’s 
fairly clear. It’s not clear in the legal framework that we have how to deal with 
this.’ (pars. 1-3; see also Eunjung Cha and McCarthy). 
Similarly, another report appearing in the Los Angeles Times also claimed, “It is unclear 
whether any law or legal proceeding applies to private contractors. There are an estimated 
20,000 private security guards in Iraq, a growing force that has prompted concern among 
some U.S. officials” (“Iraqi Prison Staff” par. 15). Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen 
McCarthy of the Washington Post argued,  
Questions about the role of civilian interrogators in the abuse of inmates at the 
Abu Ghraib prison have put the spotlight on the accountability of tens of 
thousands of contractors in Iraq and on whether the administrative setup at the 
prison gave contractors too much freedom from and too much power over military 
units. (par. 1) 
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The role of private contractors in the Abu Ghraib scandal is an interesting one. It is 
interesting because the majority of accounts that either question or defend the actions at 
Abu Ghraib refer to the actions at Abu Ghraib as a military action as a part of war. 
However, as the roles of private contractors make clear, there are individuals involved 
who are not military and who may have been part of the problem. To date, no civilian 
contractor has been publicly identified or charged with any violent action at Abu Ghraib. 
In addition to the questions about civilian contractors many in the media 
questioned how far up the chain of command knowledge and responsibility for the 
actions at Abu Ghraib went. This is due, in part, to the fact that the so-called torture 
memos that outlined the Bush administration’s post-9/11 torture policy (see chapter 2) 
were leaked to the press in June of 2004. When the memos were leaked, many media 
accounts questioned the few-bad-apples dominant frame and suggested that there was a 
higher chain of command who knew about the Abu Ghraib violence. These types of 
criticisms, unlike the poorly-trained criticisms, suggest that the violent actions were part 
of a systematic approach that was approved by higher ups in the military as part of a new 
response to terrorist enemies. 
For example, Jeffrey Smith, of the Washington Post reported,  
Some senators have said they suspect, to the contrary [to findings in Taguba], that 
the abuses stemmed from a Washington-directed policy to encourage particularly 
aggressive interrogations during this period, involving an unusually close 
collaboration between military police who were guarding the prisoners and 
intelligence analysts who wanted to extract information from the detainees. (par. 
8) 
This type of criticism in the press was spurred by many political elites who were critical 
of the Bush administration’s war policies. For example Fox ran a report quoting several 
political elites. In this report Senator Harry Reid argued, “We’re a mighty nation, and we 
have to respond accordingly. We cannot allow a few underlings to take the fall for what 
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obviously was the concerted the action” (“Congress” par. 10). Similarly, Dan Rather 
reported,  
Some members of the US Congress made it clear today they believe it – it is not 
enough to punish only low-ranking soldiers directly involved in and photographed 
abusing Iraqi prisoners. As CBS’s David Martin reports, the most critical of those 
lawmakers are asking for accountability at the very top of the military chain of 
command. (“Lawmakers Seek Accountability” par. 1) 
Some media reports even went so far as to claim that responsibility for the violent actions 
at Abu Ghraib lay with top Bush officials, particularly Donald Rumsfeld. Similar 
accounts named the President himself as a responsible party in the abuse. For example, 
David Shaw of the Los Angeles Times argued,  
The tone set by President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their 
top aides and advisors, form the beginning of the response to 9/11 to the war and 
its aftermath in Iraq, made clear that in the pursuit of its objectives, the United 
States would not be bound by any rule of law, any U.N. vote, any aspect of the 
world opinion or commonly accepted standards of wartime behavior. They might 
pay occasional lip service to the Geneva Convention, but the U.S. and the U.S. 
alone would decide how to counter terrorism, whether to attack Iraq, and how to 
treat anyone we captured or incarcerated. Individual soldiers do not abuse and 
torture prisoners, take pictures of themselves and their fellow soldiers doing so 
and disseminate those pictures back home unless they’re confident that they’re 
doing what they think their superiors wan, that they won’t be punished for what 
they’re doing. (par. 26) 
Shaw’s criticism is an important one because it suggests that torture was U.S. policy and 
that violent actions in the Abu Ghraib photographs were not the actions of a few rogue 
soldiers, but soldiers who thought they were acting according to policy. Guy Womack, an 
attorney for accused soldier Charles Graner, also pointed a finger toward the top of the 
government. In an interview with Nancy Weiner on ABC’s World News Tonight, 
Womack claimed, “all these MPs were following orders that were countenanced all the 
way up the chain of command to the commander of all U.S. forces in the country” 
(“Prisoner Abuse New” par. 5; see also “Military Reprimands Six”). Senator John Kerry 
and other political elites not only claimed that Donald Rumsfeld should be held 
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accountable, but also called for his resignation. For example, Mark Mazzetti of the Los 
Angeles Times quoted Kerry as saying, “‘[I]ts not just the little person at the bottom who 
ought to pay the price of responsibility,’ Kerry said Wednesday, calling for Rumsfeld’s 
removal. ‘The buck doesn’t stop at the Pentagon’” (par. 6). Similarly, in an editorial piece 
Anne Applebaum argued, 
There is a long way down the chain of command from Rumsfeld to the six 
soldiers from the 372nd Military Police Company who have now been charged 
with abuse of Iraqi prisoners. But the defense secretary’s feeling that America’s 
war is an exception to the old rules certainly helped create the atmosphere that 
made abuse possible. (“Willing Torturers” par. 8). 
Some reports even quoted the leaked memos directly. In their article for the Washington 
Post, Dana Priest and R. Jeffrey Smith claimed,  
In August 2002, the Justice Department advised the White House that torturing al 
Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad ‘may be justified,’ and that international laws 
against torture ‘may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations’ conducted in 
President Bush’s war on terrorism, according to a newly obtained memo. (par. 1) 
The article outlined the memo’s content and concluded that Donald Rumsfeld knew about 
and approved of the types of treatment the memos pushed and even signed off on them, 
A Defense Department spokesman said last night that the March 2003 memo 
represented ‘a scholarly effort to define the perimeters of the law’ but added: 
‘What is legal and what is put into practice is a different story.’ Pentagon officials 
said the group examined at least 35 interrogation techniques, and Rumsfeld later 
approved using 24 of them in a classified directive on April 16, 2003, that 
governed all activities at Guantanamo Bay. The Pentagon has refused to make 
public the 24 interrogation procedures. (par. 36; see also Thompson, M.; “No 
Good Defense”; Hirsh). 
In another very critical piece, Anne Applebaum wrote: 
As I say, connect the dots: They lead form the White House to the Pentagon to 
Abu Ghraib, and from Abu Ghraib back to military intelligence and thus to the 
Pentagon and the White House. They don’t, it is true, make a complete picture. 
They don’t actually reveal whether direct White House and Pentagon orders set 
off a chain of events leading to the abuses at Abu Ghraib, prisoner deaths in 
Afghanistan or other uses of torture we haven’t learned about yet. But who will 
fill in the blanks? Here is the tragedy: Despite the easy availability of evidence, 
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almost nobody has an interest in pushing the investigation as far as it should go. 
(“So Torture is Legal?” pars. 6-7)  
Another Malinowski editorial in The Washington Post takes an equally critical approach 
and also quotes the memos: 
Stress and duress interrogation techniques were invented in the dungeons of the 
world’s most brutal regimes for only one purpose – to cause pain, distress and 
humiliation, without physical scars. When Bush administration officials and 
military commanders told soldiers to use methods designed for the purpose, while 
still treating detainees ‘humanely,’ they were being naive at best and dishonest at 
worst. They should have known that once the purpose of inflicting pain is 
legitimized, those charged with the care and interrogation of prisoners will take it 
to its logical conclusion. (par. 11) 
In an editorial appearing in the Washington Post Jackson Diehl stated,  
The latest official reports on the prisoner abuse scandal contain a classic 
Washington contradiction. Their headlines proclaim that no official policy 
mandated or allowed the torture of detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that no 
officials above the rank of colonel deserve prosecution or formal punishment. But 
buried in their hundreds of pages of detail, for anyone who cares to read them, is a 
clear and meticulous account of how decisions made by President Bush, his top 
political aides and senior military commanders led directly to those searing 
images of naked prisoners being menaced with guard dogs. (par. 1; see “Roots of 
Abu Ghraib”) 
As these accounts make clear, the media did not completely buy into the few-bad-apples 
dominant frame. In fact, many members of the media and even a few members of the 
political elite questioned the role of the Bush administration in the Abu Ghraib violence. 
However, what political elites (see chapter 2) and members of the media failed to do was 
call upon themselves or the general public to respond. As was shown in chapter 2, 
political elites like John Kerry, failed to adequately push Abu Ghraib onto the political 
agenda during his run for the presidency. Similarly, the mainstream media failed to make 
Abu Ghraib a political issue, ultimately concluding that the Bush administration and the 
U.S. military could investigate itself and fix the problem. 
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CONCLUSION 
Once the Abu Ghraib photographs were leaked to the press, media sources 
scrambled to report on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Although some reports seemed 
critical of the Bush administration’s explanation for the Abu Ghraib violence, many more 
media accounts accepted this explanation unquestioningly and reinforced Bush’s war on 
terror narrative, a narrative that relies heavily upon appeals to a unified national identity 
and the necessity of violence to protect that identity. In this chapter I explored the 
different ways in which the media framed the violence at Abu Ghraib and considered the 
effect of this framing on public perceptions of the scandal. In particular, I examined 
mainstream media coverage of the incidents at Abu Ghraib beginning April 28, 2004 (the 
day that CBS first broke the story of Abu Ghraib) through December 2, 2004 (one month 
after President Bush was reelected). Using Todd Gitlin’s conception of media framing, I 
examined what I identified as the three most prominent themes in the media coverage of 
Abu Ghraib: the nature of violence, the victims of violence, and the perpetrators of 
violence. I have argued that although recent scholarly work concerning media coverage 
of Abu Ghraib argues that the American press failed to provide a counterframe to the 
Bush administration’s dominant narrative (see Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston), the 
media did, in fact, provide counterframes. However, I discovered that while 
counterframes did exist in media coverage, critical journalists often became trapped in a 
debate over what constituted torture and when torture could be considered acceptable. I 
also argued that despite reported evidence to the contrary, media sources failed to 
challenge the dominant frame that assumed the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were terrorists 
enemies plotting harm the people of the United States. And, finally, I argued that 
although critical counterframes often called into question the few-bad-apples dominant 
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frame, the media never called on itself or the American public to investigate the full 
extent of the Bush administration’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib violence. 
Thus far, I have emphasized the rhetorical significance of the violent Abu Ghraib 
images and the political and mediated language that framed them. Analysis has shown 
how political and media discourses have worked to secure the Bush administration’s 
prerogative to use torture while simultaneously distancing the American people from the 
violence enacted in their names. In the chapter that follows, I will examine the ways in 
which the Abu Ghraib violence has influenced popular culture. In particular, the 
following chapter will examine how this prerogative to torture is solidified and 
normalized in the popular television series 24, a series in which viewing audiences are 
encouraged to identify with American torturers and embrace their violent practices. 
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Chapter 4:  Popular Torture: 24  
America wants the war on terror fought by Jack Bauer. He’s a patriot (Surnow, 
qtd. in Mayer)30 
Jack Bauer:  You better listen to me very carefully Jane. Right now your 
   father is engaged in terrorist activity against the United  
   States of America. This morning he’s killed hundreds of  
   people and threatened to kill thousands more. Now, I can  
   only imagine how difficult this must be for you to believe.  
   But trust me, you’re going to cooperate with us. There’s a  
   lot at stake and there’s not a lot of time. 
Jane Saunders: I’m not going to do anything. I want to talk to a lawyer.  
Jack Bauer:   There’s no lawyer. There’s just you and me. (Season 3,  
   Episode 19, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”).   
On April 20, 2004, just eight days before the Abu Ghraib photographs would air 
on CBS, Fox’s television drama 24 was nearing the end of its third season. And, while 
American viewers were shocked and disgusted by the demeaning, violent treatment of 
U.S. captives featured in the iconic Abu Ghraib photographs, few were surprised to see 
similar, often more graphically violent, treatment in Fox’s critically acclaimed series. The 
similarity between the Abu Ghraib violence and the types of violence central to 24 should 
not have been surprising to viewers either. For, while the show was in its initial 
production stage, the U.S. underwent its worst terrorist attack in history, priming an 
American viewing audience for 24’s recurrent theme of terrorism and national security 
and, perhaps, attributing to 24’s continued commercial and critical success.31 The first 
season of 24 debuted in November of 2001 and, since then, the show has maintained an 
                                                 
30 Joel Surnow is co-creator and executive producer of 24.  
31 In its six-season run, 24 has been nominated for 57 Emmy awards, winning awards for Outstanding 
Drama Series and Outstanding Lead Actor in a Drama Series for star Kiefer Sutherland (Jack Bauer) in 
2006 (http://www.tv.com/24/show/3866/summary.html). 
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uncanny grasp on the social and political anxieties ever-present in post-9/11 American 
life.  
This popular, award-winning, and controversial television show chronicles the life 
of Federal Agent Jack Bauer in “real time.” Each hour-long episode of 24 documents an 
hour for the agent and each 24-episode season makes for one incredible, suspense-filled 
day in Bauer’s life. As a member of the U.S. Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU), Bauer must 
continually stop assassination attempts, nuclear bombs, bio-threats, and other acts of 
international and domestic terror. As a man frustrated by bureaucracy, Bauer often 
disregards political and legal protocol, doing whatever it takes to find the perpetrators of 
terrorist plots.  
Bauer’s willingness to work outside the parameters of the law is illustrated in the 
brief dialogue taken from 24’s April 20, 2004 episode. In the scene quoted above, Bauer 
has taken a young woman, Jane Saunders, captive because he believes that she knows the 
whereabouts of her father, a former member of the British Secret Intelligence Service and 
suspected mastermind behind a series of attacks on U.S. cities with a weaponized virus. 
Having contained a recent attack within a Los Angeles hotel, CTU suspects that another, 
larger attack will occur within the hour. Because CTU has been unsuccessful in finding 
other leads, Bauer has kidnapped his main suspect’s daughter. Bauer is under immense 
time pressure to locate his suspect’s whereabouts and, thus, he denies his captive her 
legal rights and eventually threatens to harm her if she does not give up her father’s 
location.  
Despite Bauer’s penchant for violence and disregard for the law in this episode, 
and many others, Bauer is not depicted as a violent man; he is portrayed as a devoted 
husband (and eventual widow), father, friend, and patriot. Because Bauer is a likable 
character placed in impossible situations, viewing audiences are encouraged to identify 
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with him. And, as viewers watch, season after season, as precious seconds tick toward 
imminent disaster plotted by ruthless terrorists and prevented by brave and unwavering 
people like Bauer, viewers are also encouraged to think about the usefulness of Bauer’s 
torturous methods for obtaining information and saving innocent American lives.  
In this chapter, I examine the television series 24, focusing specifically on what I 
consider to be 24’s most important character, not Jack Bauer, but the ticking clock that 
motivates Bauer to torture and helps justify his acts of violence. 24’s time clock is a 
digital face that consistently, and often forcefully, reminds viewers of the hourly 
constraint put on each episode. With its prominent second-hand feature that counts 
seconds into minutes with an accompanying digital peal, the 24 time clock winds up each 
episode, interjects during scene changes and commercial breaks, and counts each episode 
to a close. And, while the clock does not cease for the characters racing against it within 
the reality of the show, it does not stop for viewers either. After each commercial break, 
the clock appears to remind viewers that approximately 3 minutes have passed in the 
reality of the show while viewers were watching ads for cleaning products and 
prescription medications. Because the clock exerts such tremendous control over 24 
characters and viewers, understanding its rhetorical function is important for this project. 
In particular, I consider the ways in which the clock propels the types of torturous 
violence portrayed in the show and the ways in which an audience’s knowledge of time 
pressure encourages acceptance of violent measures. In this chapter, I ask: In what ways 
are audiences encouraged to understand motivations for torture in the television series 
24? What are the similarities and differences between the fictional justifications for 
violence in 24 and the actual justifications for violence put forward in the political and 
mediated discourses surrounding Abu Ghraib? How does 24’s fictional pro-torture 
message shape popular reception of real-life torture images like the Abu Ghraib 
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photographs. And, in what ways is the rhetoric espoused in 24 shaped by dominant 
understandings of the relationship between national identity and violence?  
In order to answer these questions, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of 
three of the six complete seasons of 24.32 The seasons I have chosen for analysis are 
Season 2 (the first full season produced after to the September 11 attacks), Season 4 (the 
first full season produced after to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal), and Season 6 (the most 
recently produced full season). I have divided episodes and scenes into two categories 
that are most important for the concerns of this project. The first set of episodes I 
examine includes interrogation and torture scenes performed both by U.S. state actors and 
by suspected terrorists. The second set of episodes I examine includes scenes that outline 
political discourses surrounding state-sanctioned violence (violent actions taken by 
members of CTU, members of U.S. law enforcement, and members of the U.S. military). 
Guided by literature concerned with the role of dominant ideology in popular culture, I 
provide an analysis of these texts that explores the ways that violence is explained and 
justified in terms of dominant understandings of American national identity. In particular, 
I argue that the action and discourse in 24 is dependent upon the same “ticking bomb” 
rhetoric that has been put forward by members of the U.S. mainstream media as a 
possible justification for the violent actions at Abu Ghraib (see chapter 3). As analysis 
will show, the construction of the necessity of torture in terms of ticking bomb rhetoric, 
both in 24 and in real life, serves to neutralize torturous violence while simultaneously 
allowing its proponents to maintain a sense of themselves as democratic citizens 
belonging to an idealized American national community. 
                                                 
32 Fox has signed on for two more seasons of 24. However, due to the recent Writer’s Guild of America 
strike, Fox has postponed the premier of the seventh season until 2009. Although nearly a quarter of 24’s 
seventh season episodes were completed prior to the strike, Fox has expressed that it delayed broadcast of 
these episodes because the show’s producers felt that an interruption in the time sequence would be 
detrimental to the plotline (“‘24’ Premiere Postponed”). 
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POPULAR CULTURE AS A SITE FOR IDEOLOGY CRITICISM 
Ideology critics have long been concerned with the impact and influence of 
popular culture. Members of the Frankfurt School have often been cited as the first 
scholars to show systematic concern with the realm of popular media and culture. Under 
director Max Horkheimer, members of the Frankfurt School attempted to revise Marxian 
theory to include considerations of new social and political conditions. “Critical theory” 
emerged as members of the Frankfurt School began to focus on the different cultural 
aspects of society that were downplayed in Marx’s original work (Bronner and Kellner 
1).  
One key theory in regard to the Frankfurt School’s understandings of mass culture 
revolves around the notion of “culture industries.” First articulated by Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment, culture industries were thought to 
play an increasingly important and increasingly oppressive role in “managing 
consciousness and obscuring social conflict” (Bronner and Kellner 9). Assertions in 
regard to the political and social agency of the mass population and the extent to which 
culture industries influenced political actions and outcomes stemmed from this concern 
with the dominant role of culture in society. Working in the United States as refugees 
from Nazi Germany, several members of the Frankfurt School held pessimistic views in 
regard the role of popular culture in influencing social and political consciousness.  
Many Frankfurt School scholars saw popular culture as a mechanism of 
repression through which powerful members of society asserted social control over the 
mass population. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that mass 
culture is not a product of the mass population, rather a systemized method of ideological 
control produced by the dominant class. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, cultural 
industries, unlike popular art, are used in the interests of the dominant class in order to 
 183
deceive the mass population by perpetuating dominant ideology through forms of popular 
entertainment. While members of the Frankfurt School have been criticized for 
discounting popular culture in terms of elitist taste, their ultimate concern with the culture 
industry is a concern with the limited means for political agency within society’s 
oppressive system of mass production.  
Although the scholars of the Frankfurt School were among the first to study the 
political influence of popular culture in a systematic way, their claims about the culture 
industry leave little room for popular involvement in the political process through culture. 
British Marxists in the early 1960s attempted to reclaim popular culture. As a result, 
scholars of British Cultural Studies (also known as the Birmingham School) began 
theorizing popular culture in a way that “acknowledged the volition of everyday people” 
(Jenkins, McPherson, and Shattuc 35). Concerned with the ways in which meanings and 
values are circulated in everyday life, scholars of British Cultural Studies also began to 
focus “on the moment of reception – the individual’s experience of everyday culture – 
rather than the cultural object as the primary source of meaning” (Jenkins, McPherson, 
and Shattuc 35). Cultural studies became more prevalent in the United States in the 1990s 
and mark a significant optimistic shift in studies concerned with the relationship between 
politics and popular culture. 
Unlike Frankfurt School scholars who understand popular culture as mass-
produced commodities consumed passively by the mass population, scholars of cultural 
studies argue that members of the mass population create culture by producing new 
meanings within existing forms of popular culture. (Clarke, et al. 10). Rather than 
consume popular culture in a passive and unthinking way, many cultural studies scholars 
argue that certain groups within mainstream society use the commodities of popular 
culture as a foundation upon which to create new meanings. Additionally, this adaptation 
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of cultural commodities is often understood as a means of resistance to the dominant 
ideologies within mainstream society.  
Both sides of this popular culture debate are important for my purposes in this 
chapter. On the one hand, the power of the culture industry behind the production of 
Fox’s award winning series cannot be denied. Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, 
Fox’s parent company, is one of nine major media conglomerates that control the global 
media market (Broe 97). Additionally, Murdoch has long been a very vocal supporter of 
neoliberal policies surrounding the deregulation of the media industry and, after 9/11, 
“Fox swung its news support wholeheartedly behind the conception of a government that 
was passive in its social spending but activist in creating a militarized garrison state” 
(Broe 100). It is no secret that Murdoch, through Fox, has been a huge supporter of the 
Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies, policies that play a prominent role in 24. 
However, on the other hand, I recognize American viewing audiences as capable of 
resisting dominant ideological discourses. Therefore, I consider 24 an important site for 
examining this contention between the production and reception of dominant ideological 
messages. 
24 and the “Ticking Bomb” 
The dominant ideological message with which this chapter is concerned is the 
ticking bomb scenario that justifies torture. The ticking bomb scenario is a philosophical 
thought experiment used in both academia and in legal circles to debate the ethics of 
torture. As Jessica Wolfendale explains, in the standard ticking bomb scenario,  
a suspect has been caught who possesses information that must be obtained 
quickly in order to avert huge civilian casualties. . . . The suspect to be 
interrogated is usually a fanatical terrorist willing to die for his cause – someone 
unlikely to be intimidated by mere threats of violence and who may well be 
prepared for torture. Under these conditions, the ticking bomb torturer must be 
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able to extract the required information in the shortest possible time without 
killing the suspect. (272) 
The ticking bomb scenario is most often grounded in utilitarian assumptions that 
advocate the use of violence against one (the terrorist in custody) in order to benefit many 
– the thousands saved through the prevention of a bomb’s detonation (see Wolfendale; 
and Bufacchi and Arrigo). And, although the ticking bomb scenario was originally 
introduced in the 1960s, it has, once again gained traction within political, legal, and 
academic debates surrounding America’s current war on terror, particularly in regard to 
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (see chapter 3).33 John T. Parry and Alan Dershowitz have 
most recently put the ticking bomb scenario forward in their writings concerning current 
problems of terrorism. Although Parry argues that torture violates both international and 
domestic laws designed to protect human rights, he reasons that torture may be the 
“lesser of two evils” under certain extreme circumstances, making torture a legitimate 
option in those cases (160). Alan Dershowitz, whose arguments have been put forward 
both in his academic work and in the mass media, argues that torture should be made 
legal in ticking bomb scenarios through the use of a “torture warrant” issued by high-
ranking court judges (See Dershowitz Shouting Fire). For Dershowitz, the legalization of 
torture would serve to limit its actual use in practice by providing the U.S. government 
with a means of legal control. He reasons, “Either police would torture below the radar 
screen of accountability, or the judge who issued the warrant would be accountable. 
Which would be more consistent with democratic values?” (“Want to torture?” par. 15). 
Dershowitz argues that suspects detained by the United States are already tortured “off 
the books” and issuing torture warrants would increase accountability for torturous 
                                                 
33 It is thought that the ticking bomb scenario was first introduced by Jean Lartéguy in his novel Les 
Centurions, whose plot focuses on the French occupation of Algeria. For more on this please see Darius 
Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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actions. Dershowitz insists that the torture warrant would only be legitimate in ticking 
bomb scenarios and would only allow “nonlethal” torture methods. He explains, 
An application for a torture warrant would have to be based on the absolute need 
to obtain immediate information in order to save lives coupled with probable 
cause that the suspect had such information and is unwilling to reveal it. The 
suspect would be given immunity from prosecution based on information elicited 
by the torture. The warrant would limit the torture to nonlethal means, such as 
sterile needles, being inserted beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain without 
endangering life. (“Want to torture?” pars. 12-13) 
Dershowitz admits that the idea of a torture warrant is hard to swallow, but insists that as 
America’s war on terror escalates, more violent actions against the United States are 
imminent and, thus, legal options for torture should be put into place before American 
citizens are faced with another terrorist attack. This insistence, by legal experts like Parry 
and Dershowitz, of the nearness and immediacy of terrorist-induced dangers has become 
an integral part of War on Terror rhetoric that has aggressively used notions of 
temporality to push forward political policies of militarization and preemptive war (Stahl; 
Davis and Cloud). 
However, opponents to the ticking bomb justification for torture rightly point out 
that this scenario relies heavily on hypothetical fantasy and circular reasoning (see 
Buffachi and Arrigo). The ticking bomb scenario also ignores the possibility of other 
successful means of gathering information about terrorist threat (such as the means 
through which the captive was identified and apprehended in the first place). What also 
makes ticking bomb justifications for torture so dangerous is that the circumstances and 
the means of violence rendered legitimate sit on a very slippery slope. In cases of extreme 
time pressure, who has the authority or the knowledge to determine who should be 
tortured and when? What means of torture can be justified over others? By basing 
justification for torture on extreme, hypothetical, and specific examples, the ticking bomb 
argument fails to provide clear parameters for practice, not to mention a complete failure 
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to account for human rights. However, as the following analysis will show, the ticking 
bomb scenario is often highly persuasive within the reality of the television show 24. 
POPULAR TORTURE 
In this chapter I examine episodes from Season 2, Season 4, and Season 6 of the 
television program 24. An initial viewing of these seasons revealed two prominent 
themes around which episodes of the program are centered: torture and politics. The 
following tables (see Tables 4.1-4.3) contain a brief plot summary of each season and 
demarcate relevant episodes for each theme.  
Table 4.1: Season 2 Plot Summary and Episodes of Interest. 






At the request of newly elected President, David Palmer, 
Jack Bauer returns to CTU (he had retired after the death 
of his wife in Season 1) to help stop known terrorist, 
Syed Ali, from detonating a nuclear bomb on U.S. soil.  
President Palmer learns that his national security 
advisor, Roger Stanton has known about the bomb threat 
for weeks and has been secretly working on a plan to 
link Ali to the government of Ali’s country. Stanton and 
an oil businessman attempt to falsify evidence that will 
like Ali to his government so that the United States will 
have a political excuse to attack Ali’s country and secure 





















Table 4.2: Season 4 Plot Summary and Episodes of Interest. 






Having retired from CTU, Jack Bauer is now in charge of 
security for Defense Secretary Heller, an administration 
member for newly elected President Keeler (Palmer did 
not run for re-election at the end of his first term). Bauer 
is also in an intimate relationship with Heller’s daughter 
and Chief of Staff, Audrey Reines.  
Terrorists kidnap Secretary Heller and his daughter and 
force Heller to make a video in which he admits to U. S. 
political and social wrongdoing. CTU learns that the 
Heller video, which was broadcast on the internet, was 
used to cover the trail of an internet hacker who 
ultimately gains access to an override system that 
controls all nuclear power plants in the United States.  
These same terrorists attack Air Force One with a 
hijacked American bomber and force it to crash land. 
President Keeler is injured in the crash and his Vice 
President, Charles Logan, assumes office. Terrorists gain 
control of U.S. missile launch codes as a result of the 
crash.  
Bauer, who was reinstated at CTU after the attack on 
Secretary Heller, learns that one of the terrorists involved 
in the attack on Air Force One is a Chinese citizen who 
has taken refuge at the Chinese Consulate. Vice President 
Logan authorizes a secret mission to invade the 
Consulate and capture the suspect. When the Chinese 
discover that Bauer is behind the attack on the Consulate, 
they demand that Bauer be taken into Chinese custody. 
Vice President Logan fears that Bauer will reveal the 
U.S. government’s involvement in the attack if tortured. 
Therefore, Logan secretly orders Bauer’s assassination so 
that Bauer cannot be turned over to the Chinese.  
Former President David Palmer, who has been serving as 
an advisor to Logan during the crisis, learns of the plot 
against Bauer and helps Bauer fake his own death to 
















Table 4.3: Season 6 Plot Summary and Episodes of Interest. 






Jack Bauer returns from China after nearly two years of 
being imprisoned and tortured there. Wayne Palmer, 
David Palmer’s brother and newly elected President, has 
brokered a deal to trade Bauer for information regarding 
the location of Hamri Al-Assad, a terrorist thought to be 
behind numerous suicide bombing plaguing major cities 
around the U.S.  
Known terrorist Abu Fayed has offered to help the U.S. 
government in exchange for Bauer. Bauer had killed 
Fayed’s brother years earlier and Fayed seeks personal 
revenge. While in Fayed’s custody Bauer learns that 
Fayed is the real terrorist behind the bombings and that 
Assad has come to the U.S. to stop him. Bauer also learns 
that Fayed is in control of several nuclear bombs.  
When Palmer learns of Assad’s peace mission, he invites 
Assad to the White House to issue a statement to the 
American public. While Assad as at the White House, 
members of the President’s own support staff attempt to 
assassinate Palmer. Although Assad dies trying to save 




















Below, I examine these themes and episodes of interest in detail. And, as the 
following analysis will show, each of these themes (torture and politics) is driven by the 
rhetoric of the ticking bomb. It will be shown that this rhetoric is used not only to justify 
torture, but also to skirt the law, make war, and protect the integrity of the American 
nation.  
Torture and 24 
24 is a television series about national security and terrorist threat. And, because 
state actors in the show are often under extreme time pressure to secure the safety of U.S. 
citizens, the show revolves exclusively around torture. There are numerous torture scenes 
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in every season of 24. As the show progresses, audiences learn that Jack Bauer is a 
skilled torturer, rarely failing to “break” his captives and almost always successful in 
obtaining the information he needs to stop a potential threat. However, Bauer is not the 
only character to torture captives in the show. Other members of CTU, although never as 
skilled at the task as Bauer, often rely on coercive methods to procure information from 
suspects. Terrorists also torture their captives in the show, however, as analysis will 
illustrate, terrorist motivations for torture are much different than the motivations that 
drive the actions of Bauer and fellow state actors. The following analysis will discuss 24 
torture scenes in detail and examine the ways in which the violent actions taken by both 
state actors and supposed terrorists rely on notions of American national identity and 
ticking bomb rhetoric. Although I will discuss patterns that emerge in regard to the types 
of torturous acts that are used, the following analysis will discuss torture scenes in 
chronological order so as to maintain clarity of each season’s plot and to illustrate the 
ways in which the intensity and amount of torture increase as the series progresses.  
While the first season of 24 contains scenes that provide a background on Bauer’s 
character and illustrate his ability and willingness to use torturous methods to get the 
information he needs, it is not until the second season that viewing audiences are privy to 
widespread use of torture by Bauer and other state agents in similar positions. Season 2 
also exposes audiences to a wider, more graphic, variety of pain-inducing methods. As 
the very first episode of Season 2 opens, a Korean man is being held in an underground, 
U.S. military-run prison. The man is held in a room that is dark, dank, and full of metal 
instruments of torture. He is restrained in a metal device with his arms and legs secured 
into a spread eagle position. His feet are submerged in heavy plastic bags that contain a 
murky yellow substance that appears to be some sort of acid or harsh chemical. The 
man’s arms, which are strapped down, are both attached to intravenous machines. His 
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eyes are held open with metal clamps so that he cannot blink. There is blood all over the 
man and all over the room. As the man screams in pain he is injected with chemicals and 
given electric shock by doctors in surgical masks. Armed, uniformed U.S. military 
personnel overlook the doctors’ progress.  
Along with the captive and his torturers, a young Korean woman is also present in 
the dark torture room. Working as a translator, the woman leans close to the man’s 
tormented face and asks him, in Korean, to tell her what he knows. The man looks 
exhausted and it appears as though his captors have been torturing him for hours. With 
this last question from the translator, the man finally breaks and whispers one word in 
Korean. The translator looks up at the U.S. soldiers in the room, horrified at his 
admission. “Today,” she says in English (Season 2, Episode 1 “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). 
By torturing this unknown terrorist at a secret military prison, members of the U.S. 
government and CTU learn that a nuclear bomb is set to go off that day on U.S. soil. As 
the day progresses, the audience learns that a known Muslim terrorist from an unnamed 
Middle Eastern country, Syed Ali, is behind the day’s plot to detonate a nuclear bomb 
over Los Angeles. In what follows, I analyze two sets of torture scenes. The first set of 
scenes illustrates the types of torture undertaken by the terrorist enemy, Syed Ali. And, 
the second set of torture scenes illustrates torture at the hands of the U.S. nation-state.  
Season 2: Terrorists as Merciless Torturers. 
The audience’s first encounter with Syed Ali occurs when Kate Warner is 
kidnapped by a few of Ali’s men. Kate Warner is the sister of Mari Warner, who, on this 
day of nuclear threat is set to marry her fiancé Reza. CTU has linked the nuclear plot to 
the Warner family, and more specifically, has targeted Reza, a man of Middle Eastern 
decent. While CTU questions Reza at their headquarters the audience learns 
(unbeknownst to CTU) that it is Marie who is involved with Ali and his terrorist cell, not 
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Reza. Ali and his men have kidnapped Marie’s sister Kate because they fear that Kate 
may have uncovered information about their terrorist plot. Kate does not trust Marie’s 
fiancé and, earlier in the season, she hired a private detective to run a background check 
on him. Because Reza works for the Warners, Kate’s private detective accessed some of 
the Warner family’s business files during his search on Reza. Ali suspects that Kate may 
have discovered the connection between Marie and his terrorist organization. He has, 
therefore, kidnapped Kate and her private detective, Paul Koplin, to make sure that the 
two do not report anything to the police or CTU.  
As the scene opens, Kate is unconscious on a couch in an unknown apartment. Ali 
wakes Kate with smelling salts, introduces himself, and asks her if she knows who he is. 
Kate admits that she has heard his name in passing, but, other than that, does not know 
anything about him. Ali does not believe Kate and tells her that he knows that she has 
been looking in her father’s business files and may have seen something that she was not 
supposed to have seen.  After a few moments of questioning, Ali forcefully takes Kate by 
the arm and shoves her into the apartment’s master bathroom. In the bathroom the private 
detective that Kate has hired, Paul Koplin, is naked and hanging by his arms from the 
shower stall. A man dressed with a transparent plastic poncho over his clothes and with 
safety goggles over his eyes holds a power sander next to Paul’s naked back. Kate is 
horrified by the scene and asks Ali to explain what he is doing to Koplin. Ali replies, “He 
is telling us your father works for the CIA. This is not new information, Kate. We know 
your father. We need to know what you saw in his files and who you told” (Season 2, 
Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.”). Koplin, who has been interrogated while Kate was 
unconscious, yells at Ali, “We didn’t tell anyone anything because we didn’t see 
anything! How many times do I have to tell you?” (Season 2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 
5:00 p.m.”). Kate turns to Ali and cries, “He’s telling the truth! Please don’t do this!” Ali 
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grabs Kate more forcefully. “Listen to me,” he says. “Nothing can get in the way of this 
sacred day. Tell us what you saw and who you told” (Season 2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 
5:00 p.m.”). Kate claims that she did not see anything because the files that she and the 
detective discovered began to delete themselves once they were opened. Paul interjects 
and confirms this, claiming that the files were self-deleting. Ali does not believe their 
claims and motions to the man in the plastic suit. The man starts the sander and puts it 
against Paul’s body. The camera zooms in and focuses on the lower half of Koplin’s face 
as he screams in torment. The scene ends with Warner and Koplin’s screams coupled 
with the sound of the power sander reverberating in the small, enclosed bathroom space. 
As the scene fades to black for a commercial break, the sounds of the power tool and the 
screaming is replaced by the distinct metallic chime of the 24 digital clock that ticks off 
precious seconds into the break.  
When the audience returns to the scene of Kate and Paul, the man in the plastic 
suit is throwing a chemical that appears to be paint thinner onto Koplin’s open wounds. 
As Koplin screams in pain, Kate sits in the corner of the room, tied to a chair. She 
screams at Koplin’s torturer to stop, claiming that she does not know what he and Ali 
want to hear from her. “Yes you do,” Ali says calmly (Season 2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 
5:00 p.m.”). He the nods to the man in the plastic suit and the man takes rock salt and 
rubs it into the wounds on Paul’s back. “We didn’t see anything. We didn’t tell anyone 
anything! I swear! I don’t know anything! How can I tell you what I don’t know?” Kate 
screams as she breaks down into uncontrollable sobs (Season 2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 
5:00p.m.”). Ali turns to her and says, “I believe you” (Season 2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 
5:00 p.m.”). He then takes his gun from a holster hidden under his shirt and shoots Paul 
several times, killing him. Kate screams and sobs. Ali turns to the turns to his assistant 
and says, “If she would have known anything, she would have told us. Kill her” (Season 
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2, Episode 9, “4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.”). In these two torture scenes, the audience learns 
that just as Bauer and his team will stop at nothing to prevent terrorist attacks, the 
terrorists are equally committed threatening the United States. And, because the audience 
knows that Warner and Koplin are speaking the truth and do not know anything about Ali 
and his nuclear plot, the audience is also encouraged to see Ali and his men as ruthless 
merciless, unwilling to forgive Warner and Kolin’s unintended interference in to their 
plans, and unwilling to spare the lives of their innocent captives. All the while, viewers 
are consistently reminded that each moment Ali remains undeterred in his mission equals 
a moment closer to an impending attack on the United States. 
Kate Warner’s plotline does not pick up again until the following episode. As the 
scene opens, the audience learns that Kate is still alive and that CTU has discovered the 
location where Ali is keeping her hostage. As CTU rushes to set up a sting operation 
outside of the apartment building, Kate remains tied to the chair in the apartment 
bathroom; Koplin lays dead in the bathtub, wrapped in a thick, clear plastic tarp. Paul’s 
torturer calmly washes blood from his hands in the bathroom sink as Ali enters the room 
and speaks to the man in Arabic. “I thought you were going to kill her,” Ali says. “If she 
knew anything, she’d have told us” (Season 2, Episode 10, “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). The 
man replies in Arabic, “Probably. But I’d like to be certain” (Season 2, Episode 10, “5:00 
p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). In Arabic, Ali replies, “And I would like to pray one last time, 
properly” (Season 2, Episode 10, “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). The man tells Ali to pray 
while he finishes with Kate. The two men embrace and Ali leaves. The man looks at 
Koplin’s body and then turns to Kate. In English, he asks her, “Do you want to suffer as 
he did?” (Season 2, Episode 10, “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.) Kate shakes her head. She is 
calm, “No. Of course not,” she replies (Season 2, Episode 10, “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). 
“Then tell me what you’ve learned from your father’s computer files, who you told,” the 
 195
man says to her (Season 2, Episode 10 “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). Kate replies, “I already 
told you. I don’t know anything” (Season 2, Episode 10 “5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.”). The 
man laughs quietly and moves to a makeshift table that has several tools and sharp 
instruments laid across the top. He picks up a utility knife, the scene fades, and the digital 
clock ticks off a few seconds before the scene ends in a commercial break. 
 When the scene returns to Kate and her torturer, he has cut her ear with the utility 
knife and is putting a chemical on it while she cries in pain. The man has decided that she 
does not know anything about the plot to detonate the nuclear bomb. Kate tries to 
convince the man that he could leave her in the apartment and be gone before the police 
ever found her. The man pulls a gun from the drawer and tells her that his killing her 
quickly will be better for her. As he cocks his gun at Kate’s head and prepares to shoot 
her, a CTU tactical team, led by Bauer, breaks in, saves Kate, and takes the man into 
custody. However, before Jack can question the man he convulses and dies of self-
poisoning.  
It is interesting to note that the above torture scenes do little to further Season 2’s 
plot. The audience does not learn anything new about the nuclear threat. What the 
audience does learn is that Ali has no regard for innocence and no qualms about violence 
or death. They also learn that he and his men are motivated by their Muslim faith and that 
they are willing to die for their cause. What these scenes of torture illustrate are the 
extreme measures taken by terrorists to harm the American people. And, other than the 
mention of God as a motivator for Ali’s righteous cause, viewers are not privy to any 
political or social motivations behind his terrorist actions. This dearth of political 
motivation within terrorist torture scenes comes as a stark contrast to torture scenes in 
which the captors are state-agents. As the following analysis will show, state-sanctioned 
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torture, unlike terrorist torture, is rarely performed on innocent people and is always 
motivated by political utility, temporal necessity, and social justice. 
Season 2: State Sanctioned Torture, Clean and Dirty 
Terrorists are not the only torturers in the second season of 24. State actors also 
participate in torturous actions, prompted by the temporal pressure to save American 
lives “in time.” State-sanctioned torture differs from terrorist torture in two important 
ways. First, as noted above, issues of national security always motivate state-sanctioned 
torture. And, second, state-sanctioned torture has two distinctive types of practice; these 
types I have labeled “clean” and “dirty.” The following analysis of scenes chosen from 
Season 2, explores both types of torture. The first set of scenes examined illustrates what 
I have termed “clean” torture. Throughout the 24 series, this type of torture often takes 
place inside government or office buildings and the practice utilizes pain-inducing 
chemicals and electric shock to provide a relatively “clean” and sterile torture of captives. 
The second set of torture scenes I examine illustrates the “dirty” or outwardly messy type 
of violent torture that, within the reality of the show, is usually practiced by state-actors 
who must interrogate terrorists at the site of capture and away from the conveniences of 
torture rooms and sterile needles. This type of torture involves more unorthodox methods 
of pain as agents use torture tools found at hand: knives, writing pens, cigar cutters, and 
the like. The torture techniques that I have labeled dirty also often involve direct threats 
to family members and friends of the captive in combination with these unorthodox 
methods for inducing pain.  
The first series of scenes analyzed below illustrates “clean” torture methods. 
These particular scenes are interesting because in them President Palmer directly 
approves the torture. The torturer is a member of the U.S. Secret Service, and the victim 
of torture, Roger Stanton, is the director of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). As 
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the torture scene opens, Stanton is tied to a chair in a secret, guarded room in the 
Presidential bunker. He is barefoot, and his feet are submerged in a bucket of water. He is 
attached to a heart monitor and there is a cart with a hospital defibrillator next to the 
monitor. Secret Service Agent, Ted Simmons, questions Stanton. “Time is of the essence, 
Mr. Stanton,” Simmons says calmly. “Intensity and duration of the electrical current will 
increase substantially each time I repeat a question” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 
7:00 p.m.”). As Simmons prepares the defibrillator, Stanton looks at him and says simply, 
“Yes, I know the drill Agent Simmons” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). 
As the defibrillator begins to hum with electricity, Simmons asks, “What is your agenda, 
Mr. Stanton, and who else is involved?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 
p.m.”). When Stanton does not reply, Simons shocks him and calmly turns to increase the 
intensity of the electrical current on the machine. “Who else knew about the bomb, Mr. 
Stanton? Who have you been working with?” Simmons asks (Season 2, Episode 11, 
“6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). “I don’t know anything about a bomb,” Stanton replies in an 
even tone (Season 2, Episode 11 “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Agent Simmons shocks 
Stanton again and continues to question him.  
The scene fades and when the plot returns to Stanton’s interrogation, it is in the 
following episode. Stanton looks exhausted and haggard. Agent Simmons re-enters the 
interrogation room, rolls up his sleeves, and asks, “Who else knew about the bomb, Mr. 
Stanton?” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “I don’t know what you’re 
talking about,” Stanton replies (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). Stress 
from the electric shocks has made his breath labored and he is visibly sweating. As 
Stanton answers Simmons, the camera angle shifts and the audience views the scene from 
a security camera mounted near the ceiling of the interrogation room. As the camera pans 
out, it becomes apparent that this view from the security camera is the one monitored on 
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a computer screen by President Palmer in his office. As the President watches the 
interrogation from his desk, his Chief of Staff, Mike Novick enters the room. Novick 
informs the President that Agent Jack Bauer has Syed Ali in custody and that Bauer is 
preparing to interrogate him. The President tells Novick to make sure that Bauer has all 
of the resources he needs to question Ali. Meanwhile, Stanton’s interrogation continues 
on Palmer’s screen. Palmer comments to Novick, “Agent Simmons tells me that Roger 
received the same training of resisting interrogation [as] he did” (Season 2, Episode 12, 
“7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). Palmer pauses and watches as Agent Simmons increases the 
electrical voltage on the defibrillator. He then says, to himself as much as to Novick, “But 
everyone breaks eventually” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”).  
This series of scenes represents the type of state-sanctioned torture I have labeled 
clean. In these types of torture scenes a powerful state-actor, in this case the President of 
the United States, authorizes the use of torture. The acts of torture themselves seem 
almost clinical. In the scene described above, the torturer, Agent Simmons, utilizes 
common medical equipment to inflict pain and monitor the physical impact of this pain 
on his captive. All the while Simmons never breaks a sweat. The President’s viewing of 
the torture scene illustrates another factor that makes clean torture clean: While Stanton is 
tortured in the Presidential bunker at the President’s request just feet from the President 
himself, the President never personally gets his hands dirty. He is a witness to violence 
not a direct agent of it. 
Although the state-sanctioned torture performed in 24 is often performed with 
sterile instruments and little mess, state agents, particularly agents like Jack Bauer, must 
often rely on imposing physical pain with methods and tools available at the time of a 
suspect’s capture. In the following torture scene, taken from Season 2, Jack Bauer 
tortures the recently captured Syed Ali. After a successful sting operation inside a 
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mosque in which Ali has been participating in evening prayer, Bauer and his team 
arrange to interrogate Ali in the mosque’s basement. Because Ali is CTU’s prime suspect 
and because the nuclear bomb attack planned by Ali is set to happen at any minute, Bauer 
chooses to interrogate Ali on site, so as not to lose precious time taking Ali back to CTU. 
The scene in which Bauer interrogates Ali opens with Ali restrained in a chair and 
covered in blood. Bauer leans close to Ali’s face and grabs Ali by the back of the hair. He 
says, “I know who you are. I know everything that you’ve done. Where is the bomb?” 
(Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). Ali groans in pain as Bauer steps back 
and repeatedly punches Ali in the stomach and face. “Where’s the bomb?” Bauer screams 
(Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”).  Ali spits a large amount of blood on 
the floor next to Bauer, looks defiant, and says nothing. “You are a waste of my time,” 
Bauer says turning from Ali and wiping sweat from his own face. “When is the bomb 
going to detonate?” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “You are the one 
wasting time,” Ali says calmly. “I woke up today knowing I would die” (Season 2, 
Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). At this Bauer crosses the room and whispers in 
Ali’s ear, “I can make you die in more pain than you have ever imagined,” he says 
grabbing Ali’s hand and breaking his wrist (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 
p.m.”). “Then I will have much more pleasure in paradise,” Ali says through clenched 
teeth. “Right.” Bauer says sarcastically (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). 
In this scene, violence is at the center of Bauer’s interrogation. Because Syed Ali 
is depicted as a known terrorist and because Bauer and his team face immense time 
pressure (they have to find the bomb before it is detonated), the violence depicted in 
Bauer’s interrogation of Ali goes unquestioned. No one in the mosque, not even the 
mosque’s imam, tries to stop Bauer’s violent actions; no one questions Bauer’s motives. 
When Bauer’s attempts at gaining information from Ali through physical violence fail, 
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Bauer moves to another strategy: violence against Ali’s family. In another interrogation 
scene with Ali, Bauer arranges monitors in front of Ali’s chair. On the monitors, Ali’s 
wife and two sons appear, bound, gagged, and held at gunpoint by soldiers in black 
hoods. “Those men will kill your family if you don’t tell me where the bomb is now,” 
Bauer says to Ali. “I despise you for making me do this,” Bauer says. “They’re waiting 
for my order. This is your last chance. Where’s the bomb?” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 
p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). With these words, Bauer makes it clear to Ali that Ali, who refuses to 
give Bauer the information he needs, is to blame for Bauer’s violent actions. When Ali 
refuses to tell Bauer the location of the bomb, Bauer sends a signal to the armed men on 
he television screen. The man holding Ali’s eldest son steps forward, pulls the boy closer 
to the camera, and shoots the boy in the head. As the boy falls to the ground, Bauer tells 
Ali that he will kill Ali’s entire family if Ali does not give up the location of the bomb. At 
this, Ali breaks down and gives Bauer the information he needs. 
The audience later learns that execution of Ali’s son has been staged. Ali’s family 
remains alive. And, although the fact remains that the U.S. government willingly and 
knowingly took Ali’s family hostage, the fact that Ali’s son is not dead gives some relief 
to viewers in regard to the moral ambiguity of Bauer’s actions. Because he did not take 
an innocent life, Bauer, unlike Ali who viewers have seen torture and kill innocent 
people, seems justified in his actions. As the plot moves forward with Bauer’s continued 
attempts to locate and secure the nuclear bomb, viewers are not encouraged to consider 
the legality of Bauer’s actions against Ali and his family. Because Bauer is one step 
closer to stopping terrorist threat, viewers are also not encouraged to consider the trauma 
caused to the family who has been held captive or of Ali who, as far as the viewing 
audience is concerned, is taken off to jail never learning that his son is still alive. 
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Temporal pressure and the need to protect American citizens trump the cruel treatment of 
terrorist enemies and their families. 
Season 4: Governmental Approval and the Violation of Human Rights 
While the cruel treatment of terrorist enemies becomes common sense within the 
reality of 24 as early as Season 2, it is not until the fourth season that human rights come 
under close scrutiny. Season 4 is the first full season to air after the Abu Ghraib incidents. 
Therefore, it is interesting to note the anxieties concerning torturous actions in the show 
and the ways in which those anxieties are ultimately quelled through appeals to national 
security. There are two sets of scenes of most importance in Season 4; each deals with 
torture as it intersects with U.S. law and the principles of human rights. In the first set of 
scenes analyzed below, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Heller, authorizes the use of 
“non-invasive” torture techniques on his own son when CTU suspects the son’s 
involvement in the day’s terrorist plot. The second set of scenes deals specifically with 
the issue of human rights when a human rights lawyer is brought in to CTU and prevents 
the interrogation of CTU’s key suspect, forcing Jack Bauer to work outside of the law to 
get the information that he needs. 
In the first set of scenes concerning the torture of Richard Heller, the Secretary of 
Defense’s son, Richard is brought into custody because CTU suspects he has information 
regarding the kidnapping of Secretary Heller and his daughter (Richard’s older sister), 
Audrey Reines. Heller and Reines were ambushed outside of Richard Heller’s home. 
Because Heller’s visit to his son was known only to the Secretary of Defense, his 
entourage, and Richard Heller, CTU suspects Richard Heller of being involved in the 
kidnapping plot. Richard Heller is a young college student with left-leaning political 
affiliations. And, just before the Secretary and his daughter were kidnapped from outside 
Richard’s home, Secretary Heller and his son had been arguing about Richard’s recent 
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series of public protests against his father’s national security policies. When Richard 
Heller is first taken to CTU, Secretary Heller is in the custody of the terrorists and CTU 
has learned that they plan to kill Heller within the next few hours. Secretary Heller’s son, 
Richard, is being held in an interrogation room at CTU for questioning. Agent Curtis 
Manning enters the room and has another agent restrain Richard in a chair. When Richard 
asks Curtis what he is doing, Curtis responds by asking Richard what he knows about his 
father’s abduction. “Who else knew your father would be at your house this morning?” 
Manning asks (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). When Richard denies 
any knowledge of the attack on his father, Manning nods to the fellow agent and the 
agent retrieves a syringe out of his briefcase. “What are you, crazy?” Richard asks 
(Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Manning looks at Richard for a 
moment, then tells him, “Makes every nerve within your body feels like it’s on fire” 
(Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Richard cannot believe that he, the 
Secretary of Defense’s son, is being treated the way he is. He claims, “You’re bluffing. I 
know you can’t get away with this” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). 
Manning merely smiles and tells Richard, “By the time you’re released, the mark on your 
arm will be gone. It’ll be just your word against mine” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. 
to 10:00 a.m.”). “My father’s the Secretary of Defense for God’s sake,” Richard cries 
(Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). “I thought you hated him,” Manning 
says menacingly. “Now he’s ‘dear old dad?’” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 
a.m.”). Richard cries for help and Manning’s assistant begins to inject Richard’s arm with 
the pain-inducing chemical. Just before the needle punctures Richard’s skin, Manning 
orders the agent to stop and leaves the interrogation room to speak with his supervisor 
and head of CTU, Erin Driscoll.  
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Driscoll, who was watching in an adjacent room through a two-way mirror, is 
visibly angry about Manning’s decision to halt the interrogation. “I can’t do it, Erin. I’m 
not going let Darren work on Richard Heller,” Manning tells her (Season 4, Episode 3, 
“9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Frustrated, Driscoll asks, “Why not?” (Season 4, Episode 3, 
“9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). “Maybe he’s protecting a friend,” Manning explains. “But he 
wasn’t knowingly involved with a terrorist. It’s an inappropriate use of force” (Season 4, 
Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). When Driscoll reminds Manning that he is under 
an order to interrogate Richard Heller, he suggests that they use a non-invasive method. 
“I’ve seen good results with sensory disorientation,” he says. “Cut off his sight. Saturate 
his auditory. It’s non-invasive”  (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Eager 
to get the information she needs from Richard Heller and leery of being held responsible 
for the torture of the Secretary of Defense’s son, Driscoll agrees to try Manning’s 
method.  
The scene fades and when the plot returns to Richard Heller he is attached to a 
sensory disorientation device. His eyes are covered with dark heavy-looking goggles and 
discordant noise is being piped into headphones on his head. Manning reenters the 
interrogation room, takes off Richard’s sensory disorientation goggles and headphones, 
and shines a bright light into Richard’s face. He asks, “How long do you think you’ve 
been sitting here like this?” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). “Three, 
four hours,” Richard replies in a daze (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10: a.m.”). 
Manning leans close to Richard’s face and says, “It’s been less than 30 minutes. Time is 
the first thing you lose track of in sensory disorientation, and it only gets worse” (Season 
4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Richard begins to cry and says, “This isn’t legal. 
You can’t keep me here” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). “You’ll be 
here until you tell me what I need to know,” Manning replies (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 
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a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). When Heller insists that he has told CTU everything he knows, 
Manning continues, “Your father was kidnapped by terrorists. Our polygraph analysis 
tells us you’re hiding something that might help us find him. Just tell me what it is and all 
this stops” (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). “I’m not going to do this,” 
Richard insists (Season 4, Episode 3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). Manning picks up the 
goggles and headphones from the table and says, “If you don’t care enough about your 
father to tell me what I need to know, I’ll get it out of you this way” (Season 4, Episode 
3, “9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.”). The scene fades with Richard screaming blindly after 
Manning as he leaves the interrogation room. Richard’s screams are muffled by the sound 
of the ticking clock as the scene fades. The clock’s urgent chime reinforces the time 
pressure under which CTU must operate and as it muffles Richard’s cries, it mollifies the 
moral ambiguity of the actions taken against him. These scenes featuring the torture of 
Richard Heller are interesting because they are the first to depict state actors doubting 
their use of force against a suspect. However, due to 24’s notorious plot twists, the 
audience is encouraged to be suspicious of Richard Heller. Just like the agents at CTU, 
the audience is unsure of Richard’s motives. 
As the plot progresses, Secretary Heller and his daughter, Audrey, are rescued. 
Because his father has been found, CTU frees Richard Heller from the sensory 
depravation device. However, he remains locked in CTU custody. Richard Heller’s 
plotline does not move forward again until Episode 6. In this episode, Senator Heller 
joins CTU to help stop the terrorists who kidnapped him from overriding U.S. nuclear 
devices and, by the time Heller is reunited with his son, Richard has been in CTU custody 
for nearly four hours. Unlike Richard, Heller is a tough man, a man always thinking 
about what is best for the United States. As the scene opens, Secretary Heller enters the 
room where his son is being held captive. Richard looks relieved to see his father alive. 
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When Secretary Heller enters the room, Richard runs to him and hugs him. “They said 
you were okay. Audrey too. Thank God. I said some awful things before. I was afraid I’d 
never get a chance to apologize,” Richard says (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 
p.m.). Secretary Heller smiles at his son. “I said some pretty harsh things myself,” he 
says. “But no matter what was said, you’re still my son, and I will always love you” 
(Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). After this brief reunion, Secretary 
Heller’s demeanor changes. Looking at Richard sternly he says, “They said they were 
using some interrogation techniques.” (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). 
“Totally out of line,” Richard responds. “I’m going to sue them blind” (Season 4, 
Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.). Richard seems relieved by his father’s presence, 
which he takes as a cue that he is free to leave CTU. As Richard makes for the door to the 
interrogation room, Secretary Heller stops him and says, “I think it’ll be a little more 
effective if you let me deal with it. I promise you, if they were out of line, heads will roll” 
(Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Richard looks visibly surprised at his 
father’s suggestion. Richard asks, “What do you mean, ‘if’?” (Season 4, Episode 6, 
“12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Secretary Heller looks at his son sternly and asks, “Why did 
they think you were holding something back from them?” (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 
p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Still surprised by his father Richard states, “I don’t know” (Season 4, 
Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Heller moves closer and, speaking softly, he says, 
“Richard, if you know something that would shed some light on what happened to me…” 
(Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Angrily, Richard interrupts his father. 
“Wait,” he yells. “You don’t think I would tell them if I thought it was relevant?” (Season 
4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Richard, incredulous, asks his father why he is 
siding with CTU. Heller looks evenly at Richard. “Son, do you have any idea what your 
sister just went through? If you know anything that would help us find the people behind 
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this, tell me now,” he demands (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Richard 
tries to reason with his father and says, “Dad, I’m glad you’re alive, I really am, but I am 
not going to tell these people things about my private life that they don’t need to know” 
(Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). “That you don’t think they need to 
know,” Secretary Heller interjects. “Richard, these people were trying to save our lives” 
(Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”).  
Richard, still shocked by his father’s reaction, proclaims, “These people can’t be 
trusted and what they did to me is proof” (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 
p.m.”). At this, Secretary Heller turns to the two-way mirror and calls Agent Manning 
into the room. When Manning joins them Secretary Heller says, “Agent Manning, I am 
authorizing you to do whatever you feel is necessary to get this information out of my 
son” (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). Richard tries to interject to reason 
with his father. But, Secretary Heller stops him short. “I love you, son,” he says. “But I 
have a duty to my country” (Season 4, Episode 6, “12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.”). As Richard 
calls for him, Secretary Heller leaves his son in the interrogation room with Manning. 
The audience later learns that the information Richard was hiding from CTU and 
his father concerns his sexuality. Richard, viewers learn, is gay. And, having not yet 
come out to his father, Richard wished to keep elements of his personal life private. The 
audience learns that Richard had met a man in a bar a few nights before the kidnapping 
and taken him home. Richard later admits that the encounter may have been staged so 
that the man could access Richard’s phone, thus learning of Secretary Heller’s plans to 
visit his son. In the end, although viewers may be sympathetic toward Richard’s desire to 
keep his private life private, they learn that privacy and personal protection from 
detainment and torture under the law are privileges in times of crisis. And, even though 
Richard did not intentionally aid terrorists in their plot to kidnap his father, the violent 
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actions taken against Richard are ultimately justified. By putting his personal feelings for 
his son aside and allowing CTU to torture Richard, Secretary Heller allowed CTU to get 
the information it needed. By allowing CTU to torture his son, Secretary Heller did what 
was needed to protect his country. 
CTU’s dealings with Richard Heller are not the only moments concerned with 
human rights in Season 4. This season also deals specifically with legal issues of human 
rights surrounding detention and interrogation. In the next set of scenes to be analyzed, 
human rights law becomes a weapon. Habib Marwan, the terrorist behind the day’s 
events, gives a human rights lawyer an anonymous tip when one of his men is arrested. 
The lawyer’s intervention into CTU’s investigation ultimately slows their progress and 
allows Marwan and his remaining men to escape. In this scene a man named Joe Prado is 
apprehended in a CTU sting operation. Prado is a U.S. citizen and because Marwan fears 
that Prado will disclose too much information about the attacks if he is interrogated by 
CTU, Marwan makes an anonymous call to a human rights lawyer, telling the lawyer of 
Prado’s illegal arrest. What makes this set of torture scenes so interesting is that 
Marwan’s understanding of the law is correct. CTU has no legal right to take Prado into 
custody and interrogate him because they do not have enough evidence to charge him 
with any crime. However, the human rights lawyer is portrayed as a hindrance to the 
investigation, a hindrance that wastes time and threatens to cost thousands of American 
lives. 
 Frustrated by the politics of the legal bind (see more on this below), Jack Bauer 
decides to quit his newly re-instated position at CTU (at the beginning of the season 
Bauer worked for Heller, but joined CTU to help manage the day’s crisis). As a citizen 
with no official affiliation with CTU, Bauer plans to interrogate Prado once Prado is 
released from CTU custody. The torture scene opens with Prado’s release from CTU. A 
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hardened criminal, Prado is suspicious of CTU’s compliance with his lawyer’s request to 
release him. As the head of CTU, Bill Buchanan, escorts Prado from the premises, Prado 
becomes suspicious. He asks, “What the hell are you trying to pull here? First you want 
to torture me and now you’re throwing me out?” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 
1:00 a.m.”). Prado’s lawyer tries to calm his client. “It’s okay, Joe” he says. “I’m sure 
they tried to fight the restraining order, then realized they couldn’t” (Season 4, Episode 
18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Prado insists that CTU is up to something and his lawyer 
tells him that a Federal Marshall can escort him safely home. “No, no, no,” Prado cries. 
“You know what? Change of plan. I don’t want to leave here until I know I’m safe for the 
next few days” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). At this Prado heads 
back toward the interrogation room. Agent Manning blocks Prado’s path and says, “If 
you don’t leave, I’m going have to arrest you for trespassing a secured government 
building. Once that happens, not even your attorney can protect you” (Season 4, Episode 
18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Prado’s lawyer confirms this and a reluctant Prado leaves 
the building flanked by his lawyer and the Federal Marshall.  
Meanwhile, Jack Bauer, no longer a member of CTU, hides near Prado’s car in 
the parking lot and waits. He watches as Prado’s lawyer leaves and then, knocking the 
Marshall unconscious with an electric stun gun, Bauer forces Prado into the card. “Make 
a sound and I will blow your brains out all over the windshield,” Jack says holding a gun 
to Prado’s head. “Handcuff your left arm to the dashboard, now (Season 4, Episode 18, 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Prado complies and Bauer climbs into the back seat behind 
Prado, keeping his gun trained on the back of Prado’s head. “Now, you and I both know 
your heart isn’t in this,” Bauer says. “You just wanted the money. I don’t want you. All I 
want is Marwan”  (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Prado insists that he 
does not know anything. He says, “I don’t know any Marwan. I don’t know what you’re 
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talking about” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Impatient, Bauer says, 
“Yeah. Well, I’m running out of time here, so why don’t we just cut to the chase?” 
(Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”).  
Bauer proceeds to break each of Prado’s fingers one by one, screaming in Prado’s 
ear to tell him where to find Marwan. Crying and screaming in pain, Prado insists he does 
not know. Finally, Bauer puts a knife to Prado’s throat and threatens to kill him. “Okay, 
okay, okay,” Prado says. “Marwan’s… Marwan’s going to be at a place called ‘The Hub’ 
tonight” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Satisfied with this 
information, Bauer knocks Prado unconscious and heads back into CTU to be reinstated 
and gather a tactical team to capture Marwan. As this set of scenes illustrates, the time 
pressure associated with imminent threat on national security forces Bauer to work 
around the legal parameters of human rights. Standard legal protections such as the right 
to an attorney are made annoying and ridiculous as the bureaucracy of human rights 
protection hinders CTU’s ability to capture their terrorist suspect and prevent him from 
causing harm to the people of the United States. And, while the civil rights lawyer who 
stands up for the legal protection of his client is portrayed as a villain, Jack Bauer, a man 
willing to break the law and assault another American citizen is portrayed as a hero and a 
patriot. 
Season 6: The Effects of Torture 
The last two sets of torture scenes I analyze are taken from 24’s Season 6. These 
torture scenes are important because they are the first to address the potential mental and 
physical side effects of torture for torture victims. In this season, Jack Bauer returns to 
the United States after nearly two years of being tortured by the Chinese government. 
Bauer returns to the U.S. as part of a trade deal made by newly elected President Wade 
Palmer, the late David Palmer’s younger brother. Upon his release from China, Bauer 
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learns that he is to be handed over to known terrorist Abu Fayed. Fayed claims that he 
knows the whereabouts of another terrorist, Hamri Al-Assad, a man who the U.S. 
government believes to be behind a series of suicide bombings in major U.S. cities. 
Fayed, who wants personal revenge on Bauer, agrees to give Assad’s location to the U.S. 
in exchange for the former CTU agent. An unwavering patriot, Bauer is honored to die in 
the arrangement, claiming he would rather die for something than for nothing. As Bauer 
is prepared for the exchange with Fayed, the audience learns that he has not spoken a 
single word during his detention in China. Furthermore, although Bauer’s patriotism 
remains strong, his demeanor and physical appearance are noticeably different. Bauer has 
acid burn scars up and down his arms and he is quiet, distance, and gaunt. Knowing he 
has come back to the United States only to meet his death, Bauer asks that his daughter, 
Kim, does not learn of his return.  
After Bauer is taken into Abu Fayed’s custody, he soon learns that Fayed is the 
actual terrorist behind the suicide bombings. He also learns that Fayed has obtained 
several suitcase nuclear bombs and plans to detonate them in cities around the U.S. 
Hamri Al-Assad, on the other hand, has changed his terrorist ways and decided to 
become more politically mainstream. Bauer learns from Fayed that Assad has come to the 
U.S. to stop Fayed. Fayed has framed Assad so as to divert the U.S. government away 
from his own terrorist scheme and to punish Assad for abandoning his cause. Bauer 
ultimately escapes from Fayed’s custody and attempts to warn CTU that Fayed is the 
terrorist they want, not Assad. However, the agents at CTU question Bauer’s assessment 
of the situation, worried that his judgment may be impaired due to the years of torture he 
has suffered. Because CTU will not believe him that Assad is innocent, Bauer takes it 
upon himself to stop CTU from assassinating Assad. Bauer manages to warn Assad in 
time and gain Assad’s trust. The two men, Bauer and Assad, then set out to stop Fayed.  
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In the following scene Bauer and Assad interrogate a man who has been working 
as a double agent for Assad and Fayed. Knowing that Fayed plans to attack another U.S. 
city within the next few hours, Bauer and Assad torture the man in order to learn Fayed’s 
location. The man is tied to a chair. Bauer leans close to his face and screams, “Where’s 
Fayed?” (Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). When the man insists that he 
does not know Fayed’s location, Bauer takes a writing pen from the table next to the 
man’s chair. He stabs the pen into a bundle of nerves in the man’s shoulder. As the man 
screams, Bauer continues to ask him about Fayed’s whereabouts. The man continues to 
insist that he does not know, crying and screaming in pain. The camera focuses in on 
Bauer’s face. He looks visibly upset and pulls the pen from the man’s shoulder. Assad, 
who has been watching Bauer work, asks, “Why’d you stop?” (Season 6, Episode 2, 
“7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). Bauer responds quietly, “I can see it in his eyes, he’s not going 
to tell us anything” (Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”).  At this, Bauer turns 
to leave the room. Assad grabs a utility knife from the table and shoves the blade into the 
man’s kneecap. The man screams and Assad asks, “Where is Fayed?” (Season 6, Episode 
2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). Desperate to stop the pain in his knee, the man says, “I know 
where some of his men will be. I overheard Fayed giving them instructions to go there” 
(Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). Assad twists the knife to increase the 
man’s pain. The man gives him Fayed’s exact location. Assad then asks, “You’ve told me 
everything?” (Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). The man swears that he has 
told Assad all he knows. Assad pulls the knife out of the man’s knee, tells the man he 
believes him, and then stabs the man in the heart, killing him. He then turns to Bauer who 
is visibly shaken by the scene and says, “My men are dead. I can find Fayed but I cannot 
stop him by myself” (Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). “I don’t know how 
to do this anymore,” Bauer says quietly (Season 6, Episode 2, “7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”). 
 212
“You’ll remember,” Assad reassures him as they head out the door (Season 6, Episode 2, 
“7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.”).  
This scene is an important one for several reasons. First, it is the only scene in six 
seasons in which Bauer chooses to opt out of violence. Second, it is one of the only 
scenes in six seasons in which Bauer’s read on the suspect is incorrect. And, finally, this 
scene provides the audience with its first glimpse of any torture-induced emotional or 
physical trauma. Jack Bauer, the show’s hero, is portrayed as a broken man, a shadow of 
his former self. Bauer’s struggle with violence within the reality of the show stems, in 
part, from his experience as a victim of torture. However, it is also important to consider 
the social and political context in which Season 6 was produced and aired. This particular 
episode originally aired in January, 2007. A Gallup poll conducted around the same time 
reveals that only 36% of Americans supported the Iraq War, the lowest since the war 
began in March of 2003 (Newport). So while Bauer questions his violent tactics in light 
of his lived experience, the show’s focus on this topic can be read, in part, as a reaction or 
reflection of the social context in which 24, as a popular rhetorical text, works. 
Ultimately, though Bauer’s resistance against violence leads to his failure, a fact that 
reinforces torture’s necessity, validates its practice, and assuages doubts viewers might 
have otherwise. Had Assad not stepped forward and completed Bauer’s torturous task, 
Fayed’s trail would have gone cold. The lesson of this scene for viewing audiences, as 
illustrated by Assad’s assurances to Bauer, is not that torture should be abandoned, but 
that torture is sometimes necessary. And, as Assad’s prediction that Bauer “will 
remember,” plays out, this lesson on the necessity of torture is reinforced. As the season 
progresses Bauer does remember. He successfully tortures several suspects, including his 
own brother.  
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However, while anxieties in Season 6 over the traumatic effects of torture 
diminish as Bauer slowly works his way back to his former torturing self, it is important 
to note that Bauer is not the only character in Season 6 emotionally and physically 
damaged by torture. Near the end of the season, viewers learn that the Chinese 
government has also tortured Bauer’s former lover, Audrey Reines. The audience learns 
that Reines, frustrated by her own government’s refusal to remove Bauer from Chinese 
custody, had gone to China a year earlier in an attempt to find him. The audience also 
learns that Chinese government has faked Reines’ death and secretly taken her into 
custody to be tortured. And, while Bauer’s character showed initial signs of trauma that 
diminish over the course of the season, Reines’ mental and physical state is much 
different. When Bauer and CTU finally learn that Reines is alive and manage to rescue 
her, she is a complete mental vegetable, unable to recognize anyone or anything around 
her. However, despite Reines’ delicate mental state CTU believes she may have 
information that can lead them to the Chinese terrorists who have tortured her. In the 
following scene, Audrey’s condition is discussed as CTU weighs options for getting the 
information from her. Nadia Yassir, acting head of CTU, and Agent Doyle, the agent in 
charge of the tactical mission set to find the Chinese, speak with a specialist about 
Reine’s mental condition. The specialist says, “She’s a type three catatonic capable of 
following simple commands and repeating words and basic phrases, but otherwise utterly 
unresponsive” (Season 6, Episode 20, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Because they are 
concerned about finding the Chinese as soon as possible, Yassir asks, “Do you think 
you’ll be able to get the information we need from her?” (Season 6, Episode 20, “1:00 
a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “Within your time frame? Not without intervention,” the specialist 
says skeptically (Season 6, Episode 20, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). When Agent Doyle 
asks for clarification the specialist states,  
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Miss Reines is suffering from severe psychological abuse amplified by 
pharmacological agents as evidence by more than 100 injections sites on her 
arms, feet and groin. It’s going to be next to impossible to communicate with her 
in the near term unless we essentially attempt to shock her out of this state. 
(Season 6, Episode 20, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”) 
The specialist then suggests that Reines be given additional drugs to shock her system. 
The specialist warns that doing this to Reines may cause her additional emotional and 
physical trauma; however, Yassir and the specialist agree that this risk is worth taking 
because the information Reines may have can save thousands of American lives. Bauer, 
who learns of Yassir’s plan, is able to stop the procedure on Reines and get the 
information he needs from her without pharmaceutical intervention. However, despite 
Bauer’s attempts to connect with Reines on an emotional level, at the season’s close, 
Reines’ catatonic state remains and it is uncertain whether or not she will ever recover. 
It is interesting to note that the pharmaceutical torture that has caused Reines’ 
mental distress at the hands of the Chinese is a type of torture often utilized in 24 by the 
U.S. government as part of its regimen of clean torture tactics. Regular viewers need little 
explanation of the techniques performed on Reines in China because they have seen CTU 
utilize similar methods on several suspects throughout the course of 24’s six-season run. 
Audiences have seen the technique used on various suspects, including CTU agents 
thought to be spies, Reine’s brother Richard Heller (see Season 4 analysis above), even 
Audrey Reines who was thought to be working with terrorists in Season 5. However, 
although pharmaceutical torture is common practice for CTU, viewers are not explicitly 
encouraged to associate Reines’ trauma with CTU’s practices. Instead, Reines’ condition 
is framed as a result of the ruthless Chinese government’s disregard for limitations on 
torture practices. And, although suspects in CTU custody often suffer fates equal or 
worse to that of Reines, viewers are never privy to the aftermath of CTU’s torture 
methods. 
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Politics of 24 
While the scenes in 24 that feature torture of are of great importance, it is also 
important to note that this torture does not happen in a social and political vacuum. 
Therefore, in order to get a more complete understanding of the ways in which violence 
is used and justified in terms of national identity and particularly in terms of ticking 
bomb rhetoric, this section of analysis focuses on the political discourses that surround 
the violent actions in 24. Like the analysis sections discussing torture, these scenes 
analyzed below appear in chronological order. 
Season 2: For the Good of the Country: President Palmer’s Approval of Torture 
In the second season of 24, Jack Bauer tortures Syed Ali, the known terrorist 
behind the day’s attacks, and a member of the U.S. Secret Service tortures Roger Stanton, 
a member of the President’s own cabinet. Importantly, President Palmer is very much 
involved in the decision-making processes regarding torture’s use in both instances. For 
example, it is President Palmer who arranges for his Secret Service agent to torture Roger 
Stanton. As the scene opens, Palmer meets Agent Simmons in a remote location on the 
Presidential retreat grounds. As Palmer approaches Simmons, he motions for the Secret 
Service agents that have accompanied him to wait by the motorcade so he can speak to 
Simmons privately. Upon greeting the agent, Palmer asks him how long Simmons has 
been in Secret Service and inquires about Simmons’s training in special operations. 
Palmer asks, “Ever have the chance to put your training to use?” (Season 2, Episode 11, 
“6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Simmons tells Palmer that he was in the Gulf War and was 
able to put his training to use there. Palmer nods at this and asks, “Anywhere else?” 
(Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Agent Simmons hesitates a moment 
and then says, “There were some other covert ops” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 
7:00 p.m.”). Palmer seems pleased by this and asks, “Under the directorate of the CIA?” 
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(Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). The agent looks at the President, starts 
to say something, and then remains silent. “It’s alright Ted,” Palmer assures him. “I’m 
not on a witch hunt here. But I do need you to answer the question” (Season 2, Episode 
11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Simmons confirms that he has worked for the CIA on 
secret missions. This pleases Palmer. “Good,” he says and then asks, “You understand 
the gravity of today’s situation?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). “Of 
course, sir,” Agent Simmons replies simply (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 
p.m.”). Palmer nods and asks, “Then I guess you’ve heard by now that Roger Stanton is 
no longer functioning as the head of NSA?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 
p.m.”). “I heard he was arrested,” Simmons replies. (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 
7:00 p.m.”). Palmer confirms this and assures Simmons that Stanton was arrested under 
the authority of the Presidential office. He then looks at Simmons sternly and says, “What 
I’m about to ask you to do falls outside the parameters of your charge at Secret Service. 
You won’t be able to tell anyone about this without my direct consent. You still with me 
Ted?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Agent 
Simmons matches the President’s serious tone and asks, “What would you like me to do 
sir?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). Palmer tells Simmons that he 
wants the Agent to extract information from Stanton. Simmons nods and asks, “If he 
resists, how far am I permitted to go?” (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.”). 
“Whatever you need to do,” Palmer says. (Season 2, Episode 11, “6:00 p.m. to 7:00 
p.m.”). Simmons confirms this with a nod and Palmer returns to his awaiting motorcade.  
The tone of this scene parallels the tone of the Abu Ghraib torture memos in 
which members of the United States military ask for and are granted the means to do 
what ever it takes to get the information needed to stop terrorist threat. Within the reality 
of 24 the urgency and gravity of this tone is compounded by the temporal pressure to stop 
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a nuclear threat within a few-four period. This scene is also important because it 
highlights the importance of Presidential involvement in decisions to torture suspects 
while simultaneously reinforcing the need to keep the integrity of the Presidential office 
in tact for the good of the country. Part of Agent Simmon’s patriotic duty, then, is to 
distance the President from any wrongdoing if the torture of Stanton ever becomes 
public.  
Although Palmer does not directly request all acts of torture in Season 2, what the 
political scenes in this season make clear is that torturous acts, when they serve to prevent 
terrorist threat and protect the American people, have the President’s support and 
approval. For when Jack Bauer decides to torture Syed Ali by threatening to kill Ali’s 
family, the President is well aware of Bauer’s actions. And, in the following scene, in 
which the President Palmer is briefed regarding Bauer’s actions against Ali’s family, 
Bauer’s actions are justified in terms of national security. 
“Sir, are you aware that Jack Bauer is threatening the lives of Syed Ali’s family?” 
the president’s Chief of Staff, Mike Novick, asks the Palmer (Season 2, Episode 12, 
“7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “No,” Palmer replies. “Where is the family?” (Season 2, 
Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “In their own country,” Novick says. “CTU’s been 
in contact with security forces there who have Ali’s family in custody. We’ve just got 
word that Jack has requested that they kill the family one by one until Ali tells us the 
location of the bomb” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). The President 
remains calm at this news and asks, “Will the security forces do this in your estimation?” 
(Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “Their government is afraid of what 
we’ll do in retaliation if the bomb does go off. Yes, I think they would.” Mike says 
(Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “Can we let this happen?” Palmer asks. 
“Condone the murder of innocent people?” (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 
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p.m.”). “The argument would be that the bomb is an act of war and war has inevitably 
resulted in civilian casualties,” Novick responds (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 
8:00 p.m.”). “Look, I don’t want a rationale here, Mike. I don’t know of a war where a 
President knowingly targeted children for assassination,” Palmer says, weighing the 
political gravity of the consequences of Bauer’s actions (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 
p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). “Compare this to a weapons factory we discover near a hospital, a 
situation we have faced,” Novick answers. “Now the bombing would still be ordered on 
the logic that many more people would be saved by the destruction of the factory. Now 
the numbers are even more compelling here. A few people may have to die to save 
millions,” Novick says (Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). President 
Palmer ultimately complies with Novick’s reasoning. However, it is clear to viewers that 
the decision is a difficult on for Palmer. He asks, “How could it have come to this?” 
(Season 2, Episode 12, “7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”). The 24 clock ticks as the scene fades to 
black.  
In this scene, President Palmer, disturbed by Bauer’s actions, questions the ethics 
of Bauer’s interrogation. However, the President is reassured that “war has inevitably 
resulted in civilian causalities” and that Bauer’s acts of violence are justified by the need 
for national security. The President does nothing to stop Bauer because he knows that 
without the information they need from their prime suspect, Syed Ali, it is unlikely that 
CTU will find the nuclear bomb in time. Therefore, killing Ali’s innocent wife and 
children becomes the lesser of two evils and the psychological trauma Ali endures while 
watching his family die becomes justified in the name of the American people.  
Season 4: The Dangers of Moral Intervention  
In the above scenario, the President has his reservations about extreme uses of 
violence, but ultimately complies when he realizes that torturous actions and murder are 
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necessary in extreme circumstances like nuclear threat. However, it is not always the case 
that the acting President in 24 complies with the use of torture. In the following section of 
analysis I analyze the scenes from Season 4 that occur prior to Jack Bauer’s decision to 
quit CTU so that he can forcefully interrogate terror suspect Joe Prado (see above). As 
the scene opens, Bauer is frustrated by the fact that CTU has not begun Prado’s 
interrogation. Confronting the head of CTU, Bill Buchanan, Bauer asks, “What the hell’s 
going on here? You’ve got a key witness on a missing warhead. We should be pressing 
this guy with everything we’ve got” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). 
Buchanan tells Bauer that, although he agrees with Bauer completely, it is up to a court 
judge to make the decision. He also tells Bauer that CTU cannot file an appeal in court 
until several hours later. Frustrated by this, Bauer asks, “Does he [the judge] know what 
the stakes are?” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Buchanan replies, “He 
does, but his feeling is Prado’s got no record, he shouldn’t be treated like a terrorist” 
(Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. 1:00 a.m.”). Angrily, Bauer tells Buchanan, “Bill, we 
need to interrogate this person and I don’t care what court order they’re waving at you” 
Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Buchanan tells Jack that he agrees, but 
that the suspect is with an attorney and a U.S. Marshall.  
Upon learning this, Bauer rushes to the interrogation room where Prado is being 
held to confront the attorney. When he enters the room he asks Agent Manning why the 
suspect is not in restraints. Manning tells him that the attorney is with Amnesty Global 
and their order supersedes CTU authority. The attorney, Weiss, approaches Bauer and 
attempts to reason with him. He says, “Mr. Bauer, my client is cooperating. He’s not 
trying to go anywhere. All he wants is to be treated like any other US citizen” (Season 4, 
Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Bauer turns to the attorney and says, “Your client 
aided and abetted the people who attacked the President of the United States today” 
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(Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). “You don’t know that,” Weiss replies 
(Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. 1:00 a.m.”). “As a matter of fact, we do,” Bauer says, 
stepping closer to Weiss (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). “Then charge 
him,” Weiss replies. Realizing that his intimidation tactics are not working on the lawyer, 
Bauer asks Weiss to speak with him privately outside of the interrogation room. Once 
they are alone in the hall, Bauer says, “You and I both know that your client isn’t clean, 
and that he conspired to steal a US nuclear warhead” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. 
to 1:00 a.m.”). Weiss replies, “All my client wants is due process” (Season 4, Episode 18, 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Frustrated, Bauer makes one last attempt to make Weiss 
realize the importance of the situation. He says, “Mr. Weiss, these people are not going to 
stop attacking us today until millions, and millions of Americans are dead. Now, I don’t 
want to bypass the constitution, but these are extraordinary circumstances” (Season 2, 
Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Bauer’s argument does not convince Weiss. He 
replies, “The constitution was born out of extraordinary circumstances, Mr. Bauer. This 
plays out by the book, not in a back room with a rubber hose” (Season 4, Episode 18, 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Jack looks at the attorney gravely and says, “I hope you can 
live with that” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”).  
As Bauer opens the secured door to the interrogation room to let Weiss return to 
his client, something occurs to him. He asks the attorney how he managed to get to CTU 
as quickly as he did. When the attorney refuses to answer Bauer’s question, Bauer turns 
to Manning and asks him whether or not Prado had time to make a phone call to the 
attorney. Manning says that Prado did not and Bauer takes Manning outside of the 
interrogation room to talk privately. Once they are in the hallway Bill Buchanan joins 
them. Bauer tells Manning and Buchanan his suspicions that Habib Marwan, Prado’s 
accomplice and terrorist behind the day’s attacks, is the one who has called Prado’s 
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attorney. “Marwan called Amnesty Global,” Bauer says. “This is his play” (Season 4, 
Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). “That means Prado definitely knows something 
Marwan doesn’t want us to hear,” Buchanan agrees. “We still can’t get around that court 
order” (Season 4, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). At this Buchanan and Bauer 
decide to call the President. 
A new scene opens with Buchanan and Bauer on the phone with Vice President 
Logan. Logan has recently been instated as acting President because a U.S. fighter plane 
that had been hijacked by Marwan’s operatives earlier in the day has shot down Air Force 
One, critically injuring the President. Logan has struggled with his new Presidential role. 
Throughout his brief rein as President, viewers have witnessed Logan but matters of 
public opinion and his own personal safety over concerns with the wellbeing of the 
country. On the phone with Bauer and Buchanan, Logan seems desperate to end the day’s 
crisis (fearing dips in public opinion) and is eager to hear that CTU has found new leads. 
Logan asks, “Yes, Bill? What do you have for me?” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. 
to 1:00 a.m.”). “Sir, in the process of trying to track down this missing warhead we 
brought in a prime suspect for questioning,” Buchanan responds (Season 2, Episode 18 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.). This pleases Logan. He asks, “What have you 
learned?”(Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Buchanan responds, “Well, 
that’s the problem, sir. Right now, our hands are tied. Amnesty Global has interceded on 
his behalf” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Logan is concerned by this 
and asks Buchanan why Amnesty Global has interceded. Buchanan tells the President 
that their suspect is a U.S. citizen who has no previous record. When Logan asks why the 
man is a suspect, Buchanan tells him that CTU found Prado speaking with Marwan, but 
that in the ambush Marwan managed to escape. Logan is concerned by Amnesty Global’s 
intervention and says, “I don’t understand. It doesn’t violate any law to question a 
 222
suspect” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). At this, the President’s Chief 
of Staff, Mike Novick, intervenes. He asks Buchanan and Bauer, “Am I correct in 
assuming that this suspect is unlikely to respond to the kind of Q&A his lawyer would 
permit?” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Relieved that Novick has a 
grasp on the situation, Bauer interjects, “That’s correct, Mike. If we want to procure any 
information from this suspect, we’re going to have to do it behind closed doors” (Season 
2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”).  
Logan realizes why Buchanan and Bauer have called. He asks, “You’re talking 
about torturing this man?” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Annoyed 
by this question, but keeping restraint and respect in his voice, Bauer responds, “I’m 
talking about doing what is necessary to stop this warhead from being used against us” 
(Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Logan expresses the need to discuss 
the matter with his advisors and puts Buchanan and Bauer on hold. When asked his 
opinion, Mike Novick confers with Buchanan and Bauer that the President needs to allow 
CTU to do what ever it takes to find Marwan. Logan’s other advisor, Walt Cummings, 
expresses reservations regarding the use of torture. He says, “Should this man be 
innocent as he claims he is, your first act as President is to sanction his torture. That’ll 
forever haunt your Presidency” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 to 1:00 a.m.”). Logan, ever 
concerned with his political image, takes this advice very seriously. He decides to 
postpone making a decision about Prado. Returning to his conversation with Buchanan 
and Bauer, he says, “All right, gentleman. Here’s what I’ll agree to. I’ll call a special 
session with members of the Justice Department and we’ll discuss this. I’ll have an 
answer for you in twenty minutes” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). 
Frustrated by this, Bauer interjects, “Mr. President, this thing could be over in twenty 
minutes” (Season 2, Episode 18, “12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Logan stands his ground, and 
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Bauer pleads, “With all due respect, sir, please let us do our jobs” (Season 2, Episode 18, 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.”). Logan refuses to discuss the matter further and tells Bauer he 
will get back to CTU as soon as he can. It is this interaction with President Logan that 
prompts Buchanan and Bauer to devise their scheme that would allow Bauer, as a citizen, 
to interrogate Prado illegally away from CTU property. And, as the above analysis 
shows, Buchanan and Bauer’s instincts about Prado’s guilt prove correct. Under duress 
Prado gives Bauer Marwan’s location. 
The show’s plotline does not return to President Logan and the White House until 
the following episode. In an interesting series of scenes, politics and concerns for public 
opinion impede the prevention of national security threats. As viewers watch the 
following encounter between President Logan and his Chief of Staff, Mike Novick, they 
do so with the knowledge that Jack Bauer has already procured Marwan’s location from 
Prado through violent means. As the scene opens, Logan is making his case to Novick. 
He says, “Authorizing the torture of a foreign national’s one thing, but torturing a U.S. 
citizen… I can’t…” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). As the President 
struggles with his decision, Novick interjects, “Sir, this man, Prado, has information on 
the whereabouts of a nuclear warhead” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). 
When the President insists that they do not know extent of Prado’s involvement with the 
terrorists, Mike responds, “No, sir, we don’t because you’re not letting CTU do what they 
need to do” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Logan insists that he wants 
to wait until he hears back from the Attorney General. Novick pleads with Logan “Mr. 
President, we are running out of time,” he says (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 
a.m.”). The pressure placed on his decision visibly flusters Logan. He looks to Walt 
Cummings, the advisor who originally objected to the use of torture and asks him again 
for his opinion. Cummings responds, “I think you need to make a decision, sir, and 
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sooner rather than later” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). At that 
moment, Novick’s secretary enters and tells him that Buchanan is on the phone for him. 
Thanking the woman, Novick asks, “What should I tell him? Mr. President…” (Season 4, 
Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “Stop pressing me for an answer I’m not ready to 
give! I need more time,” Logan snaps (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). 
Novick leaves the room and takes the call from Buchanan. 
On the phone with Buchanan, Novick is apologetic that the President has not yet 
made his decision. Buchanan informs Novick that the President’s decision is no longer 
necessary; Prado has given up Marwan’s location. Novick is surprised by this and asks, 
“You mean Bauer physically coerced him? Tell me what happened, chapter and verse” 
(Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Buchanan understands Novick’s desire 
for the details, expresses that it would be better politically for Novick to remain ignorant 
of Bauer’s actions. Buchanan says, “Mike, Bauer got the information we needed. I think 
it’s best if I insolate you from the details” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 
a.m.”). Although earlier Novick had agreed with Bauer and Buchanan regarding the need 
to use force to get information from Prado, he now expresses concern that CTU has acted 
against the President’s decision. “The President gave explicit orders,” Novick says. You 
should have restrained Bauer” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). 
Buchanan understands Novick’s concern but insists, “With all due respect, restraint is a 
luxury we can’t afford right now” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). 
Frustrated, Novick asks Buchanan what he is supposed to tell the President. Buchanan 
has already thought of an answer. He says, “Convince him to sign off on the extreme 
interrogation, and we’ll cheat the timeline in the official record” (Season 4, Episode 19, 
“1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Novick refuses to deceive the President, and Buchanan 
questions Novick’s judgment, asking, “Even though we both know Bauer was right? 
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Mike, someone out there has one of our nuclear warheads. May I speak off the record?” 
(Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Novick encourages Buchanan to speak 
his mind, and Buchanan expresses that he worries about the President. He says, “I’m 
concerned about his ability to lead us through this crisis” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 
a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Novick, looking as though Buchanan’s concerns have crossed his 
own mind, says, “I understand” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). This 
scene reinforces the notion that the American people strong, decisive leadership in order 
to survive national crisis. It also suggests that considerations of political gain or human 
rights can endanger American lives.  
This tension between politics that is driven by public opinion and national 
security driven by the need for information is reinforced in the following scene. As 
Novick heads to speak to the President, a new scene opens at CTU. Buchanan leaves his 
office to give orders to the tactical team responsible for apprehending Marwan. The team 
is lead by Jack Bauer who is back on CTU’s payroll. As he heads toward Bauer and his 
team, Buchanan is stopped by Audrey Reines. Reines, who had been kidnapped by 
Marwan’s operatives with her father, Defense Secretary Heller, earlier that morning, has 
remained at CTU to help its agents avert the day’s crisis. Reines, who is used to working 
in the White House is incensed by CTU’s handling of Prado’s interrogation. She asks, 
“Bill. How could you let Jack torture Prado?” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 
a.m.”). Buchanan tells Reines that Bauer did what he had to do to get the information that 
CTU needed to find Marwan, their only lead. Reines is not convinced by this and, as an 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense, she is concerned about the political and legal 
ramifications of Bauer’s actions. She insists, “The President made it very clear that he 
didn’t want Prado’s rights violated” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). 
Buchanan is frustrated by Reines’ assertions. He replies, “That’s right, he did make it 
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clear, and he was wrong.” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “We can’t 
just break protocol because we think it’s right at the time, and expect to get away with it,” 
Reines insists (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “Normally, I’d agree with 
you,” Buchanan explains. “But, in this case I’d rather ask for forgiveness than 
permission” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Surprised and angered by 
Buchanan’s response, Reines asks him, “What kind of answer is that?” (Season 4, 
Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “The answer is it worked,” Buchanan says simply. 
“We got Marwan’s location. Audrey, with all due respect, this is not Washington D.C. 
Policy and politics do not always work on the front line, which is where we are today” 
(Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Reines seems offended by this. She 
says, “Yes, well, Charles Logan is a politician, and he is not going give you forgiveness. I 
hope this does not come back to haunt you or Jack” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 
2:00 a.m.”). Buchanan determines that the political and legal risks that he and Bauer have 
taken are worth capturing the terrorist. He says, “If what we did gets us to Marwan, we’ll 
live with it” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). He then leaves Reines to 
tend to his tactical team. 
Although Reines’ reminder of the seriousness of the political and legal 
consequences of his actions frustrates Buchanan, her warnings to him are valid. In fact, 
when Logan hears of Bauer’s actions, he orders Secret Service to arrest Bauer 
immediately. Bauer is heading a tactical team and is moments from apprehending CTU’s 
prime suspect, Habib Marwan. When Secret Service moves in to apprehend Buaer on the 
President’s orders, they blow Bauer’s cover and Marwan escapes. In the following scene, 
Buchanan explains to Logan and Novick why CTU was unable to apprehend the terrorist. 
As the scene opens, Logan can barely control his anger. He asks Buchanan, “How 
did Marwan get past your men?” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 to 2:00 a.m.”). “They had 
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to move in before they were ready,” Buchanan explains, struggling to control his own 
anger (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). When Logan asks Buchanan why 
the team moved so soon, Buchanan explains, “Secret Service showed up to take Bauer 
into custody, which compromised one of our positions” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 
a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Logan is surprised and upset by this because he knows that his 
actions have caused CTU to lose Marwan. He says, “I didn’t mean…That’s not what I 
meant to have happen” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). “With respect, 
sir,” Buchanan responds. “Your orders were explicit” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. 
to 2:00 a.m.”). In an attempt to break the tension between Logan and Buchanan, Novick 
interjects by asking Buchanan, “What other search protocols are you running?” (Season 
4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Buchanan tells Novick and the President that 
Marwan’s location at the club was their only lead. Upon learning this, Novick puts 
Buchanan on hold to speak privately to the President. “This is not my fault,” Logan says 
defensively. “None of this would have happened if Jack Bauer hadn’t disobeyed my 
orders in the first place” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). Novick replies,  
I’m sorry, sir, but if you’re asking me to agree with that assessment, I can’t. If it 
wasn’t for Jack, we wouldn’t have located Marwan. CTU is waiting for us to call 
them back with a directive. What would you like me to tell them, Mr. President? 
(Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”) 
Logan looks distraught, “I have no idea,” he says. “And that’s the problem, isn’t it? It is 
my fault we lost him. This man, Marwan, has a nuclear warhead and I allowed him to 
escape” (Season 4, Episode 19, “1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.”). This is an important scene 
because it shows that consideration of the law and of human rights poses a dangerous 
threat to national security in times of crisis. Because President Logan refused to torture 
Prado, he risked losing Marwan’s trail. Because he decided to punish Jack Bauer for 
breaking the law, he succeeded in allowing Marwan’s escape.  
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Season 6: The Social and Political Ramifications of Detention Facilities in the U.S. 
While tensions concerning the human and civil rights of people in U.S. custody 
appear sporadically in Season 4, theses tensions drive much of the plot in Season 6. And, 
while the torture scenes in this season introduce viewers to the potential emotional and 
physical consequences of torture, similar ramifications of emotional and physical 
wellbeing are also prominent in Season 6’s political scenes. In the following section of 
analysis, I will discuss the political scenes that focus on the consequences of harsher laws 
against terrorism. In particular, these scenes introduce a concern with what these laws 
might mean for U.S. citizens. Season 6 begins with a discussion of enemy combatant law 
and U.S. political policy surrounding the detention of civilians. 
As the season begins, the audience learns that cities around the United States have 
been plagued by suicide bombings. The following scene opens in the White House, 
Karen Hayes, the U.S. national security advisor, is having an argument with Tom 
Lennox, the President’s Chief of Staff, in the Oval office over a new security policy. 
“These places that you keep building, they’re nothing more than concentration camps,” 
Hayes says (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). “Detention facilities,” says 
Lennox, correcting her. “And, the criteria for determining who should be detained are 
very reasonable” (Season 6 Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). “Reasonable?” Hayes 
asks. “This revised plan of yours justifies locking up every American who prays towards 
Mecca” (Season 6, Episode 1, “”6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.). Lennox rolls his eyes and 
accuses Hayes of exaggerating the facts. She continues, “Right now, the American 
Muslim community is our greatest asset. They have provided law enforcement with 
hundreds of tips and not a single member of that community has been implicated in these 
attacks” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). 
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Lennox is not convinced by Hayes’s argument. “So far,” He says and turns to the 
President, whose identity is not yet known to viewers. “Mr. President, the people are 
losing faith in our ability to protect them. We’ve got to do something about this now” 
(Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). Hayes moves toward the President’s 
desk along with Lennox and says, “And locking up more Muslims will not make them 
safer” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). Lennox looks at Hayes a moment 
and then says calmly, “No Karen, but it will make them feel safer” (Season 6, Episode 1, 
“6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). As Hayes begins to make a point about the potential civil 
unrest Lennox’s proposal might induce, Lennox interrupts and says simply, “Security has 
its price” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). “So does freedom, Tom,” the 
President says and as the camera pans toward the President’s face. The audience learns 
that the new President is Wayne Palmer, former President David Palmer’s brother. 
“Listen,” he continues. “I just don’t see how I can sign off on something like this. I mean 
wasn’t it just three months ago that I took an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution?” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). Lennox defends his 
proposal. He argues that all of the measures it contains are legal and that his legal 
counsel, Blake, confirmed its legality with the Attorney General. “There is a precedent, 
sir, especially in war time,” Blake interjects. “Lincoln suspended habeas corpus, 
Roosevelt signed Executive Orders . . .” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). 
“Yes, Blake, I know this,” Palmer says. “And Roosevelt imprisoned over 200,000 
Japanese Americans in what most historians consider to be a shameful mistake” (Season 
6, Episode 1, “6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). “Well,” Lennox says, “I would ask those 
historians how many of those Japanese Americans were thus prevented from perpetrating 
acts of sabotage in this country. I realize that what I’m proposing has its challenges, but 
we cannot continue to keep our heads buried in the sand” (Season 6, Episode 1, “6:00 
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a.m. to 7:00 a.m.”). As Lennox is speaking, an assistant enters the room and hands Hayes 
a notice. The President and his advisors learn that there has been another suicide attack in 
Los Angeles.  President Palmer must find the terrorist they think to be behind the attacks, 
Omri Al-Assad, and prevent future attacks from happening. Although the depiction of the 
enemy terrorist other in this scene does not differ in tone from the numerous depictions of 
terrorists across 24’s six-season series, this first episode of Season 6 is the first time that 
assumptions regarding the race and religion of the terrorist other are explicitly stated.   
The consequences of Lennox’s proposal become even more apparent when 
Palmer’s sister, Sandra, is arrested under enemy combatant provisions in the law. Sandra 
Palmer is a lawyer whose client, Islamic American Alliance, is being investigated by the 
FBI. Palmer and the Alliance’s President, Wallid, are arrested when Sandra refuses to 
turn over the Alliance’s personnel files to the FBI. Wayne Palmer learns that his sister 
has been arrested and taken to a temporary detention facility outside of Los Angeles. He 
calls her at the facility when she arrives. “What were you thinking deleting those files?” 
President Palmer asks angrily (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 to 9:00 a.m.”). “I was standing 
up to an unlawful seizure,” she replies (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 to 9:00 a.m.”). “You 
making a point is the last thing I need today,” Wayne Palmer says. “Now, I’ve ordered 
your release. Agents are waiting outside with instructions to take you back home” 
(Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). Sandra Palmer with her brother for 
intervening on her behalf. She says, “I don’t want to be released, Wayne. I want to fight 
this. Bring attention to the civil liberties that your administration has allowed to be 
violated” (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). The President is equally 
annoyed with his sister’s stubborn behavior. He asks, “Do you have any idea what’s 
going on today?” (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). “Of course I do,” 
Sandra replies. “Innocent people are dying all over the country and you chose now to 
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make a civil rights case out of this,” Wayne says sternly. Sandra Palmer insists that since 
she is the one who deleted the files, her client should be released, not her. Palmer refuses 
to consider this and tells his sister to go home, explaining that he does not have the time 
to discuss the matter any further. 
When Sandra Palmer hangs up the phone, she approaches the FBI agent who 
brought her to the facility and demands to speak with her client. The agent refuses and 
Palmer insists, saying, “I’m his attorney. You have to give me access to him” (Season 6, 
Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). The agent reminds Palmer that he is following 
Presidential orders and tells her that he cannot let her have access to her client. “Wallid 
has rights,” Palmer insists (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). “Limited 
rights, Miss Palmer,” the agent says. “He’s being held under the revised enemy 
combatant statute” (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). Sandra Palmer is 
furious at this. She says, “Applying the statute to somebody like him is ridiculous. Is the 
law just being completely thrown out of the window?” (Season 6, Episode 3, “8:00 a.m. 
to 9:00 a.m.”). The agent refuses to engage the conversation any further. He says, “When 
you’re through with the lectures, I have orders to drive you home” (Season 6, Episode 3, 
“8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.”). This series of scenes shows the consequences of national 
security law that fails to account for human rights or civil liberties. Because viewers 
know that Sandra Palmer and her client are innocent and they are asked to consider the 
consequences of such laws for innocent people caught within them. However, with the 
constant threat of violence and an increasing insecurity about enemies look like and how 
CTU will ever be able to stop them, the notion that innocent people often have to pay a 
price for their freedoms in ultimately reinforced. 
 232
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have examined the ways in which temporal pressure and 
perceived threats to national security motivate the use of torture in the television series 
24. In particular, I have considered the ways in which constant tick of the 24 clock and 
appeals to national identity encourage audiences to accept violent measures taken against 
terrorist enemy others. I have argued that scenes in 24 can be divided into two distinct 
categories: torture scenes and political scenes. I have provided an analysis of these texts 
and explored the ways in which violence is explained and justified in terms of dominant 
understandings of national identity and violence. In particular, I argued that the action 
and discourse in 24 is dependent upon the same “ticking bomb” rhetoric that has been put 
forward by members of the U.S. mainstream media as a possible justification for the 
violent actions at Abu Ghraib. This construction of the necessity of torture in terms of 
ticking bomb rhetoric, both in 24 and in real life, I have shown, serves to normalize 
torturous violence while simultaneously allowing it proponents to maintain a sense of 
themselves as democratic, patriotic citizens within an idealized American national 
community.  
Importantly, analysis of 24 reveals how this popular culture text simultaneously 
responds to and cultivates American public opinions regarding torture as a means for 
fighting a War on Terror. While analysis in previous chapters of this project have 
revealed the ways in which the initial shock induced by the Abu Ghraib photographs was 
contained and managed through the political and mediated discourses that framed them, 
analysis in this chapter has shown how torture has become normalized in American 
national consciousness. In the same ways that the political and mediated discourses 
surrounding Abu Ghraib distanced the American people from the atrocities of torture 24 
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embraces torturous violence and encourages viewing audiences to identify with the 
characters who use it in the name of American national security. 
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Conclusion: The Banality of Torture 
[I]f we lived in a country that allowed the government to hold people in jail 
indefinitely based on what they write or think, or based on mere suspicion that 
they are up to no good, then the government would no doubt discover and arrest 
more terrorists. But that probably would not be a country in which we would want 
to live. That would not be a country for which we could, in good conscience, ask 
our young people to fight and die. In short, that would not be America. 
(Feingold)34 
We have no higher responsibility than stopping terrorist attacks. And this is no 
time for Congress to abandon practices that have a proven track record of keeping 
America safe. (Bush, “President’s Radio Address: March 8, 2008” par. 9) 
On March 9, 1954 during a historic broadcast of See It Now, esteemed reporter 
Edward R. Murrow voiced criticism against Senator Joseph McCarthy and his anti-
communist campaign. Set in a social climate of suspicion and persecution, Murrow’s 
report was a much-calculated political risk. As the broadcast came to a close, Murrow 
proclaimed that the American people “must not confuse dissent with disloyalty” (“A 
Report”). For Murrow, the American spirit was one that refused the repression of fear and 
embraced the freedom to speak on behalf of injustice.  
It is in this sense that this dissertation is a product of true and unwavering 
patriotism. I did not undertake this project solely to condemn U.S. political leaders and 
the American national press; rather the motivation for my work is based on the belief that 
rhetorical scholars can give voice to those suffering in silence by shedding light on the 
violent practices that hide in the shadows of our democratic ideals. Language plays a 
crucial role in making torture possible. Language not only defines our enemies and 
determines how we can treat those enemies under the law, but it also helps us reconcile 
                                                 
34 Senator Russ Feingold was the only U.S. Senator to vote against the Patriot Act in 2001. 
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our democratic beliefs with the violence that protects them and forgive ourselves when 
torture doesn’t go away. 
Why did the revelation of the Abu Ghraib torture photographs fail to galvanize 
widespread public protest, if not against the war, then against the image of “our side,” the 
side of democratic ideals, hurting and humiliating detainees? To be sure, the release of 
the photographs generated significant national conversation in the mass media, on the 
Internet, inside activist groups, and among friends. However, American citizens’ shock 
and alarm failed to translate into public contestation calling the war into question on a 
significant scale.  
How do we make sense of this relative quiescence? On the one hand, there is 
always a lag between knowing and doing, and one could argue that war policy is 
responding to the fallout from Abu Ghraib. Further, one could argue that, without a 
strong social movement in place, citizens lack the rhetorical resources to interpret the 
images of torture in oppositional terms or use them to motivate people to take more 
public action out of their personal outrage. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal occurred as 
part of a war in response to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. These attacks produced both 
fear and anger—of and at Muslims and Middle-Easterners, among others—in the 
American public and warranted U.S. military action against Afghanistan and then Iraq.  
Thus, in a public primed to accept extreme measures, dominant media and 
political frames were able to contain the shock of the Abu Ghraib photographs in a series 
of significant rhetorical strategies. In the wake of public upset, political insiders, national 
news media, and popular culture distanced the public and the administration from the 
reality of the torture, appealed to necessity of extreme measures, and naturalized torture 
as an acceptable, even heroic, aspect of U.S. foreign policy. In these three ways, the 
rhetorical discourses surrounding the Abu Ghraib crisis worked to neutralize public shock 
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and anger. Of course, this process of neutralization was and is never total or complete. 
Pockets of social movement activity and artistic expression picked up the Abu Ghraib 
images in critical ways, and even the mass media circulated meaning frames that 
acknowledged critical points of view. On the whole, however, the news of this series of 
case studies is that political rhetoric, news media, and popular culture texts offered 
audiences a rationale for torture and reassured us that our democracy was sound. 
The Abu Ghraib photographs were incredibly shocking. Like many Americans, I 
was provoked to wonder how a country fighting a war to defend its democratic ideals and 
a freedom-loving people could have allowed such acts to take place. Many citizens also 
wondered when and whether violent interrogation techniques are ever necessary to stop 
terrorist attacks. Certainly, the photographs spurred numbers of citizens to question the 
war itself and to ask whether, in this case, the U.S. was on the side of right. If we torture 
our captives, what does that say about the United States as a nation?  
In response to such possibly profound cracks in the national self-image, 
mainstream political and popular rhetorics went to work. First, political rhetoric validated 
feelings of shock as both the Bush and Kerry campaigns expressed surprise and horror at 
the actions captured on film. The media, too, reinforced feelings of surprise and disgust 
in news reports and editorial commentary. A reflection of public shock is also found in 
the television series 24. Even while revealing the violence of torture to viewers, the 
show’s characters attempt to keep the violent actions undertaken by Bauer and other CTU 
agents out of the public spotlight. This secrecy is justified on the grounds that public 
exposure to violence could instigate public panic. On this rationale, viewers might accept 
the fact that some things are better kept secret, ironically, to protect democracy. 
The initial shock over the torturous actions captured in the Abu Ghraib 
photographs was further managed through rhetorical strategies that distanced the 
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American public from violence. The presence of violent agents within many of the 
photographic images allowed political and media leaders to blame a few select 
individuals for torture. President Bush, followed by Senator Kerry, rhetorically 
maintained the integrity of the American spirit by laying blame against “those few who 
did not represent America.” America’s mission in Iraq also remained in tact as American 
political leaders painted a picture of a rogue few working outside the confines of the law. 
The American press was more divided on the subject with many reports questioning the 
Bush administration’s role in the Abu Ghraib violence. However, many more reports 
followed the example set by the Bush administration, calling the violence at Abu Ghraib 
the work of a few bad apples and insisting that those few did not spoil the bunch. 24 
differs from the other rhetorical discourses examined in this dissertation in that viewing 
audiences are encouraged to identify with Jack Bauer as both a patriot and torturer. 
Through the urgency instilled by the constantly ticking clock, the program makes an 
argument for the necessity of torture and encourages identification with Bauer as the hero 
who will do whatever it takes to protect Americans. Audiences are encouraged to 
understand Bauer’s actions as a necessary evil. When torture becomes necessary, its 
practice is naturalized, rendered as common sense rather than as something shocking and 
exceptional.  
Necessity and naturalization also became important strategies within the 
rhetorical management of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The language of the so-called 
torture memos is based on notions of necessity, secrecy, and the U.S. government’s 
prerogative for violence. Analysis showed that these dominant ideological assumptions 
ultimately shaped the ways in which both the Bush campaign and the Kerry campaign 
would address the incidents at Abu Ghraib publicly during in their 2004 campaigns. U.S. 
participation in torture did not become a major political issue in 2004. Torture’s absence 
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from either candidate’s political agenda illustrates how the persuasive success of Bush’s 
War on Terror rhetoric helped explain the Abu Ghraib photographs in terms of national 
identity and necessity. Although the U.S. media did provide some counterframes for the 
Abu Ghraib scandal, these frames were undermined when critical journalists became 
trapped in debates regarding what constituted torture and when torture could be 
considered acceptable. In other words, the media’s agenda shifted from investigating the 
accountability of the Bush Administration for war crimes to debating whether torture is 
necessary, under what circumstances, and with what limitations. 
In arguing that the rhetorical discourse surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal worked to manage shock, foster distance, and ultimately naturalize national 
violence in terms of necessity, I am not arguing that visual depictions of violence 
inherently promote this type of reaction. Indeed there are some cases in our nation’s 
history in which the exposure of violent imagery has fostered political protest and 
movements for change. In 1955, by insisting on an open-casket funeral and inviting her 
local community and the national press to witness the grotesque murder and mutilation of 
her fourteen-year-old son, Mamie Till successfully tapped into the American national 
consciousness and helped spur the early Civil Rights movement. Photographic images of 
Emmett Till’s disfigured face and body ran in numerous news sources and fueled public 
outcry against violent lynch mobs in the American South (Harold and DeLuca). 
Similarly, photographic images that emerged out of the Vietnam War, specifically those 
images that captured victims of violent warfare, are often credited with turning the 
American public against the Vietnam War. Of particular significance is the 1972 
photograph dubbed “Accidental Napalm.” This photograph, which features a young girl 
running naked toward the camera’s lens as she flees from the Napalm attack on her 
village won war photographer, Hung Cong Ut, a Pulitzer Prize and has since become an 
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iconic symbol of the American public’s weakening support for the efforts in Vietnam 
(Hariman and Lucaites “Accidental Napalm”).  
What the case studies in this dissertation show is that the power of revelatory 
images that could, under some circumstances, indict a nation and its leaders, is mitigated 
by context and by rhetorical management of their meaning. We are now coming out of 
the period of unquestioning public support for the war in Iraq; however, much of what 
goes on there remains beyond the veil of American nationalist ideology. As the United 
States continues to torture its so-called enemies in a shroud of secrecy, public concern for 
the prevention of torturous violence continues to wane.  
In fact, torture has not only become a non-issue for many Americans, but in some 
respects, torture seems to have become an increasingly popular and acceptable form of 
entertainment. Although the recent Writer’s Guild of America strike forced Fox to 
postpone the premier of its newest season of 24 until February 2009, there is considerable 
buzz about the show’s new plotline. Just one week after Bush vetoed the Intelligence Bill, 
which would have prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency’s use of waterboarding and 
other “harsh interrogation techniques,” NPR ran a feature story on Jack Bauer, 24’s 
protagonist. NPR’s Pam Fessler began this report on Bauer with a question. She asked, 
“What is it about Jack Bauer that’s so appealing? He’s always yelling or torturing people, 
including his own brother who, admittedly, was a bad guy.” (par. 1). Fessler gave a 
cheerful and resolute answer to her question over the recorded screams of Bauer’s brother 
being tortured. “People say they admire Jack Bauer because of one thing,” Fessler said. 
“He’s committed to saving the United States from attack” (par. 2). During the course of 
Fessler’s brief feature on Bauer she interviewed a wide array of 24 fans—ranging from 
Stephanie Romanski, a woman who runs a 24 fansite out of her Nebraska home to U.S. 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to Barry Steinhardt, a top official with the 
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ACLU—who all praised Bauer as a post-9/11 superhero and insisted that Bauer’s 
fictional world was just escapist entertainment, just a T.V. show.  
However, while this wide assortment of fans insisted that Bauer’s character was 
merely fictional, each fan simultaneously admitted to identifying with Bauer and wishing 
for such a hero in reality. Barry Steinhardt argued that although in real life a person like 
Bauer would not get away with such gross violations of human rights, watching Bauer in 
action gave him nostalgic pleasure, reminding him of cowboy movies of his youth (“Jack 
Bauer” par. 19-20).  Secretary Chertoff admired Bauer’s willingness to make “the least 
bad choice” and take responsibility for it, claiming that Bauer provided a “great 
aspiration” for the American people (“Jack Bauer” par. 16). When asked if she believed if 
there was a real life agent like Bauer working for the U.S. government, Stephanie 
Romanski said simply, “I want to believe that” (“Jack Bauer” par. 34). In a moment 
reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s observation of the “banality of evil” (Arendt), another 
NPR correspondent joked at the end of the segment: “You can tell us which characters 
helped to shape your life, or maybe threatened to pull out your finger nails if you didn’t 
change your behavior” (“Jack Bauer” par. 38). 
Four years after the Abu Ghraib scandal horrified Americans and threatened their 
self-sense of belonging to an idealized American national community based in 
democratic values, it seems reasonable, even funny, to identify with fictionalized 
torturers. Recognizing this identification, one cannot help but wonder how it came to be. 
Rhetoric must be part of any answer to this question. In this project I have argued 
that an understanding of the ways in which Abu Ghraib came to be known to the 
American public can provide insight into the rhetorical and ideological function of 
national violence against a foreign other. The photographs were a shock to the national 
psyche, but subsequent discourses, including Presidential rhetoric, news media frames, 
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and popular entertainment, neutralized the shock by asking the American public to 
understand torture as a) the private prerogative of the state and its forces; b) an ugly but 
necessary reality in situations of imminent threat; c) used only against hardened terrorists; 
and d) when misused, the actions of a few undisciplined individuals. Fans of 24  “want to 
believe” in the heroism of the private torturer defending the people of a public 
democracy. However, as this project has shown, political and popular discourse contained 
the meaning of the real acts of torture at Abu Ghraib in ways that threaten democratic 
deliberation. Images of the enemy as barbaric and inhuman and the cultivation of the fear 
of terrorist threat increase the American public’s comfort with torture. Most alarmingly, 
the discourses under examination here warrant a kind of shadow government with the 
license to do unspeakable things in secret.  
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, U.S. 
political leaders, along with the American national press, have shaped public perceptions 
of the violent actions of America’s War on Terror through language and imagery that 
frames and reinforces idealized appeals to American national identity. And as Senator 
Russ Feingold, the only U.S. Senator to vote against the U.S. Patriot Act, pointed out in 
October of 2001, these appeals, in turn, have helped create a militarized U.S. nation-state 
whose policies are detrimental to the very freedoms upon which the ideal America rests 
(Feingold). What my research for this project has made clear is that violence and national 
identity are symbiotically related. When our forces deploy violence to protect our 
conceptions of “us” by controlling a dangerous “them,” violence becomes constitutive of 
national identity. National identity, in turn, protects the sanctity of violence enacted in 
our name. “Why do they hate us?” George Bush asked after the 2001 attacks. “They hate 
us for our way of life,” he answered (Bush “Address by the President”). Ironically, 
protecting “our way of life” sometimes violates its most cherished principles. 
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The management of this contradiction is of keen and increasing importance to 
rhetorical scholars. Recognizing the rhetorical strategies that selectively sanction violent 
actions helps us to understand how violence becomes a legitimate site for the circulation 
of meaning about nation, identity, violence, and war. Addressing the power dynamic 
inherent in these rhetorical strategies allows us to begin to understand the ways in which 
violence and appeals to national identity work together. It is only by addressing this 
relationship between violence and national identity that rhetorical scholars and advocates 
for social change can ever truly understand the persuasive power of the nation and 










“8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.” 24 Season Two. Fox Television Network. 29 October 2002.  
“4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.” 24 Season Two. Fox Television Network. 14 January 2003. 
“5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.” 24 Season Two. Fox Television Network. 21 January 2003. 
“6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.” 24 Season Two. Fox Television Network. 4 February 2003. 
“7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.” 24 Season Two. Fox Television Network. 11 February 2003. 
“7:00 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.” 24 Season Three. Fox Television Network. 20 April 2004. 
“9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.” 24 Season Four. Fox Television Network. 10 January 2005. 
“12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.” 24 Season Four. Fox Television Network. 24 January 2005. 
“12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.” 24 Season Four. Fox Television Network. 18 April 2005. 
“1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.” 24 Season Four. Fox Television Network. 25 April 2005. 
“6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.” 24 Season Six. Fox Television Network. 14 January 2007. 
“7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.” 24 Season Six. Fox Television Network. 14 January 2007. 
“8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.” 24 Season Six. Fox Television Network. 15 January 2007. 
“1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.” 24 Season Six. Fox Television Network. 30 April 2007. 
“‘24’ Premiere Postponed as FOX Responds to Writers’ Strike.” Buddytv.com. 2007. 26 
Feb. 2008 < http://www.buddytv.com/articles/24/24-premiere-postponed-as-fox-
r-13484.aspx>. 
“Abu Ghraib Report: Top Brass Blamed for Abuse.” Narr. Charles Gibson. World News 
Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 25 August 2004. Transcript. 
“Abuse: Outrage on the Hill.” Narr. Judy Woodruff. Judy Woodruff’s Inside Politics. 
CNN. 4 May 2004. Transcript.  
“Abuses at Abu Ghraib.” The New York Times 1 May 2004, late ed.: A14. 
“American Soldiers Accused of Abusing Iraqi Prisoners Saying They Were Just 
Following Orders. Narr. Tom Brokaw. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 5 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
 244
“Analysis of Military Response to Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Scandal.” Narr. Greta Van 
Susteren. Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren. Fox. 5 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
“Analysis with Robert Scales.” Narr. Brit Hume. Fox Special Report with Brit Hume. 
Fox. 4 May 2004. Transcript. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. 2nd ed. London: Verso, 1991. 
Apel, Dora. “Torture Culture: Lynching Photographs and the Images of Abu Ghraib.” Art 
Journal 64 (2005): 88-100. 
Applebaum, Anne. “So Is Torture Legal?” The Washington Post 16 June 2004, final ed,: 
A27. 
---. “Willing Torturers.” The Washington Post 5 May 2004, final ed.: A29. 
Arendt, Hanna. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1963. 
“Army Report Confirms Abuses of Iraqi Prisoners in Abu Ghraib Prison.” Narr. Jim 
Miklaszewski. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
Barker, Chris. Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities. Philadelphia, PA: Open 
University Press, 1999.  
Barrett, Ron. “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Abu Ghraib Story Broke When We Saw 
Visual Proof of Torture. Why Not Sooner?” Columbia Journalism Review 43 
(2004): 6. 
Barry, John, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff. “The Roots of Torture.” Newsweek 24 
May 2004: 26. 
Barry, John, Mark Hosenball, and Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Abu Ghraib and Beyond.” 
Newsweek 17 May 2004: 32. 
Bennett, Lance W. “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations.” Journals of 
Communication 40 (1991): 103-125. 
Bennett, Lance W. and Regina G. Lawrence. “News Icons and the Mainstreaming of 
Social Change.” Journal of Communication 45 (1995): 20-39. 
Bennett, Lance W., Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. “None Dare Call it 
Torture: Indexing and the Limits of Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib 
Scandal.” Journal of Communication 56 (2006): 467-485. 
 245
Bennett, Lance W. and Steven Livingston. “A Semi-Independent Press: Government 
Control and Journalistic Autonomy in the Political Construction of News.” 
Political Communication 20 (2003): 359-362. 
“Beyond Those Sick Images.” The Los Angeles Times 4 May 2004: B12. 
Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995.  
Billips, Mike. “Confronting a Scandal’s Debris.” Time 24 May 2004. 
Boxer, Sarah. “Humiliating Photographs as Trophies of War.”  The New York Times 20 
May 2004, final ed.: E3. 
Braiker, Brian. “See No Evil.” Newsweek 13 May 2004. 
---. “‘The War on Terror is not Working.’” Newsweek 26 May 2004. 
Bresheeth, Haim. “Projecting Trauma: War Photography and the Public Sphere.” Third 
Text 20 (2006): 57-71. 
“Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt Discusses the Abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq by 
U.S. Military Personnel.” Narr. Matt Lauer and Katie Couric. Today. NBC. 3 May 
2004. Transcript. 
 “British Troops Clash with al-Sadr Supporters.” Narr. Jamie McIntyre. CNN Live 
Saturday. CNN. 8 May 2004. Transcript. 
Broe, Dennis. “Fox and Its Friends: Global Commodification and the New Cold War.” 
Cinema Journal 43 (2004): 97-102. 
“Broken Olympic Dreams.” Narr. Paula Zahn. Paula Zahn Now. CNN. 24 August 2004. 
Transcript. 
Bronner, Stephen E. and Douglas M. Kellner. Introduction. Critical Theory and Society: 
A Reader. Ed. Stephen E. Bronner and Douglas M. Kellner. New York: 
Routledge, 1989. 1-21. 
Bufacchi, Vittorio and Jean Maria Arrigo. “Torture, Terrorism and the State: A 
Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 
(2006): 355-373. 
Bush, George W. Address by the President of the United States Delivered to a Joint 
Session of Congress and the American People. Washington, D.C. 20 September 
2001. In Vital Speeches of the Day 67 (2001): 760-63. 
 246
---. “Discussion with Jordanian King over Iraq.” The Rose Garden, Washington, D.C. 6 
May 2004. 
---. “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.” Memo to the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Chief of 
Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 7 
February 2002. Memo 11 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. 
Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 134-
135.  
---. Interview with Al-Ahram International. The Map Room, Washington, D.C. 7 May 
2004. 
---. Interview with Al Arabiya. Washington, D.C. 5 May 2004. 
---. Interview with Alhurra Television. The Map Room, Washington, D.C. 5 May 2004.  
---. “Military Order of November 13.” Executive Order. 13 November 2001. Memo 2 of 
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua 
L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 25-28.  
---. “President Bush Reaffirms Commitments in Iraq.” The Pentagon. 10 May 2004.  
---. “President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom.” Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania. 24 May 2004.  
--- “President Remarks at Victory 2004 Reception.” Denver, Colorado. 1 June 2004. 
---. “President Welcomes Prime Minister of Hungary.” The Oval Office. Washington, 
D.C. 22 June 2004. 
---. “President’s Statement on the U.N. International Day in Support of Victims of 
Torture.” 26 June 2004. 
---. “Press Conference Following the G8 Summit.” Savannah, Georgia. 10 June 2004.  
---. “Remarks by the President and the First Lady” Dubuque, Iowa. 7 May 2004. 
---. “Remarks by the President and the First Lady.” Victory Rally, LaCrosse, Wisconsin. 
8 May 2004. 
---. “Remarks by the President at Michigan Rally.” Sterling Heights, Michigan. 3 May 
2004. 
---. “Remarks by the President at Ohio Rally.” Cincinnati, Ohio. 4 May 2004. 
 247
---.”Remarks by the President at the Republican National Committee Gala.” Washington, 
D.C. 5 May 2004. 
---. “Remarks by the President to the American Conservative Union 40th Anniversary 
Gala.” Washington, D.C. 13 May 2004.  
---. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.” The White House, 
Washington, D.C., 11 September 2001. 
---. “Welcome to the Canadian Prime Minister.” The Rose Garden, Washington, D.C. 30 
April 2004. 
Burke, Kenneth . The Philosophy of Literary Form. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1941. 
Bybee, Jay S. “Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.” 
Memo to Alberto R. Gonzales. 1 August 2002. Memo 14 of The Torture Papers: 
The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2005. 172-217. 
“Chain of Command.” Narr. Ted Koppel. Nightline. ABC. 16 June 2004. Transcript. 
Chan, Sewell. “MP to be First Tired for Abuses.”  The Washington Post 10 May 2004, 
final ed.: A19. 
---. “Rage is on Display During Prison Tour.”  The Washington Post 6 May 2004, final 
ed.: A19. 
---. “U.S. Official: Abuse Allegations Are ‘a Big Deal.’” The Washington Post 3 May 
2004, final ed.: A16. 
---. “U.S. to Cut Iraq Prison Population.”  The Washington Post 5 May 2004, final ed.: 
A1. 
“Bush: ‘I have never ordered torture.’” CNN.com 22 June 2004. 18 January 2008 
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/22/rumsfeld.memo/>. 
Chan, Sewell, and Jackie Spinner. “Allegations of Abuse Lead to Shakeup at Iraqi 
Prison.” The Washington Post 30 April 2004, final ed.: A24. 
Chan, Sewell, and Michael Amon. “Prisoner Abuse Prove Widened.”  The Washington 
Post 2 May 2004, final ed.: A1. 
Charland, Maurice. “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the People of Quebecois.” The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 133-150. 
 248
Cheney, Dick. Telephonic Interview with Tony Snow. Fox News. Washington, D.C. 11 
May 2004 
Cherwitz, Richard A., and Kenneth S. Zagacki. “Consummatory Versus Justificatory 
Crisis Rhetoric.” Western Journal of Speech Communication 50 (Fall 1986): 307-
324. 
Clarke, John, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts. “Subcultures, Cultures and 
Class.” Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain. Ed. 
Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson. London: Hutchinson and Company, 1975. 9-74. 
Clift, Eleanor. “Capitol Letter: Where’s Kerry?” Newsweek 7 May 2004. 
Cloud, Dana L. “Therapy, Silence, and War: Consolation and the End of Deliberation in 
the ‘Affected’ Public.” POROI 2 (August 2003): 
<http://inpress.lib.uiowa.edu/poroi/papers/cloud030816.html>. 
---. “‘To Veil the Threat of Terror’: Afghan Women and the <Clash of Civilizations> in 
the Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 
(August 2004): 285-306. 
Cody, Edward. “Artists Express Iraqi’s Anger.”  The Washington Post 9 June 2004, final 
ed.: A14. 
“Commission Finds Major Failures of Command in Abu Ghraib Scandal.” Narr. Susan 
McGinnis. CBS Morning News. CBS. Transcript. 
“Conduct Unbecoming.” Narr. Chris Bury. Nightline. ABC. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Congress, the Pentagon, and White House Negotiate How to Release Additional Photos 
of Abused Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Brian Wilson. Fox Special Report with Brit 
Hume. Fox. 10 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Court Martial in Iraq.” Narr. Dan Rather. 60 Minutes II. CBS. 28 April 2004. Transcript.  
Cover, Robert M. “Violence and the Word.” The Yale Law Journal. 95 (July 1986): 
1601-1629. 
Croucher, Sheila. “Ambivalent Attachments: The Hegemonic Politics of American 
Nationhood.” New Political Science 28 (2006): 181-196. 
Dao, James. “Picture of Pride to Symbol of Abuse.”  The New York Times 7 May 2004, 
final ed.: A1. 
Davenport, Christian, and Michael Amon. “Accused Soldiers a Diverse Group.”  The 
Washington Post 9 May 2004, final ed.: A18. 
 249
Davis, Amanda J. and Dana L. Cloud. “Goliath in David’s Clothing: The Oppressed 
Militant and the Mighty Victim in the Rhetoric of Self-Defense.” Unpublished 
essay, 2007. 
Deans, Bob. “Bush Issues Apology, Stands by Rumsfeld in Abuse Scandal.” Cox News 
Service. 6 May 2004. 
Deluca, Kevin M., and Jennifer Peeples. “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: 
Democracy, Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle.” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 19 (2002): 125-151. 
Dershowitz, Alan M. Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age. Boston: Little 
Brown and Company, 2002. 
---. “Want to Torture? Get a Warrant.” San Francisco Chronicle 22 January 2002. 26 
February 2008 < http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/01/22/ED5329.DTL>. 
Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication.1966. Nationalism Ed. John 
Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
Dewar, Helen. “Lott Defends Treatment of Iraqi Prisoners.” The Washington Post 3 June 
2004, final ed.: A6. 
Dickinson, Greg. “Selling Democracy: Consumer Culture and Citizenship in the Wake of 
September 11.” Southern Communication Journal 70 (2005): 271-284. 
Diehl, Jackson. “How Torture Came Down from the Top.”  The Washington Post 27 
August 2004, final ed.: A21. 
“The Disappeared.” Narr. Chris Bury. Nightline. ABC. 13 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Does CIA Go Too Far Questioning al Qaeda Members?” Narr. Sean Hannity and Alan 
Colmes. Hannity & Colmes. Fox. 13 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Donald Rumsfeld Visits Iraq.” Narr. Dan Rather and Wyatt Andrews. CBS Evening 
News. CBS. 13 May 2004. Transcript. 
Dow, Bonnie J. “The Function of Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential 
Crisis Rhetoric.” Western Journal of Speech Communication 53 (Summer 1989): 
294-310. 
Duke, Lynne. “A Woman Apart: For Fellow Soldiers, Lynndie England’s Role at Abu 
Ghraib is Best Viewed from a Distance.” The Washington Post 19 September 
2004, final ed. 
 250
Edensor, Tim. National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford: Berg, 
2002. 
Edwards, Janis L. and Carol K. Winkler. “Representative Form and the Visual Ideograph: 
The Iwo Jima Image in Editorial Cartoons.” 1997. Readings in Rhetorical 
Criticism. 3rd ed. Ed. Carl R. Burgchardt. State College: Strata Publishing, Inc., 
2005. 487-508. 
Ehrenreich, Barbara. “Feminism’s Assumptions Upended.”  The Lost Angeles Times 16 
May 2004: M1. 
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: An Introduction. London: Verso, 1991. 
Entman, Robert M. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
---. “Punctuating the Homogeneity of Institutionalized News: Abusing Prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib Versus Killing Civilians at Fallujah.” Political Communication 23 (2006): 
215-224. 
Espo, David. “Rumsfeld Apologizes for Abuser of Iraqi Prisoners.” The Associated Press 
State & Local Wire. 7 May 2004.  
Eunjung Cha, Ariana, and Ellen McCarthy. “Prison Scandal Indicates Gap in U.S. Chain 
of Command.” The Washington Post 5 May 2004, final ed.: A20. 
“Evidence High-Ranking US Officials Received Repeated Warnings.” Narr. Tom 
Brokaw and Andrea Mitchell. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 10 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Explosion in East Jerusalem Rocks Palestinian Shop.” Narr. Fredericka Whitfield. CNN 
Live Saturday. CNN. 8 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Failure of Leadership in Iraqi Prison?”  Narr. Tucker Carlson and Paul Begala.  
Crossfire. CNN. 11 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Fallout Around World After Photos Surface.” Narr. Jim Miklaszewski. NBC Nightly 
News. NBC. 30 April 2004. Transcript. 
Federal Bureau of Investigations. “Counterterrorism.” 2001. 15 March 2007 
<http://jackson.fbi.gov/cntrterr.htm>.  
Feingold, Russ. “On Opposing the U.S.A. Patriot Act.” Associated Press Managing 
Editors Conference. Milwaukee Art Museum, Wisconsin. 12 October 2001. 6 
March 2008 <http://www.archipelago.org/vol6-2/feingold.htm>. 
 251
Fisher, Ian. “Ex-Prisoners of G.I.’s Offer More Claims of Mistreatment.”  The New York 
Times 4 May 2004, late ed.: A8. 
---. “Iraqi Tells of U.S. Abuse, From Ridicule to Rape Threat.” The New York Times 14 
May 2004. late ed.: A8. 
 “Former Hostage Hamill Returning Home.” Narr. Kathleen Koch. Live. CNN. 3 May 
2004. Transcript. 
Foster, Robert. “The Commercial Construction of ‘new nations.’” Journal of Material 
Culture 3 (1999): 263-282. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1977. 
Fowler, Roger. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: 
Routledge, 1991. 
Geertz, Clifford. “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in 
the New States.” 1963. Nationalism Ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
Gellner, Ernest. “Nationalism.” 1964. Nationalism Ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony 
Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
“General in Charge of Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq Denies Knowing About Humiliation 
and Torture of Prisoners.” Narr. John Seigenthaler. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 2 
May 2004. Transcript. 
Gibbs, Nancy.  “Their Humiliation, and Ours.” Time 17 May 2004. 
Giddens, Anthony. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, ii: The Nation-
State and Violence. 1985. Nationalism Ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
Gilmore, Gerry J. “More Abu Ghraib Images Could Harm Troops, Official Says.” 
American Forces Press Service 17 July 2007 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14847>. 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic. London: Verso, 1993.  
Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of 
the New Left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003. 
Glanz, James. “Torture is Often a Temptation and Almost Never Works.” The New York 
Times 9 May 2004, final ed.: 5. 
 252
Goldsmith, Jack. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush 
Administration. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. 
Gonzales, Alberto R. “Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners 
of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.” Memo to President 
George W. Bush. 25 January 2002. Memo 7 of The Torture Papers: The Road to 
Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2005. 118-121. 
Gossett, Sherrie. “Bogus GI Rape Photos Used as Arab Propaganda.” WordNetDaily.com 
4 May 2004. 3 November 2007 
<http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38335>. 
---. “Boston Globe Publishes Bogus GI Rape Pictures.” WordNetDaily.com 12 May 2004. 
3 November 2007 
<http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38464>. 
Graham, Bradley. “Army Investigates Wider Iraqi Offenses.” The Washington Post 1 
June 2004, final ed.: A1. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 1929-1935. 2nd ed. Trans. Q. 
Hoare & G. N. Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1999.  
Greenberg, Karen. “From Fear to Torture.” The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2005. xvii-xx. 
Greenberg, Karen, and Joshua L. Dratel, ed. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2005.  
Grindstaff, Davin A. and Kevin M. DeLuca. “The Corpus of Daniel Pearl.” Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 21 (2004): 305-324. 
Grundberg, Andy. “Point and Shoot: How the Abu Ghraib Images Redefine 
Photography.” American Scholar 74 (2005): 105-109. 
“Guests Debate Legality of Gitmo Interrogation Practices.” Narr. Sean Hannity and Alan 
Colmes. Hannity & Colmes. Fox. 1 December 2004. Transcript. 
Halbfinger, David M. “Kerry Urges Bush to Voice U.S. Regret On Iraq Abuse.” The New 
York Times. 6 May 2004. 
Hall, Stuart. “The Whites of Their Eyes: Racist Ideologies and the Media.” Silver 
Linings. Ed. G. Bridges and R. Brunt. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981. 
 253
Hariman, Robert, and John Louis Lucaites. “Dissent and Emotional Management in a 
Liberal-Democratic Society:  The Kent State Iconic Photograph.” Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly 31 (2001): 4-31. 
---. “Performing Civic Identity: The Iconic Photograph of the Flag Raising on Iwo Jima.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 88 (2002): 363-392. 
---. “Public Identity and Collective Memory in U.S. Iconic Photography: The Image of 
‘Accidental Napalm.’” Critical Studies in Media Communication 20 (2003): 35-
66. 
Harold, Christine and Kevin M. DeLuca. “Behold the Corpse: Violent Images and the 
Case of Emmett Till.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8 (2005): 263-286.  
“Harsh Report Released by Defense Department Panel on Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse.” 
Narr. Dan Rather.  CBS Evening News. CBS. 24 August 2004. Transcript. 
Hasain, Marouf Jr. In the Name of Necessity: Military Tribunals and the Loss of 
American Civil Liberties. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005. 
Hauser, Gerard. “Aristotle on Epideictic:  The Formation of Public Morality.” Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly 29 (1999): 5-23.  
Haynes, William J., II. “Counter-Resistance Techniques.” Memo to Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld. 27 November 2002. Memo 21 of The Torture Papers: The 
Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2005. 237. 
Hendren, John, and Patrick J. McDonnell. “Abuse Investigation Includes 25 Deaths.”  
The Los Angeles Times 5 May 2004: A1. 
Hersh, Seymour M. “The Gray Zone.” The New Yorker. 24 May 2004: 38-44. 
---. “Torture at Abu Ghraib.” The New Yorker. 10 May 2004: 42. 
Hesford, Wendy S., “Staging Terror.” The Drama Review 50 (2006): 29-41. 
Higham, Scott, and Joe Stephens. “Punishment and Amusement.” The Washington Post 
22 May 2004, final ed.: A1. 
Higham, Scott, Joe Stephens, and Josh White. “Dates on Prison Photos Show Two Phases 
of Abuse.”  The Washington Post 1 June 2004, final ed.: A1. 
Hirsh, Michael. “New Torture Furor.” Newsweek 8 June 2004. 
 254
Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1990. 
hooks, bell. Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics. Boston: South End Press, 
1990. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 1969. Trans. 
John Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1991. 
“How Widespread? Prison Abuse.” Narr. Peter Jennings. World News Tonight with Peter 
Jennings. ABC. 7 May 2004. Transcript. 
Hulse, Carl, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. “Lawmakers View Images from Iraq.” The New 
York Times 13 May 2004, late ed.: A1. 
“Human Smugglings Generate Billions.” Narr. Fredricka Whitfield. CNN in the Money. 
CNN. 27 June 2004. Transcript. 
Ignatius, David. “The Other Americans: Outside Abu Ghraib Some People are Trying to 
Help.”  The Washington Post 7 May 2004, final ed.: A33. 
“Images of Abuse Rock U.S. Military.” Narr. Wolf Blitzer. Wolf Blitzer Reports. CNN 3 
May 2004. Transcript. 
“Inside Abu Ghraib: One Prisoner’s Story.” Narr. Peter Jennings and Bill Redeker. World 
News Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Internal Army Report Details Mistreatment of Prisoners at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib Prison.” 
Narr. Hoda Kotb. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 1 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, Attorney Neal Puckett.” Narr. Greta Van 
Susteren.  On the Record with Greta Van Susteren. Fox. 4 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt” Narr. Greta Van Susteren. Fox on the Record 
with Greta Van Susteren. Fox. 3 May 2004. 
“Interview with Comedian Bill Maher.” Narr. Larry King. Larry King Live. CNN. 2 June 
2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Former Army Interrogator Mike Ritz.” Narr. Dana Bash. CNN Saturday 
Night. CNN. 8 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Former Presidential Adviser David Gergen.” Narr. Greta Van Susteren. 
Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren. Fox. 6 May 2004. Transcript. 
 255
“Interview with Frank Gaffney, Mark Brzezinksi.” Narr. Uma Pemmaraju and Catherine 
Herrige. Big Story Weekend Edition. Fox. 15 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Louis Cantori.” Narr. John Gibson, Kelly Wright, and James Rosen. The 
Big Story with John Gibson. Fox. 30 April 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview Senator John McCain.” Narr. George Stephanopoulos. This Week with George 
Stephanopoulos. ABC. 2 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Interview with Seymour Hersh.” Narr. George Stephanopoulos. This Week With George 
Stephanopoulous. ABC. 9 May 2004. Trancript. 
“Interview with Seymour Hersh.” Narr. Wolf Blitzer. Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. 
CNN. 2 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Iraq: The Pictures Seen ‘Round the World.” The Hotline. 3 May 2004.  
“Iraqi Prison Abuse Scandal: Interview with Major General Geoffrey Miller.” Narr. 
Charles Gibson.  Good Morning America. ABC. 20 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Iraq Prison Staff Seen as Issue.” The Los Angeles Times 30 April 2004: A7. 
“Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Widespread.” Narr. Betty Nguyen. CNN Live Sunday. CNN. 2 May 
2004. Transcript.  
“Is Mainstream Media Focusing on Abuse Scandal Over Terrorism?” Narr. Sean Hannity 
and Alan Colmes. Hannity and Colmes. Fox. 14 May 2004. Transcript. 
Ivie, Robert L. Democracy and America’s War on Terror. Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 2005. 
“Jack Bauer: Quiet, Ruthless Defender of America.” Narr. Pam Fessler. Morning Edition. 
Natl. Public Radio. 17 March 2008 < 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88382495>. 
Jeffreys, Sheila. “Double Jeopardy: Women, the US Military and the War in Iraq.” 
Women’s Studies International Forum 30 (2004): 16-25. 
Jehl, Douglas, Steven Lee Myers, and Eric Schmitt. “Abuse of Captives More 
Widespread, Says Army Survey.”  The New York Times 26 May 2004, late ed.: 
A1. 
Jehl, Douglas, and Eric Schmitt. “Afghan Policies on Questioning Landed in Iraq.”  The 
New York Times 21 May 2004, late ed.: A1. 
 256
---. “In Abuse, a Portrayal of Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed G.I.’s.” The New York Times 9 
May 2004, late ed. 
---. “Prison Interrogations in Iraq Seen as Yielding Little Data on Rebels.” The New York 
Times 27 May 2004, late ed.: A1. 
Jenkins, Henry, Tara McPherson, and Jane Shattuc. “Defining Popular Culture.” Hop on 
Pop: The Politics and Pleasures of Popular Culture. Ed. Henry Jenkins, Tara 
McPherson, and Jane Shattuc. Durham, SC: Duke UP, 2002. 26-42. 
“John Kerry Shares Vies on Hot Issues.” Narr. Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes. Hannity 
& Colmes. Fox. 13 May 2004. Transcript. 
Johnson, Glen. “Kerry Vows Independent Panel on Abuse.” The Boston Globe. 16 June 
2004: A4. 
Kapitan, Tomis, and Erich Schulte. “The Rhetoric of ‘Terrorism’ and its Consequences.” 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 30 (2002): 172-196. 
Kennedy, Rory, dir. Ghosts of Abu Ghraib. HBO. 2007. 
“Kerry.” City News Service 5 May 2004. 
Koziak, Barbara. Retrieving Political Emotion. University Park, PA: Penn State UP, 
2000.  
Krugman, Paul. “Just Trust Us.”  The New York Times 11 May 2004, final ed.: A23. 
Kumar, Deepa. “Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management 
During the 2003 Iraq War.” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3 
(2006): 48-69. 
Lacey, Marc. “Aftereffects: Human Rights; Iraqi Detainees Claim Abuse by British and 
U.S. Troops.” New York Times 17 May 2004, late ed.: A11. 
 “Lawmakers Seek Accountability from US Military Chain of Command Over Abuse of 
Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Dan Rather. CBS Evening News. CBS. 5 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
Leibovich, Mark. “The Scandal Scandal? Sen. James Inhofe’s Opposing View.” The 
Washington Post 13 May 2004, final ed.: C1. 
Lenin, Vladimir I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. 1939. New York: 
International Publishers, 1969. 
 257
Lewis, Anthony. Introduction. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen 
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. xiii-xvi. 
Lieberman, Paul, and Dan Morain. “Unveiling the Face of the Prison Scandal.” The Los 
Angeles Times 19 June 2004: A1. 
Lucaites, John Louis and Robert Hariman. “Visual Rhetoric, Photojournalism, and 
Democratic Public Culture.” Rhetoric Review (2001): 37-42. 
MacFarquhar. “The Struggle for Iraq: World Reaction.” The New York Times 5 May 
2004, late ed.: A18. 
MacKinnon, Catherine A. Only Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993. 
Malinowski, Tom. “The Logic of Torture.” The Washington Post 27 June 2004, final ed.: 
B7. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots 
of Terror. New York: Doubleday, 2004.  
Martin, Brian. “Nonviolence Versus Terrorism.” Social Alternatives 21 (2002): 6-9. 
Marx, Anthony. “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions.” Political Science Quarterly 117 
(2002): 103-126. 
Mayer, Jane “Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind ’24.’” The New Yorker 
Online 19 Feb 2007. 1. March 2008 
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer>. 
Mazzetti, Mark. “Prison Abuse Reports May Insulate Bush from Blame.” The Los 
Angeles Times 26 August 2004: A7. 
McDonnell, Patrick J., Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, and Nick Anderson. “Report on Iraq 
Found ‘Systemic and Illegal Abuse.” The Los Angeles Times 3 May 2004: A1. 
McGee, Michael Calvin. “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology.” 
1980. Readings in Rhetorical Criticism. 3rd ed. Ed. Carl R. Burgchardt. State 
College: Strata Publishing, Inc., 2005. 452-466. 
---. “In Search of ‘The People’: A Rhetorical Alternative.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 61 (1975): 235-249. 
McGreary, Johanna. “The Scandal’s Growing Stain.” Time 18 May 2007. 
“Media Coverage of war in Iraq.” Narr. Charles Osgood. Sunday Morning. CBS. 23 May 
2004. Transcript. 
 258
Milbank, Dana. “U.S. Tries to Clam Furor Caused by Photos.” The Washington Post 1 
May 2004, final ed.: A1. 
“Military Reprimands Six Soldiers in Connection With Alleged Abuse of Iraqi 
Prisoners.” Narr. Daryn Kagan. CNN Live Today. CNN. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
Miller, T. Christian. “Contractors Fall Through Legal Cracks.” The Los Angeles Times 4 
May 2004: A8. 
Miller, T. Christian, and Greg Miller. “Iraqi Prison Workers Questioned.” The Los 
Angeles Times 1 May 2004: A7. 
Milloy, Courtland. “Disturbing Turn for Shock and Awe.” The Washington Post 3 May 
2004, final ed.: B1. 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas. “Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodies Spectacle, and Abu 
Ghraib.” Radical History Review 95 (2006): 21-44. 
“More Photos and Criminal Investigations involving Prisoner Abuse Scandal.” Narr. Jim 
Miklaszewski. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 21 May 2004. Transcript. 
Myers, Steven L. “Veto of Bill on C.I.A. Tactics Affirms Bush’s Legacy.” The New York 
Times on the Web 9 March 2008. < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/washington/09policy.html?_r=1&ex=12057
26400&en=b362df4055cd76c9&ei=5070&emc=eta1&oref=slogin>. 
Nairn, Tom. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. 1977. Nationalism 
Ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
National Counterterrorism Center. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, Statistical 
Annex.” 2006. 15 March 2007 < 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65489.pdf>.  
“New Images: More Grisly Photographs, Videotape of Prison Abuses.” Narr. Peter 
Jennings. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 21 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
Newport, Frank. “Majority of War Opponents Question its Underlying Rationale.” 
Gallup News Service. 25 January 2007  
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/26140/Majority-War-Opponents-Question-Its-
Underlying-Rationale.aspx>. 
“The Nightmare at Abu Ghraib.” The New York Times 3 May 2004, late ed.: A22. 
Novak, Viveca, and Douglas Waller. “New Abuse Charges.” 28 June 2004. 
 259
Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 
1960’s to the 1990’s. London: Routledge, 1994. 
“Outrage at a Prison American Soldiers’ Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Martha 
Raddatz. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 30 April 2004. 
Parry, John T. “Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad.” Ed. 
Sanford Levinson. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2004. 
Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973. 
 “Personal Story: Kennedy Speaks Out Against Military Torture.” Narr. Bill O’Reilly. 
The O’Reilly Factor. Fox. 16 June 2004. Transcript. 
Phifer, Jerald. “Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Stategies.” Memo to General 
James T. Hill. 11 October 2002. Memo 19 of The Torture Papers: The Road to 
Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2005. 227-228. 
Philbin, Patrick, and John C. Yoo. “Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Memo to William J. Haynes, II. 28 December 2001. 
Memo 3 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg 
and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 29-37. 
Photographs of Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners by US Soldiers had Inflamed Many in the 
Muslim World.” Narr. Dan Rather. CBS Evening News. CBS. 3 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
“The Photographs: Violent and Sexual Scenes Emerge in Abuse Scandal.” Narr. Linda 
Douglass. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 12 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
“Political Grapevine: Poll Shows a Majority of Americans Think Prisoner Abuse is 
Unacceptable.” Narr. Jim Angle. Special Report with Brit Hume. Fox. 7 May 
2004. Transcript. 
“Potential Lasting Impressions.” Narr. Bob Faw. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 10 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
Powell, Collin L. “Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of 
the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan.” Memo to Counsel to the 
President. 26 January 2002. Memo 8 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2005. 122-125. 
 260
“President Bush Calms Outrage over Abuse.” Narr. John Gibson, James Rosen, Kelly 
Wright. The Big Story with John Gibson. Fox. 5 May 2004. Transcript. 
“The President Condemns the Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners by American Soldiers.” Narr. 
Wendell Goler. Fox Special Report with Brit Hume. Fox. 30 April 2004. 
Transcript. 
President’s Radio Address. George W. Bush. 8 March 2008.  
The President’s Weekly Radio Address. George W. Bush. 8 May 2004. 
Priest, Dana, and R. Jeffrey Smith. “Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture.” The 
Washington Post 8 June 2004. final ed.: A1. 
Priest, Dana, and Joe Stephens. “Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations.” The 
Washington Post 9 May 2004, final ed.: A1. 
“Prison Abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison by U.S.” Narr. Jim Miklaszewski. Today. 3 May 
2004. Transcript. 
“Prison Abuse New Revelations.” Narr. Nancy Weiner. World News Tonight Sunday. 
ABC. 23 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Prison Abuse Revelations and Photographs of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Clearly Weigh on 
the Minds of Combat Troops in Iraq.” Narr. David Hawkins. CBS Evening News. 
CBS. 13 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Prisoner Abuse Scandal: President Sees New Photos.” Narr. Charles Gibson. Good 
Morning America. ABC. 11 May 2004. Transcript. 
 “Private 1st Class Lynndie England in Court.” Narr. Heidi Collins. Paula Zahn Now. 
CNN. 3 August 2004. Transcript. 
“Pvt. England in Court: Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal.” Narr. Steve Osunsami. World News 
Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 3 August 2004. Transcript. 
Rajiva, Lila. “Iraqi Women and Torture, Part One: Rapes and Rumors of Rape.” 
Dissident Voice 27 July 2004. 2 November 2007 
<http://www.dissidentvoice.org/July2004/Rajiva0727.htm>. 
---. The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2005. 
“‘Rap Sheet’: Morality of Torture.” Narr. Fredricka Witfield. CNN Sunday Night. CNN 
13 June 2004. Transcript. 
 261
“Reaction in Iraq to Pictures of U.S. Soldiers Mistreating Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Renay 
San Miguel. CNN Saturday Morning News. CNN. 1 May 2004. 
Reese, Stephen D., Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August E. Grant, ed. Framing Public Life: 
Perspectives on Media and Our Understandings of the Social World. Mahwah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001. 
Rejali, Darius M. Torture and Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2007. 
Remnick, David. “Hearts and Minds.” The New Yorker 17 May 2004: 27. 
“A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.” Narr. Edward R. Murrow. See It Now. CBS. 
9 March 1954. Transcript.  
“Retired Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy Discusses the Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners for 
Intelligence Purposes.” Narr. Lester Holt and Campbell Brown. Sunday Today. 9 
May 2004. Transcript. 
Rice, Condoleezza. Interview with Al Arabiya. Eisenhower Executive Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. 3 May 2004.  
Rich, Frank. “The War’s Lost Weekend.” The New York Times 9 May 2004, late ed.: Arts 
and Leisure 1. 
Ripley, Amanda. “The Rules of Interrogation.” Time 17 May 2004. 
Risen, James. “G.I.’s are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives.” The New York Times 29 
April 2004, late ed.: A15. 
“Role of Military Intelligence, What it Might have Played.” Narr. Daryn Kagan. CNN 
Live Today. CNN. 11 May 2004. Transcript. 
“The Roots of Abu Ghraib.” The New York Times 9 June 2004, late ed.: A22. 
Roston, Eric, and J.F.O. McAllister. “Humiliation in an Iraqi Jail.” Time 10 May 2004. 
Roth, Bennett. “Iraq Prison Scandal: President Calls Abuse ‘Abhorrent.’” The Houston 
Chronicle. 6 May 2004. 
Roth, Kenneth. “Time to Stop ‘Stress and Duress.’” The Washington Post 13 May 2004, 
final ed.: A29. 
“Rule of Lawlessness.” The Washington Post, final ed.: B6. 
 262
Rumsfeld, Donald. “Counter-Resistance.” Memo to General James T. Hill. 6 April 2003. 
Memo 27 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg 
and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005.  
“Rumsfeld Feels the Heat as More Photos Surface.” St. Petersburg Times 7 May 2004. 
“Rumsfeld Promises Punishment for Abusive MPs.” Narr. Lou Dobbs. Lou Dobbs 
Tonight. CNN. 4 May 2004. Transcript.  
Rutten, Tim. “‘Abuse’ May Not Be Accurate.” Los Angeles Times 15 May 2004: E1. 
---. “Regarding Media.” The Los Angeles Times 15 May 2004: E1. 
Saad, Lydia. “With Transfer of Sovereignty Looming, Attitudes About Iraq Remain 
Negative.” Gallup News Service. 14 June 2004 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/11977/Transfer-Sovereignty-Looming-Attitudes-
About-Irag-Remain-Negative.aspx>. 
“Saddam Hussein’s Torture Victims Being Rehabilitated in US and Helping Bolster US 
Image Abroad.” Narr. Tom Brokaw. NBC Nightly News. NBC. 21 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
Sanger, David. “U.S. Must Find a Way to Move Past Images.”  The New York Times 10 
May 2004, late ed.: A9. 
“Saving the Mission.” Narr. Ted Koppel. Nightline. ABC. 4 May 2004. Transcript. 
Scelfo, Julie. “‘She was Following Orders.’” Newsweek 11 May 2004. 
Scelfo, Julie, and Rod Nordland. “Beneath the Hoods.” Newsweek 19 July 2004: 40. 
Scheer, Robert. “When We’re the Evildoers in Iraq.” The Los Angeles Times 4 May 2004, 
B:13. 
Schmitt, Eric. “Army Report Says Flaws in Detention Did Not Cause the Abuses at Abu 
Ghraib.” The New York Times 23 July 2004, final ed.: A9. 
Schrader, Esther. “Poor Leadership Blamed for Abuse at U.S. Prison in Iraq.”  The Los 
Angeles Times 4 May 2004: A1. 
Schrader, Esther and Patrick J. McDonnell. “Bush Denounces Troops’ Treatment of 
Prisoners.” The Los Angeles Times 1 May 2004, A:1. 
 263
“Secretary Rumsfeld Receives a Standing Ovation During a Town Hall Meeting at the 
Pentagon.” Narr. Brian Wilson and Bret Baier. Special Report with Brit Hume. 
Fox. 11 May 2004. Transcript.  
“Senate Judiciary Committee Questions Attorney General.” Narr. Dan Rather and David 
Martin. CBS Evening News. CBS. 8 June 2004. Transcript. 
“Senator John McCain of the Armed Services Committee Discusses the U.S. Military’s 
Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Rene Syler. The Early Show. CBS. 6 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
“Sequence of Events: Abu Ghraib Prison.” Narr. Peter Jennings. World News Tonight 
with Peter Jennings. ABC. 10 May 2004. Transcript. 
Serrano, Richard A. “Abused Iraqi Detainees Said to Hold No Intelligence Value.”  The 
Los Angeles Times 4 August 2004: A4. 
Serrano, Richard A., and Patrick J. McDonnell. “Witness Faults Actions of Prison 
Interrogators.”  The Los Angeles Times 13 May 2004: A1. 
 Shah, Hemant, and Michael C. Thorton. Newspaper Coverage of Interethnic Conflict: 
Competing Visions of America. London: Sage, 2004. 
“Shame on Display.” Narr. Paula Zahn. Paula Zahn Now. CNN. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
Shanker, Thom. and Jacques Steinberg. “Bush Voices ‘Disgust’ at Abuse of Iraqi 
Prisoners.” The New York Times 1 May 2004, late ed., A: 1. 
Shaw, David. “Media Matters.” The Los Angeles Times 30 May 2004: E16. 
Shenon, Philip. “Officer Suggests Iraqi Jail Abuse was Encouraged.” The New York 
Times 2 May 2004, late ed.: 1. 
“Six Soldiers Charged, Two Relieved of Command in Abu Ghraib Prisoners Abuse 
Incident.” Narr. Brit Hume, Bret Baier, and David Lee Miller. Special Report with 
Brit Hume. Fox 3 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Six U.S. Soldiers Face Criminal Charges for Abusing Iraqi Prisoners.” Narr. Aaron 
Brown. Newsnight with Aaron Brown. CNN. 3 May 2004. Transcript. 





Slackman, Michael. “What’s Wrong with Torturing a Qaeda Higher-Up?” The New York 
Times 16 May 2004, late ed. 
Smith, Jeffrey. “Soldiers Vented Frustration, Doctor Says.” The Washington Post 24 May 
2004, final ed.: A18. 
“Smoketown 6 Craves Publicity, Little More.” Lancaster New Era. 16 December 2004: 
A6. 
“‘Smoketown Six’ Stripped to Thongs to Re-Create Human Pyramid Image From Abu 
Ghraib Prison Scandal.” 2004 ACLU Defends Six Men Arrested During Protest at 
President Bush Rally 27 March 2007 
<http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/protest/11525prs20041014.html>. 
Smyth, Frank. “Abu Ghraib: Within the Horror.” The Los Angeles Times 23 May 2004: 
M6. 
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador, 2003. 
“Special Report Introduction.” Narr. Peter Jennings. Special Report. ABC. 7 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
Spickard, Paul. “Race and Nation, Identity and Power: Thinking Comparatively about 
Ethnic Systems.” Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World. Ed. 
Paul Spickard. New York: Routledge, 2005. 1-29. 
Spinner, Jackie. “MP Gets 8 Years for Iraq Abuse.” The Washington Post 22 October 
2004, final ed.: A20. 
Sollors, Werner. Ed. The Invention of Ethnicity. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. 
Stahl, Roger. “A Clockwork War: Rhetorics of Time in a Time of Terror.” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech  94(2008): 73-99. 
Taguba, Antonio. “The Taguba Report.” Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military 
Police Brigade. March 2004. Report 2 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2005. 405-556. 
“Talking Points: Seymour Hersh.” Narr. Bill O’Reilly. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox. 3 May 
2004. Transcript. 
“Talking Points: J.D. Hayworth.” Narr. Bill O’Reilly. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox. 5 May 
2004. Transcript. 
 265
Tester, Keith. “Reflections on the Abu Ghraib Photographs.” Journal of Human Rights 
(2005): 137-143. 
Tetreault, Mary Ann. “The Sexual Politics of Abu Ghraib: Hegemony, Spectacle, and the 
Global War on Terror.” NWSA Journal 18 (2006): 33-50. 
Thomas, Evan, et. al. “No Good Defense.” Newsweek 17 May 2004. 
Thomas, Evan, Julie Scelfo, Trent Gregax, and Pat Wingert. “Explaining Lynndie 
England.” Newsweek 15 May 2004. 
Thompson, John B. Ideology and Modern Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990. 
Thompson, Mark. “The Verdict on Rumsfeld.” Time 6 September 2004. 
Tilly, Charles. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 
2003. 
“Top Story.” Narr. Tony Snow. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox. 10 May 2004. Transcript. 
“Torture.” Narr. Ted Koppel. Nightline. ABC. 12 May 2004. Transcript. 
“The Torture Photos.”  The New York Times 5 May 2004, final ed.: A26. 
“Twisting American Values.” The Los Angeles Times 9 June 2004: B12. 
“Unresolved Problems.” Narr. Kenneth Roth. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox. 25 May 2004. 
Transcript. 
“US Army Responds to Documented Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners by American 
Soldiers.” Narr. Dan Rather. CBS Evening News. CBS. 29 April 2004. Transcript. 
“U.S. Marines Turn to Former Saddam General.” Narr. Lou Dobbs. Lou Dobbs Tonight. 
CNN. 30 April 2004. Transcript. 
“U.S. Public Rejects Nearly All Forms of Torture or Coercion Even in Face of Possible 
Terrorist Attack.” Worldpublicopinion.org 22 June 2004 < 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btjusticehuman_rightsra/111.php
?nid=&id=&pnt=111&lb=bthr>. 
Van Natta, Don. “Interrogation Methods in Iraq Aren’t All Found in Manual.” The New 
York Times 7 May 2004, late ed.” A13. 
Vedantam, Shanker. “The Psychology of Torture.” The Washington Post 11 May 2004, 
final ed.: A14 
 266
“Voice on Audiotape Vows to Assassinate Iraqi Leader.” Narr. Carlo Costello. CNN 
Daybreak. CNN. 23 June 2004. Transcript. 
 “Was Vietnam Worse than what Americans are Doing in Iraq?” Narr. Kara Phillips and 
Miles O’Brien. Live. CNN. 12 May 2004. Transcipts. 
“The Washington Post Releases New Video and Photographs of Abuse at Abu Ghraib 
Prison in Iraq.” Narr. Jim Miklaszewski. Today. 21 May 2004. Transcript. 
Weber, Max. “The Nation.” 1948. Nationalism Ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
---. “Politics as a Vocation.” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Eds. H.H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills, Oxford: Oxford UP. 1958. 15 March 2007 
<http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf>. 
“Were MPs at Abu Ghraib ‘Following Orders’?” Narr. Greta Van Susteren. Fox on the 
Record with Greta Van Susteren. Fox. 12 May 2004. Transcript. 
“White House Answering Claims that the President Laid the Groundwork for Prisoner 
Abuse at Abu Ghraib by Condoning Torture at Guantanamo Bay.” Narr. Ann 
Curry. Today. NBC. 23 June 2004. Transcript. 
White, Josh. “Decision Awaited on Trial for Pfc. England.”  The Washington Post 1 
September 2004, final ed.: A15. 
White, Josh, Christian Davenport, and Scott Higham. “Videos Amplify Picture of 
Violence.” The Washington Post 21 May 2004, final ed.: A1. 
White, Josh, and Thomas E. Ricks. “Iraqi Teen Abused at Abu Ghraib.” The Washington 
Post 24 August 2004, final ed.: A1. 
“Who Gave the Orders? Chain of Command in Abu Ghraib Scandal.” Narr. Peter 
Jennings and Martha Raddatz. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. ABC. 12 
May 2004. Transcript. 
Wilgoren, Jodi. “Kerry Ties Prisoner Abuse to Bush’s Handling of War.” The New York 
Times 15 May 2004, late ed.: 13. 
Wilson, Scott. “Ex-Detainee Tells of Anguishing Treatment at Iraq Prison.” The 
Washington Post 6 May 2004, final ed.: A18. 
Wolfendale, Jessica. “Training Torturers: A Critique of the “Ticking Bomb” Argument.” 
Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006): 269-287. 
Wolffe, Richard. “Trail Mix: Losing Moral High Ground.” Newsweek 5 May 2004. 
 267
Yoo, John C. “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations 
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them.” Memo to Tim Flanigan. 25 
September 2001. Memo 1 of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. 
Karen Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 3-24.  
Yoo John C., and Robert J. Delabunty “Applications of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees.” Memo to William J. Haynes, II. 9 January 2002. Memo 4 
of The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen Greenberg and 
Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. 38-79. 
Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender & Nation. London, UK: Sage, 1997. 
Zernike, Kate. “Prison Guard Calls Abuse Routine and Sometimes Amusing.” The New 
York Times 16 May 2004, final ed.: 1: 16. 
Zernike, Kate. “The Woman With the Leash Appears in Court on Abu Ghraib Abuse 
Charges.”  The New York Times 4 August 2004, final ed.: A8. 
 
Vita 
Amanda Jean Davis was born in Englewood, Colorado on August 3, 1980, the 
daughter of Karen Alyse Davis and Thomas Joseph Davis. After completing her work at 
Grand Junction High School, Grand Junction, Colorado, in 1998, she completed two 
years of study at Mesa State College. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from 
Vanderbilt University in 2002. In November of 2003, she received a Master of Arts 
Degree from Goldsmiths College, The University of London. In August of 2004, she 




Permanent address: 615 N. 18th Street, Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
